Pepys's life work was the administration of the navy. Of all the great figures who have laboured in that field he has the clearest and strongest claim to have professionalised the service. The navy of Drake and Hawkins, even of Charles I and Cromwell, was not a recognisable, permanent, continuous force. Its ships might, or might not, have been built for the single purpose of war; they might, or might not, belong to the Crown or, in the terminology of the Commonwealth, to the State. Neither the officers nor the seamen were employed on a regular and permanent basis. They wore no uniform. No central record was kept of their service. Appointment and promotion were thus necessarily somewhat arbitrary. Rates of pay had early been standardised but were, in the case of the seamen, only capriciously honoured. Victualling and medical care ranged from the inadequate to the miserable. Small wonder that the problem of manning could only be resolved by the press gang, that barbarously inequitable form of conscription.
Much of this was still true when Pepys in Evelyn's words 'layed pg 283down his Office & would serve no more'.1 But even where there was no large or obvious change, Pepys had generally taken an inconspicuous but decisive step in the direction of the rational, the systematic, the orderly and the efficient. As Michael Lewis has well written: 'Apparently he did nothing really drastic: only a number of seemingly small things. And yet, in each case, that small thing led on inexorably to another small thing: and that to another: and so on until, somehow – long after he was dead and gone – the whole conception of the Naval Officer as he had found it had given place to an entirely different one.'2 Professor Lewis is here writing about his reformation of the officer structure but the same principle applies mutatis mutandis to every other department of the service: to the construction and fitting out of ships, to the dockyards that serviced and repaired them, to their armament, to their stores both military and marine; to the standards of diet and health, to the promotion of discipline and professional knowledge; above all to the discountenancing of favouritism and corruption and to the establishment of financial and administrative control through proper methods of accountancy and the regular keeping of records.
What was the navy on which Pepys had such a transforming effect? Why and how did he become the agent of such far-reaching changes? What does the diary tell us about these matters? The term 'navy' in Pepys's time did not always bear the sense we put on it today. 'Chance without merit brought me in' wrote Pepys (vi.285), by which he meant that he owed his start in the Navy Office to his kinship with Sandwich, not to any professional qualification. The navy might mean, as here, the permanent administrative body charged with the maintenance or provision of ships and men and officers to fight the country's battles at sea. Or it might mean, as it originally did, the totality of English ships and English seafarers without the distinction, implicit in our eyes, between military and civilian. It could not mean a permanently embodied, salaried, uniformed and ultimately pensionable force such as we know because it did not then exist. Pepys was to help to create it. What he meant when he used the word navy was something larger and less strictly defined. Essentially he meant the maritime interests and resources of the country viewed in relation to their defence. In its immediate application this narrowed itself down to the Navy Board, the permanent governmental body whose job it was to look after these matters.
The confusion of what we should now call the merchant marine with the fighting service was not muddle-headed: it reflected the facts. As Professor Ralph Davis has pointed out in his The rise of the English shipping industry (1962), a number of the most important and lucrative trades such as the Levant or the E. India Companies engaged in could only be carried on by vessels that could give a good account of them-pg 284selves when the guns were run out.3 By an act of 1662 all Mediterranean-going ships over 200 tons were to carry at least 16 guns and to have a crew of at least 32 men. East Indiamen, mostly of 500 tons or upwards, were even more formidably armed and manned. There was nothing absurd in such ships appearing in the hugely expanded fleets of Cromwell and Charles II though Pepys's patron, Sandwich, one of the pioneers of the tactics of fighting in line, urged that they should be left out of the line of battle.4 Long before Pepys had severed his connection with the navy this had been accomplished. The ships had, so to speak, been professionalised. Their officers, thanks almost entirely to his efforts, were in a fair way to being so.
Nonetheless, to understand Pepys's life work in its proper context the mixed character of English maritime endeavour must be kept in mind. From the beginning trade and war were complementary, not, as we think of them, antithetical. Even in the next century Pitt's monument in Guildhall commemorated the fact that under his administration commerce had been 'united and made to flourish by war'.5 It was to this that England owed her supplanting of the Dutch as the leading European seapower. Pepys's lifetime exactly coincided with this process. When he was born in 1633 the Dutch were our superiors in every branch of maritime activity: fishing, the European carrying trade, the Mediterranean trade, the oceanic trades to Africa, the Far East, the Americas and the E. Indies. When he died in 1703 the position had been almost entirely reversed. As Professor Charles Wilson has pointed out Dutch prosperity depended to a degree unique in the 17th century on peace.6 Her neighbours, France and England, on the other hand, had, or thought they had, much to gain by war. In the Dutch Wars of Pepys's youth and manhood the United Provinces might hold their own, or rather more than hold their own, in the fighting and yet be bound to lose. England was astride their trade routes; England afforded the only safe riding for ships bound up Channel in which to shelter from the prevailing south-westerly gales; England did not have an expensive and vulnerable land frontier to garrison and reinforce against the first military power of Europe.
This forcible take-over of the Dutch interest was the foundation on which the English shipping industry rose to prominence, if not to primacy, in the nation's economy. And this rise was both cause and effect of the rise of English seapower. Foreign seaborne trade was what seapower was about. Readers of the diary and of Pepys's correspondence are left in no doubt that merchants and shipowners were his chief sources of naval intelligence and his preferred advisers on naval policy. The activities of these men provided the raison d'être of the Royal Navy: the seamen they employed were its source of manpower. Even their ships still continued to supply a considerable part of the force needed in pg 285time of war. Above all the splendid officer corps that the Restoration navy inherited from the Commonwealth came very largely from the same stable. The professional sea officer like the professional seaman learned his trade and earned his livelihood in merchant ships when the Royal Navy had no employment to offer him. In peacetime this was the general condition. Pepys wished to build up and maintain a cadre of officers in continuous service as the French navy had already begun to do.
The transformation of the officer structure lay at the heart of Pepys's aims and achievements. The navy he was introduced to in the early months of the diary was the force that Warwick had shaped into the instrument of victory in the Civil War and that Blake had led to victory against the Dutch and the Spaniards. Apart from a sprinkling of Cromwellian army officers such as Monck and Pepys's own cousin and patron, Sandwich, the officers were what he called 'bred seamen' or as they were disparagingly nicknamed after the Restoration 'tarpaulins'. Charles II as King and his brother the Duke of York as Lord High Admiral lost no time in bringing in a number of new officers of a very different type, courtiers, favourites, noblemen, collectively known as 'gentlemen'. Thus from the moment that he became Clerk of the Acts Pepys was faced with a serious and sharp division between the rival groups. The 'gentlemen' were almost by definition ardent royalists: the 'tarpaulins' were, like Monck and Sandwich themselves, men who had served the usurping governments of the Commonwealth. Much more to the point the tarpaulins were in general thorough masters of their business both as practical seamen and as fighting commanders. They shared a tradition of winning battles and enjoyed the confidence in themselves and in each other that Nelson so eagerly fostered in his captains. The gentlemen usually had courage enough; some of them had experience of military command; a few such as Prince Rupert, Sir Robert Holmes and Sir Thomas Allin had put in a considerable amount of sea time. But their real strength lay in the fact of their political or court or family connections.
The diary is full of references to this alarming fissure. Pepys and his friend and mentor Sir William Coventry were on the side of the tarpaulins. They knew their job. They obeyed orders themselves and imposed discipline on their subordinates. But as Pepys found in his own professional life it was not enough to be right or to be on top of one's job. It was often more important to have the ear of the monarch or the backing of some powerful group. This the gentlemen were much better placed to obtain than the tarpaulins. Hence from quite early on, even in the diary years, Pepys's irritation at the indiscipline and incompetence of the gentlemen is balanced by an unwilling recognition that they could do things for the service that no one else could. What was wanted pg 286was an officer corps that combined the prestige and power of the gentlemen with the professional skills of the tarpaulins. The decisive step towards this was taken in 1677 with the introduction of an examination for the rank of lieutenant, for which candidates had to produce certificates of three years sea service in the rank of midshipman.7 No single measure did more to establish the Royal Navy as a profession.
The appointment of commissioned officers normally belonged to the King or to the Lord High Admiral. The Navy Board of which Pepys was a member up to 1673 was charged with looking after ships, dockyards, stores and pay, and, through the Victualler and the Ordnance Board, with food and guns and ammunition. The only ships' officers who traditionally came within its competence were the so-called standing officers who belonged to a particular ship and who, unlike the commissioned officers, were continuously employed: the carpenter, the gunner, the cook, the master and the boatswain. None of these officers would have been described as sea officers, a term that bears an essentially military connotation. The master was responsible to the captain for the navigation and handling of the ship; the boatswain was similarly responsible for the boats, anchors, rigging and cables. Other officers who might be carried on the larger ships in time of war were the surgeon and his mates, few of whom were as capable and high-minded as Pepys's friend James Pearse. The muster-masters were an administrative invention of Pepys's to check the collusive frauds of the captain and the purser.8 (Pepys's erratic brother-in-law, Balty, appears to have been surprisingly successful in this capacity.) The purser was in charge of the men's food and drink (supplied by the victualler) and sold them clothing and other necessities. The pursership of a 1st-rate was a lucrative and much sought after position. Sometimes purely administrative officials accompanied their masters to sea as Pepys and Creed did in 1660 as Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief and Deputy Treasurer of the fleet respectively, or as Sir William Coventry did in 1665 as Secretary to the Lord High Admiral. Chaplains though appointed by warrant from the Navy Office like the master and the rest were not standing officers and disappeared into civilian life when their ship paid off.
It is perfectly clear that from the beginning the Navy Board of the Restoration collectively and Pepys individually had considerable say in the appointment and promotion of commissioned officers. Partly this was because the Board was of an exceptionally high calibre. In Sir George Carteret, Sir William Penn and Sir William Batten it had three members, all experts, in whom both the King and the Duke of York had long trusted, so far as the cynicism of the one and the narrowness of the other permitted them to trust anyone. The presence of Sir William Coventry, secretary to the Lord High Admiral, at meetings pg 287of the Navy Board as an additional Commissioner further obscured the old boundaries. The affairs of the navy and of the admiralty were more and more seen as a totality.
In all this Pepys and his royal masters were following more closely than they would have cared to admit the precedents set by the naval administration of the Interregnum. Perhaps the chief reason for this is that the Cromwellian period was unique in our history in that a relatively vast army and a huge fleet had been kept in permanent commission. The economic burden of such an establishment had previously been unthinkable. But revolutionary times are revolutionary just because the unthinkable is thought and even put into effect. In the case of the navy it could be argued that the immense expenditure had yielded proportionable gains. The prizes taken in the First Dutch War (1652–4) virtually reconstituted the English merchant fleet and may even have doubled its size.9 In the war against Spain (1655–60) the results had not been so happy because the Spaniards were better placed to prey on our seaborne commerce than we were on theirs. But this provided a complementary argument for a strong navy. Defence if only negatively could be as profitable as attack. Shipping and seaborne trade dominated the economic thinking of the age of Pepys. As Professor Ralph Davis has written: 'The latter part of the seventeenth century was . . . the period in which economic problems relating to the shipping industry bulked largest in men's eyes and were most rapidly increasing in importance. The extensive literature on its problems, dying away from about 1680 and ceasing abruptly soon after 1700, was not merely a response to Dutch competition and the problems it posed; it also reflected the growing significance of the shipping industry to the whole English economy.'10 The policy enunciated in the Navigation Act of 1651 and restated in the more comprehensive measure of 1660 necessarily implied a stronger navy and a larger peacetime establishment than Elizabeth or the first two Stuarts had maintained. The central principle of these acts was that goods imported into England should be carried either in English ships or in those of the country from which the product came. This was the logical and systematic extension of a protectionism first discernible in the 14th century and most conspicuously exemplified in the Tudor acts confining the great wine trade with Bordeaux to English ships. The growth of colonies, notably in North America, widened the scope and importance of this monopoly. A larger navy in its turn could only be manned if there were more seamen in an expanded merchant marine.
The Restoration navy was fortunate in inheriting a body of officers second to none. It also inherited, in spite of Pepys's frequent assertions to the contrary, a very formidable fleet, most of it of recent construc-pg 288tion. The fleet that sailed over to bring Charles II back in May 1660 consisted of 32 ships out of a total of 156.11 They included three 1st-rates, 11 2nd-rates and 16 3rd-rates. All of these were a match in size, firepower and stoutness for anything the Dutch could bring against them. Indeed the 1st-rates and the larger 2nd-rates were bigger and stronger than any Dutch man-of-war. With the adoption of an aggressive foreign policy, new building became essential. In 1663 one 1st-rate was added, in 1664 two 2nd-rates. In 1666 to replace the losses of the war the heroic total of a dozen new warships was reached, including one 2nd- and four 3rd-rates. A 1st-rate carried 90 to 100 guns, a 2nd-rate 80 to 90, a 3rd-rate 60 to 70. These gradations were not entirely logical or consistent. Some 3rd-rates were more powerful than some 2nds and guns were not standardised until Anson's time at the Admiralty in the 1750s. Pepys's efforts had taken matters a long way in this direction. But the contribution to naval strength of which he was most justly proud was the building programme of the 30 new ships initiated by the act of 1677, the same year that saw the introduction of the lieutenants' examination. The fleet that he handed over to his successors in Feb. 1689 was even stronger and better found than the powerful force inherited from the Commonwealth in May 1660: 59 ships of the first three rates as against 30: total tonnage and total of guns both increased by over 50%.12
Size and gunpower gave the fighting ships of the Royal Navy their decisive superiority over the Dutch, whose warships had to be built with a shallower draft to give them the necessary freedom of movement in their own coastal waters. Because their keels were not so deep they could not carry the heavy cannon of their English opponents. This again dictated the battle tactics of the two navies. The Dutch, like the Spaniards before them, sought to deny the English advantage in gunnery by boarding and hand-to-hand fighting. The English could only exploit their weight of metal by bringing their broadsides to bear, which, if one ship were not to mask another, must mean fighting in line ahead on a course parallel to the enemy. To form these huge fleets of sailing ships into one long continuous line was a heroic undertaking. The fleet that sailed out to meet the Dutch in June 1665 consisted of 84 men-of-war besides merchantmen and fireships.13 This would, as Dr R. C. Anderson points out, have stretched over several miles of sea. To maintain any degree of control some devolution of command was essential. The fleet was therefore divided into three squadrons, the Red or Centre, the White or Van and the Blue or Rear. Each squadron was itself similarly divided into Centre, Van and Rear commanded by an Admiral, a Vice-Admiral and a Rear-Admiral respectively. The vessels in which these officers sailed were distinguished by flags; hence the still familiar term 'flagship' and the now obsolete pg 289title habitually used by Pepys, 'flagmen'. The famous series of Lely portraits known as the Flagmen of Lowestoft now in the National Maritime Museum brings us face to face with some of the most eminent commanders, both tarpaulins and gentlemen, of the navy Pepys knew.
The extent of that service has repeatedly been emphasised. Even in peacetime the building and maintenance of ships, the management of dockyards, the purchase of stores, timber, cordage, canvas and a hundred other commodities made the navy by far the biggest spending department of government. In war, with huge numbers of men to feed and (in theory) pay, its financial demands could only have been met by a modern system of taxation and debt-funding far beyond the antiquated machinery of Charles II's Treasury. Hence two aspects of naval administration that no reader of the diary can have helped noticing: first, the reiteration of the theme that all is lost for want of money and second, Pepys's vigilance against fraud and corruption, or perhaps more accurately against corruption which he had not sanctioned as reasonable in itself or as valuable to him personally. In the 17th century and long after, a post in the public service was generally regarded as the property, often a very valuable property, of its occupant. He could sell it, exchange it, transfer it to a relation or protégé. Pepys himself certainly took this view. Implicit, obviously, was the idea that 'places' as they were called should be exploited for profit. Very few carried a high salary. The money mostly came from bribes, tips, presents, rake-offs: how difficult sometimes it is to draw a clear line between these terms. Or it might come from cheating pure and simple, such as claiming wages and allowances for men who did not exist, or, as was particularly common in the dockyards, from barefaced theft. It was against these last two, deeply engrained in traditional practices, that Pepys set his face. 'A purser without professed cheating is a professed loser' Pepys had early observed.14 The counter-measure he devised against this type of swindle was the appointment of muster-masters who would return their muster books direct to the Navy Office. This provided an independent check on the figures supplied by pursers and captains who were often in collusion. To prevent the purser swindling a vigilant and efficient bureaucracy was comparatively simple. What was much harder was to stop him swindling the wretched seamen by accepting from the victualler food and drink too cheap and nasty for human consumption. Pepys was fully alive to the importance of the issue:
Englishmen, and more especially seamen, love their bellies above anything else, and therefore it must always be remembered in the management of the victualling of the Navy that to make any abatement from them in the quantity or agreeableness of the victuals is pg 290to discourage and provoke them in the tenderest point, and will sooner render them disgusted with the King's service than any one other hardship that can be put upon them.15
In spite of this pithy diagnosis, the cure escaped him. He himself occupied the post of Surveyor-General of the Victualling during the second half of the Second Dutch War and subsequently drew up the terms of the contract under which the navy was victualled. These appear to have been little more than pious aspirations. As in every department of naval life the government did not pay up. The Victualler eventually went bankrupt and the seamen were, as they always had been, generally half-starved.
The matter of pay itself was obviously bedevilled by the same fundamental failure. The money was never there. Even the Commonwealth government which had raised the pay of the seaman by 25 % had not managed to honour its commitments. The Restoration navy inherited a huge debt in respect of unpaid seamen's wages and resorted to the time-dishonoured evasions of keeping ships in commission to avoid paying the men off and of paying wages not in cash but by tickets theoretically redeemable at the Navy Office. Such tickets were often bought up at a cruel discount by brokers who were better placed than the poor seaman to thread the maze of public finance. Pepys himself constantly inveighs against both these practices in the diary and elsewhere. From time to time he put forward schemes of reform but improvements in administrative technique were beside the point. For at least a century the government had been getting away with theft and exploitation on an enormous scale and it was not going to mend its ways until it was forced to. The mutinies at the end of the 18th century and the reforming spirit of the Victorian age at last achieved this.
The navy that Pepys knew was thus in a stage of transition complementary to so much else, to science and social life to take but two examples to which its concerns bear some relation. In the field of science the connection with the Royal Society was early and strong. Pepys himself was a Fellow, and the first President, Lord Brouncker, was one of his colleagues at the Navy Board. Scientific principles were applied to the design of ships by Sir Anthony Deane and Sir William Petty, the latter of whom also attempted to supply a statistical basis to the solution of the manning problem. The navy in its turn made useful contributions to geography, hydrography and navigation. In social life the gradual evolution of the professional naval officer and of the professional administrator such as Pepys himself typified the wider changes of the period. The character of the transition in the service itself has been well summed up by Professor Christopher Lloyd:
pg 291The naval profession and the administrative basis of the service during the age of sail was forged in the crucible of the three Dutch Wars, 1652–4, 1665–7, 1672–4. The 'new model' navy formed during the Commonwealth was institutionalized during the reigns of Charles II and William III so successfully that its administrative structure, the build of its ships, the method by which it was officered, manned and supplied, continued without fundamental change until half way through the nineteenth century.16 [See also Dockyards; Dutch Wars; Navy Board]
Introduction. The Navy Board was the body of officials which under the authority of the Lord High Admiral and ultimately of the King had charge of the civilian administration of the navy – i.e. the building and repair of ships and the management of the dockyards. In medieval times the navy, besides being small, had been in effect a transport force used only occasionally for fighting, and most of what later became the Navy Board's functions were then performed by a single official, the Clerk of the Ships, whose office is traceable to John's reign. With the exploitation of overseas trade and the growth of the state's power in the 16th century a great expansion of maritime and naval activity took place. The number of royal ships was increased (from 5 to 70 in Henry VIII's reign); the distinction between warships and armed merchantmen was developed; and dockyards were built or extended. In the process a new administrative body, the Navy Board of 1546 (consisting of five, later four, officials) was created. It consisted normally of a Treasurer, Comptroller, Surveyor and Clerk of the Navy – the last often being given the title of Clerk of the Acts.
During the Civil War and Interregnum the Board was replaced by a series of commissions staffed by up to eight or ten members, mostly experienced seamen and merchants armed with general and flexible powers and deliberately made free of the constrictions attaching to the traditional officers of the Board. Some of these bodies presided over the remarkable increase in the size of the navy under the Commonwealth. After the return of the King the Board was replaced, the former Commissioners continuing to act for a short period while the members of the Board were chosen and empowered to act. The new Board set up on 4 July 1660 consisted of four Principal Officers – the historic officers of the Board: the Treasurer (Sir George Carteret), the Comptroller (Sir Robert Slingsby), the Surveyor (Sir William Batten) and the Clerk of the Acts (Pepys), together with three Commissioners – pg 292similar to those who had governed the navy during most of the Interregnum – Sir William Penn and Lord Berkeley of Stratton as full Commissioners and Peter Pett as a local Commissioner supervising the dockyard at Chatham. There was a staff of clerks who were required to attend on the Board for eight hours a day,1 of whom the senior was a Chief Clerk to the Board. He had an assistant. Each member of the Board had two clerks who were paid by their masters (from an allowance given them for the purpose) and had the status of personal servants, like Pepys's Will Hewer. In addition there were other clerks at the Navy Treasury and the Ticket Office. During the war at least seven clerks were added to the strength of the main office in Seething Lane and more to the other offices.2 Besides the clerks, there was a subordinate staff of messengers (usually two), a porter, a doorkeeper, a labourer and two watchmen.
In its work the Board was guided partly by tradition and precedent, and more explicitly by instructions issued by the Lord High Admiral. In 1660 those of 1640 were still in force. They were not replaced until Jan. 1662 when the Duke of York issued them in a slightly amended and expanded form.3 In theory these controlled the work of the Board and its members. But it was one thing to issue instructions and another to see that they were properly observed. Later enquiries were to reveal that subordinate officials and the Principal Officers alike were negligent in observing them and in some cases ignorant of their contents. Moreover, it can now be seen that the Instructions of 1662 were an inadequate guide to the government of the greatly enlarged navy of the 1660s.
General powers. The Board was to make most of its decisions jointly. It was required to meet twice a week, the hours and days being varied during parliamentary sessions for the benefit of members who were M.P.s or peers. In 1660, when it was getting into its stride, and in crises, during the war and after, it met more frequently. Two members constituted a quorum. Clerks were present except when the Board resolved to meet 'close'. The duties of the Board were set out in detail in 20 articles of the Instructions. They were to see to the repair, building and setting out of ships, and to the pay, clothing and victualling of the seamen. A principal part of their duties was to make contracts at their meetings with the merchants who supplied naval stores. Three articles, added in the 1662 version, required the Board to familiarise itself with current market prices, to avoid restricting itself to a single supplier, and to make certain that the goods were delivered according to the terms of the contracts. The officers of the Board were required to live as close together as possible and 'to trace one another in their distinct duties'. In 1662 there was one significant omission from the Instructions – that of the article concerning the power to 'press and take pg 293up all seamen, ships, hoyes and provisions whatsoever . . .', a power always unpopular and of doubtful legality. In practice, however, the strain of war led to the use of the press both with regard to men and ships, an order in council being issued for the purpose.
The Treasurer. Of the four Principal Officers the most important in status was the Treasurer (Sir George Carteret until June 1667, the Earl of Anglesey until Nov. 1668 and after 1668 Sir Thomas Littleton and Sir Thomas Osborne jointly). Since the navy was the largest of all spending departments, accounting for roughly a quarter of the government's expenditure during the diary years,4 he was a figure of national importance, often unable, like Carteret, because of his duties elsewhere, to attend meetings of the Board. The post had considerable financial attractions because in addition to a salary of £2000 the Treasurer enjoyed the proceeds of poundage, i.e. 3d. in every pound sterling he handled. (In contrast, his colleagues the Comptroller, Surveyor and Clerk of the Acts received salaries of £500, £490 and £350 respectively – and no poundage.) The poundage system was regarded as extravagant by the (national) Treasury Commissioners in 1667 and consequently when Anglesey was appointed to the post certain payments, especially those to the Victualler, were made direct from the Exchequer instead of from the navy Treasury. At about the same time the feeling that the Navy Treasurer was too powerful gave rise to the suggestion that the post should be abolished and replaced by a chief cashier who would be subordinate to the rest of the Board.5 Changes effected in 1671 went some way in this direction – the Treasurer was reduced in status and required to submit weekly accounts to the Board.
His duties, according to the Instructions of 1662, were to receive and pay monies, to see that sums allocated to the navy were made available by the national treasury, to prepare estimates for the Board and the Lord High Admiral, and check payments authorised by the Board. He was also to attend most 'pays' (the occasions when ships were paid off) and ensure that the correct rates and allowances were observed. Finally, he was to prepare ledgers which were to be audited annually and presented to the full Board. These were substantially the same duties as those defined in 1640. Despite the growth in the size and cost of the navy since 1640 nothing was now done to make appropriate changes in the management of naval finances. Some of the financial problems of the navy in the '60s were due in part to this administrative inadequacy, though the main reason was of course a chronic shortage of money.
The Comptroller. The office of Comptroller was originally envisaged as a check on the actions of the Board as a whole and as a means of preventing waste and extravagance. This was always difficult, particularly in view of the large number and variety of ledgers used, and the pg 294lack of an efficient system of cross-reference. With the expansion of the navy since the early part of the century the Comptroller's task had become virtually impossible, even in peacetime. War, and the incompetence of Sir John Mennes (Comptroller 1661–71) made things even worse.
The Comptroller's duties were set out in 11 articles of the Instructions. He was to ensure that the correct rates of seamen's pay were observed and that the Board was informed of current market prices when negotiating contracts. He was also responsible – and this constituted the greater part of his work – for auditing the accounts of the Treasurer, the Victualler and the storekeepers, and had to present an annual audit of these accounts to the Board and the Lord High Admiral. The Comptroller was thus in function primarily an accountant, but neither of the Comptrollers in the diary period – Slingsby and Mennes – had the slightest experience in accountancy. In 1663 and 1664 proposals were made to make Penn an assistant to Mennes, but were dropped in face of Mennes's resistance. In Jan. 1667 however (in response to pressure from Coventry and Pepys) an order in council was issued imposing two assistants on him, so that the office was effectively divided into three. Brouncker was to audit the Treasurer's accounts, Penn the Victualler's, and Mennes (given after 1669 five extra clerks) was to do the rest. The practice of appointing subsidiary officers continued: in 1671 a fourth was added to examine storekeepers' accounts, and during the Third Dutch War a fifth to deal with the Ticket Office.
The Surveyor. The Surveyor had responsibility for the design, building and repair of ships. This involved supervising work at the dockyards (through the local Clerks of Survey) and ensuring that an adequate supply of materials was obtained. But the expansion of the service had meant that he had to devote more time to administration and less to supervision, for which he was forced to rely on subordinate officials in the yards and in some cases on the dockyard commissioners. According to the Instructions he was to take an annual survey of the stores and to estimate what was required for the following year. Together with his subordinates, he was to ensure that all materials and stores delivered for the use of the navy were according to contract in quantity, quality and dimensions. He was also to make an annual survey of the ships, dockyards, storehouses, and other buildings, and provide an estimate of any necessary repairs. Finally, he was to supervise the issue of stores to the ships and to compare the storekeepers' accounts with those of the carpenters and boatswains which related to the use of stores while the ships were at sea. It was on him that the Board relied for an accurate account of the condition of the ships, yards and stores and for advice on what materials to purchase. As a result it was pg 295to be expected that he would have a major rôle in the making of contracts.
The Clerk of the Acts. It would be incorrect to see the Clerk of the Acts as a direct descendant of the medieval Clerk of the Ships, who was often the only permanent administrative official and had responsibility for most of the duties later undertaken by the Comptroller and Surveyor. With the expansion of the navy and its administrative framework the Clerk was increasingly restricted to the functions of a secretary. Such was the situation in 1660 when Pepys obtained the post. He was able to arrest the decline of the office and to make it the lynch-pin of naval administration. The Instructions required the Clerk to attend all meetings of the Board, to present correspondence, record decisions and prepare letters for signature and despatch. An unambitious Clerk could have exercised his duties almost entirely from the London office. Pepys decided differently. He mastered the office routines quickly and then set himself to learn the trades of his colleagues – especially that of the Surveyor. Very soon he was not only composing the letters of the office, but visiting dockyards and negotiating contracts. In addition, by virtue of his energy and ability, he became the natural spokesman for the office in its relations with Admiralty, Privy Council and Parliament. He introduced reforms in office methods – particularly in dockyard procedures and wartime victualling arrangements – and after the war conducted an investigation (supposedly the work of the Duke of York as Admiral) into the conduct of the entire office. His conclusion – accepted by the Duke – was that there were no deficiencies in the Board's structure, but only a failure by the officers (except himself) to carry out the duties defined in their Instructions.6 Similarly in 1688 at the end of his career, when the Special Commission he had set up in 1686 had done its work (which had involved superseding the Navy Board for current business) he recommended that the Board should be restored in its old form. Other able men have held the office of clerk – e.g. Charles Sergison (Clerk 1690–1719) – but none have succeeded in making it so important as it was in Pepys's hands.
The Commissioners. During the diary period ten commissioners were appointed, two of whom (Berkeley of Stratton and Hervey) contributed little to the work of the Board. Their functions were various. Sir William Penn (1660–9), most versatile of them all, not only played a part in everyday work, at meetings, pays and in the yards, but also – in addition to serving in the battlefleet in 1665 – took on special assignments: hastening out the fleet in 1665 and 1666, and after 1667 taking over the inspection of the Treasurer's accounts from the Comptroller. Brouncker (1664–79) was also used to assist the Comptroller. Sir William Coventry (1662–7), despite his absences from London with the court or the navy, was in many ways the most important of pg 296the commissioners by virtue of being secretary to the Lord High Admiral. He acted as the link between the Duke and the Navy Board. Of the other commissioners, five were dockyard officers: Pett and Cox at Chatham, Taylor at Harwich, Middleton and Tippets at Portsmouth.
Collective duties. The work for which the Board was collectively responsible was: (1) the building and repairing of ships (according to the Admiral's directions), and the supply of materials for this purpose; (2) the payment of officers and seamen; (3) the supervision of victualling; and (4) the control of the dockyards.
(1) Shipbuilding and repair. The Board's function was to provide supplies and pay the workmen. The commonest method of obtaining supplies was by contract, made after tenders had been received, which specified the price and quantity of the goods, and sometimes the time and place of their delivery. They could be concluded only in a formal meeting of the Board. The principal materials were timber, masts, iron, canvas, hemp and tar. All or nearly all were imported, which meant that not only were supplies at risk in wartime but the Board was forced to conduct business with a relatively small group of merchants. The merchants did not limit their trade to any one commodity, and the larger and more important the merchant, the greater the range of naval goods he offered. Sir William Warren offered virtually everything the navy used in bulk. The smaller merchants usually restricted themselves to one product and were likely to specialise in English materials. It was these small suppliers who were hit most severely when the Board could not pay with ready money. Other methods than contract were occasionally employed. For timber there were the resources of oak in the royal forests – obtainable only after lengthy administrative delays. There were navy 'purveyors' who dealt (on commission) in a variety of materials, and the 'purveyor of petty emptions' (usually the Chief Clerk of the Navy Office) who supplied small quantities or specialised goods. In wartime there was also the possibility of using goods taken as prize, but since these had to be bought at auction for ready money no great quantity found its way to the navy. There were a few occasions – the diary has mention of only one – when because of pressure of work the Board had to have ships built in private yards. In these cases the Board's function was to conclude a contract and inspect the ship-builder's work before authorising payment.
(2) Pays. The Board conducted pays principally through the Treasurer who was assisted by members of the Board. The Board as a whole was responsible for calculating the rates of pay,7 checking that the officers and seamen were correctly rated and seeing that the ships' books corresponded with the muster books. In the case of officers the scale of pay depended on the rate of the ship. The captain of a 1st-rate received £21 per month; the captain of a 6th-rate only £7. The discrepancy pg 297was less marked for standing officers: the carpenter on a 1st-rate received .£4 per month and on a 6th-rate £2. The seamen's pay was not affected by the rate of the ship; scales ranged from 24s. per month for an able seaman to 19s. for an ordinary seaman and 9s. 6d. for boys. All these rates applied when the ships were on active service: a lower rate (about half) applied when they were in harbour.
During 1660–2 the seamen were being paid for their service under the Commonwealth – in some cases for arrears of two or three years. The Board was not involved here except in the calculation of the amount due to the men, the pays being handled by parliamentary commissioners appointed by statute to pay off the armed forces. In the period leading up to the war, with a small number of ships in service and a reasonable supply of money, the Board was usually able to ensure fairly prompt payments. Even during this time there were occasional problems such as finding £3000 to pay off the Guernsey in March 1662. These difficulties became acute during the war. They posed a problem which the Navy Board of itself was incapable of solving.
(3) Victualling. Under the Commonwealth victualling had been managed by a board of commissioners appointed for the purpose. This system was abandoned along with other innovations at the Restoration and the duties farmed out to a single contractor as before the Civil War. Denis Gauden, who had been associated with victualling during the '50s, was appointed in Sept. 1660. His contract (Apr. 1661) required him to provide victuals at the rate of 6d. per man while the ships were in harbour and 8d. per man at sea. He was to keep a reserve stock sufficient for 4,000 men for two months and to deliver these and, given notice, any additional supplies to any port on the English, Scottish or Irish coasts. He had his headquarters in a complex of storehouses, slaughter-houses etc. on Tower Hill, with subsidiary establishments at certain ports. It was left to him to contract with suppliers and to hire the small vessels which carried the supplies to the navy. The victuals themselves consisted mainly of beef, pork, biscuit, peas and beer. The 1661 contract was drawn up by the Lord Treasurer and the Privy Council with little reference to the Navy Board. The Board's duty consisted simply in examining the victualler's accounts and of doing what they could – which was little – to see that he was paid. But the difficulties of the war years, which caused a virtual breakdown in the system, forced them into active intervention. The commanders complained that the victuals were brought too slowly to the fleet and were insufficient to keep the ships at sea. The seamen complained about the quality – stinking beer and mouldy biscuit – and of short allowances. For his part Gauden complained of shortages, rising prices and above all of slow and late payments from the navy Treasury. After the campaign of 1665 it was clear that something had to be done. A new contract was pg 298ruled out by the provision in the old one for a year's notice before any major change could be introduced. To provide Gauden with partners would improve his credit and prevent confusion in the event of his death, but no suitable merchants were available. It was therefore left to Pepys to examine the situation and to make recommendations to the Lord High Admiral. During Oct. 1665 he was at work on a variety of propositions; at the same time as searching around for reforms he was looking for a way of making 'lawful profit' for himself. His recommendation was that a number of surveyors should be appointed at the main victualling ports; they were to report to a central officer in London who would co-ordinate the reports and from time to time present an accurate account of the state of supplies to the Board and the Lord High Admiral. His suggestion was accepted by the King and the Duke 'with complete applause and satisfaction', and in Nov. 1665 he was appointed Surveyor-General of Victualling at a salary of £300. However, during 1666 the joint commanders, Rupert and Albemarle, renewed their complaints. They claimed in August that they were forced to bring back the fleet from the Dutch coast for lack of victuals. The only noticeable change, they claimed, was in the number of estimates and accounts they had to cope with. Pepys was able to demonstrate, to those ashore at least, that the situation was better than in the previous year. After the war, in 1668, tenders were invited for a new contract, and this time, in contrast to what had happened in 1661, the Board was invited by the Admiralty Committee of the Privy Council to adjudge between the contestants. At the same time it was also asked to comment on the relative merits of the two methods of victualling – by contract and by direct management. Their report (largely the work of Pepys) decided in favour of the contract system as being the cheaper, and recommended the acceptance of Gauden's tender. In its final form, as approved by the Treasury in March 1669, it nominated two partners to act with him – his son Benjamin and Sir W. Penn. Three other similar contracts were negotiated in Charles's reign but in 1683 the victualling was handed over to a board of commissioners. There is no doubt that this arrangement made control by the state easier. But the ineradicable difficulties of feeding the men at sea remained.8 [See also Dockyards; Victualling Office]
From 1630–49 the Board had occupied a house in Mincing Lane and from 1649–54 part of the Victualling Office on Tower Hill. In 1654 the government acquired for £2400 from Sir John pg 299Wolstenholme the building in which the office was housed until 1673. It was the northern section of a large house on the e. side of Seething Lane, a few doors south of its junction with Crutched Friars, with a courtyard opening onto the Lane and a garden stretching from the Lane to the n.-w. corner of Tower Hill. The site is now occupied, approximately, by a large modern block of offices. It was a rambling building lit by over 180 windows,1 taxed on 48 hearths in 1666,2 with lodgings for four Principal Officers and a clerk, as well as office accommodation and a porter's lodge. During the diary period the government spent close on £950 on repairs, alterations and decorations, carried out for the most part by workmen from the Deptford yard.3 From time to time the Navy Board made unsuccessful efforts to obtain the southern section of the house, leased to Sir Richard Ford. No representation of the house is known to survive. The building, which had narrowly escaped destruction in the Great Fire of 1666, was burnt down (without fatalities) in the night of 29 Jan. 1673 by a fire which spread to 30 neighbouring houses.4 The office records did not escape unscathed, nor did Pepys's collection. He is known to have lost his engraved portraits by Nanteuil.5 For a few days the office was lodged in Trinity House, after which the Mark Lane mansion of the Blayning family was acquired for their use. By 1683 a new building erected on the old site and adjoining ground was ready for occupation. It was designed by Wren and was re-oriented to open on to Crutched Friars.6 There the office remained until it moved to the new Somerset House in 1786. In 1869 it moved again to Spring Gardens close by the Admiralty.7 (R; La)
Navy Treasury. In 1654 in Leadenhall St; from Michaelmas 1664 onwards in Broad St in the former house (taxed on 24 hearths) of Sir Thomas Allen. It escaped the Fire and was enlarged in 1686.1 (R)
Naylor, [Oliver] (1628–1705). Clergyman and relative by marriage – he married Jane Pepys of Mileham, Norf., in 1661. Fellow of Caius College, Cambridge, 1651–9; Rector of Tavistock, Devon, c. 1652–66; Prebendary of Exeter 1661–1701; Rector of Clovelly 1666–81.1
Naylor, [William]. A relative by marriage: probably son of Richard Naylor of Offord Darcy, Hunts., and brother of Jasper Trice's third wife.1
Neale, [Thomas] (1641–99). Courtier and projector. Pepys describes the brisk tactics which won him a rich widow in 1664. After her death he almost won an heiress.1 He made and spent two fortunes, engaged in the E. Indian and Guinea trades, prospered (and broke) as a brewer, undertook building developments in the Seven Dials, and founded a penny post in the American colonies. He was elected F.R.S. in 1664 and pg 300sat in all parliaments (except that of 1681) from 1668. In 1678 he became Groom Porter at court, and in 1679 a Groom of the Bedchamber. From 1684 he had a place at the Mint, becoming an absentee Master in 1686 (to be succeeded by Isaac Newton in 1699). He managed the state lottery of 1694.2
Neat Houses, Chelsea. A number of market-gardeners' houses on the fertile heavily-manured low ground by the Thames west of the present position of Vauxhall Bridge. Since Elizabethan times celebrated also as places of entertainment. In the 1830s the area was laid out in streets and St Gabriel's, Pimlico, built. (R)
Neile, Sir Paul, kt 1633 (1613–86). Son of Richard Neile, Archbishop of York; an original F.R.S.; Gentleman-Usher of the Privy Chamber 1662–84; M.P. for Ripon Apr.–May 1640 and Newark 1673–Jan. 79. He owned a notable collection of telescopes, and is said to have been the original of Sidrophel the astrologer in Butler's Hudibras.1
Nevill, [Thomas]. Draper, of Paul's Churchyard.1
Newbery, [Capt. Richard]. A veteran who had served since c. 1644 and was in command of the Portland when put out of his commission in Apr. 1660. Blake and Monck had recommended him for the command of a frigate in 1653.1
Newell, . 'An old fellow-student' of Cromleholme's (iii.199). There were two Newells at Oxford in Cromleholme's time (1635–9): Joseph (an undergraduate at New Hall 1637–41 and by 1662 Vicar of Leckhampstead, Northants.), and John (a Fellow of Corpus Christi 1634–48 – Cromleholme's college – and by 1662 Rector of Combe Martin, Devon).1
The New Exchange, Strand. Pepys often calls it simply 'the Exchange'; but usually makes its location clear enough to avoid confusion with the Royal Exchange in the city. It was situated on the s. side of the street, opposite Half Moon (now Bedford) St and was built in 1608–9 by the Earl of Salisbury (on the site of the stables of Durham House) in imitation of the Royal Exchange. It was designed to be, like its model, both a bourse for merchants and a shopping precinct specialising in luxury goods. Its central walks were flanked by double galleries containing eight rows of shops, many of them little more than booths. The bourse failed but the shops prospered, especially after the residential development of the Covent Garden area in the 1630s. The destruction of the Royal Exchange in the Fire gave it a further fillip, and it was by then well-established as a resort of fashionable society, and figures as such in many Restoration plays. The building was taken down in 1737.
The river and stairs which took their name from the building lay at the end of Durham Yard.1 (R)
Newgate/Newgate Prison. The gate was in the city wall on the w. pg 301side, north of Ludgate and at the w. end of Newgate St. In Pepys's time the building on each side of it still served as the common gaol for the malefactors of the city and of the county of Middlesex. The gate itself was closed at night. Burnt in the Fire, it was rebuilt, improved and used as before. The open space west of it was used for executions. (R)
Newgate Market. Before the Fire Newgate St was encumbered with a middle row of stalls and houses which ran from St Martin-le-Grand to Ivy Lane and an open market west of that. Part was used for butchers' stalls and was known as the Shambles: the whole being referred to as 'Newgate Market'. After the Fire, which destroyed this whole quarter, the middle row was thrown into the street and a covered market made south of the street. It ceased to be a market in 1869. [See also Food] (R)
Newington Green. A separate part of Stoke Newington, Middlesex, less than 4 miles north of the city and to the west of the road through Stoke Newington village to Edmonton and Ware and so to Cambridge. Pepys's maternal aunt, Ellen Kite, lived there, and he knew it well as a child. (R)
Newman, Col. [George]. Committee-man in Kent during the Civil War and Interregnum.1
Newport, Andrew (1623–99). Second son of the 1st Baron Newport. A royalist agent in the '50s, he was rewarded at the Restoration with an equerry's place at court (1660) and a company of foot at Portsmouth (1662). He had business interests, and served on the customs commissions (of 1662 and 1681) and on the Royal Fishery (1664). The comptrollership of the Wardrobe to which he was appointed in 1668 was a new post: he held it until 1681. He was an M.P. for Montgomeryshire 1661–Jan. 79, Preston 1685–7 and Shrewsbury 1689–99.1 He died unmarried: Pepys's 'young Newport' was his brother, Richard, a well-known rakehell.2
Newport St, Westminster. This fashionable street ran to the west from St Martin's Lane opposite the end of Long Acre. Pepys's rich cousin Thomas Pepys lived there until 1663, and the ambitious John Creed moved there in 1669. It still survives (as Great Newport St), its length much reduced by the cutting through of Charing Cross Road. (R)
Nicholas, Sir Edward, kt 1641, bt 1653 (1593–1669). Secretary of State to Charles I (1641–9) and to Charles II (1654–62). A protégé of the 1st Duke of Buckingham and secretary to the Admiralty Commissioners 1628–38. A strong Anglican and a man of high principles, his replacement in 1662 by Arlington was a blow to the Clarendonian old guard. His younger brother Matthew was Dean of St Paul's, 1660–d. 61.1
Nicholson, [John]. A Cambridge contemporary of Pepys (at Magdalene 1651–5), son of Christopher, a prominent Presbyterian merchant of Newcastle upon Tyne. A John Nicholson was a clerk in the Post Office 1661.1
Nixon, Capt. [Edward] (d. by 1688). A captain in the Commonwealth navy, he held three commands 1661–4.1
Noble, Jack. Servant to Pepys's brother, Tom. Tom died owing him £6.1
Noell, Sir Martin (c. 1600–65). The most prominent of the merchants and financiers operating in the Interregnum; much involved in government finance; brother-in-law of Cromwell's Secretary of State, Thurloe. At the Restoration he escaped financial disaster and both he and his eldest son were knighted. At his death he left seven sons unprovided for. His wife was Elizabeth (b. Blake). Thomas Povey's brothers, Richard and William, were employed as his agents in the W. Indies.1
Nokes, . Probably Nathaniel Nokes, silkman. A Nathaniel Nokes lived 'over against Bow Church', and his late master, Ald. Francis Dashwood, dealt in silk.1
Nonsuch House, Surrey. A royal palace near Ewell begun by Henry VIII and completed by the 12th Earl of Arundel (d. 1580). It had not remained continuously in the possession of the royal family, but had since 1625 belonged to Henrietta-Maria, now Queen Mother. It was built in the showiest Tudor-Gothic style, with high corner towers and an inner court whose upper storey was decorated with bas-reliefs and painted panels. Pepys visited it several times in 1665 when the Receipt of the Exchequer was moved there during the Plague. In 1670 it was granted by the King to the Duchess of Cleveland who pulled down the house, sold the contents and divided the park into farms. There are now only a few traces of the foundations left.1
Norbury. Relatives: in 1665 living in Islington.1 George Norbury had married Sarah Sutton, sister of Mary, wife of William Wight. His wife had a house and land in Brampton, and sold some land there in 1664 – possibly the property offered to Pepys in 1662 (iii.13). Mary Wight in her will (1696) forgave him a debt of £500 used for the purchase of land at Brampton. He may be the George Norbury (son of John) admitted to Gray's Inn 1639. In 1665 his daughter Katherine (of Islington) married Robert Woolley.2
Norman, [James] (d. 1668). Clerk to the Surveyor of the Navy 1660–4; Clerk of the Survey, Chatham 1664–8. In a letter of 1668 Pepys wrote of him that he was 'as honest, active and improving an officer as pg 303any . . . in the Navy'. Two years later his widow was petitioning for his arrears of pay.1
North. A Cambridgeshire family related to the Mountagus through Sir Dudley North (1602–77; succ. as 4th Baron North 1666) who in 1632 married Anne Mountagu, niece of the 1st Earl of Manchester. He was a parliamentarian in the Civil War and sat as M.P. for Cambridgeshire in the Short and Long Parliaments until excluded in 1648. In the elections to the Convention in 1660 he was defeated for the county because he would not commit himself to an unconditional restoration, and sat for the borough. After the dissolution he retired to his books at Kirtling.
He had a progeny of gifted sons, all virtuosi – musical, learned, and patrons of the arts. The eldest, Charles (1635–91), knighted sometime before 1667, was summoned to the Lords in 1673 as Lord Grey, and succeeded as 5th Baron North in 1677. He was a prominent Exclusionist, and married the daughter of the Exclusionist Lord Grey of Warke. Francis (1637–85) became a distinguished lawyer – Solicitor-General and knight in 1671, Attorney-General in 1673, Chief Justice of Common Pleas in 1675 and Lord Keeper in 1682. He was created Baron Guilford in 1683. Two other brothers who do not appear in the diary were Roger (1653–1734), author of The lives of the Norths, and other works, and the youngest, Sir Dudley (1641–91), merchant, financier and economist – whom Macaulay judged to be 'one of the ablest men of his time'.1
Norton, [Daniel] (d. 1666). Son of Col. Richard Norton and husband of Isabella, daughter of Sir John Lawson. His widow later married Sir John Chicheley.1
Norton, Joyce. Often referred to simply as 'Joyce'; a member of the Norfolk branch of the Pepyses; daughter of Barbara Pepys (b. 1575) who had married Richard Norton of South Creake, Norf., in 1601. She appears to have lived with her cousin Jane Turner.1
Norton, [Mary]. Actress in the Duke's Company.1
Norton, Col. [Richard] (1615–91). A leading Presbyterian and parliamentarian in Hampshire and a friend of Oliver Cromwell. M.P. under the Commonwealth and 1661–91.1
Norwood, [Henry] (c. 1614–89). Royalist soldier and conspirator; imprisoned 1655–9 and employed in the negotiations between Mountagu and the King in late 1659. After the Restoration he was rewarded with a post at court as equerry (1660) and with the deputy- governorship of Dunkirk (1662) and of Tangier (1665–9). He was a Gloucestershire man and after his return from Tangier served Gloucester pg 304as Mayor (1672–3) and M.P. (1675–Jan. 79). He was also Treasurer of Virginia 1661–73; Tangier Commissioner 1673–80; and member of the Royal Fishery Company (1677). Pepys rented from him the little house at Parson's Green which he used as a week-end retreat in 1679 and 1681. His letters to Pepys are full of life and humour. He gave the name Parson's Green to part of Tangier.1
Nott, [William]. Bookbinder and bookseller; in Ivy Lane and at the White Horse, Paul's Churchyard before the Fire; afterwards at the King's Arms, Pall Mall until at least 1696. He bound much of Clarendon's library. Pepys still dealt with him in 1681.1
Nun, Madame. Of the Queen's household; probably Elizabeth Nunn, laundress. Pepys refers to her as Will Chiffinch's sister (i.e. sister-in-law); his wife was Barbara Nunn.1
The Nursery Theatre. On 24 Dec. 1660 the King granted to George Jolly the right to set up a third theatre in London in addition to those of Killigrew and Davenant. This grant after a devious history led to Killigrew and Davenant obtaining the right to set up a nursery for training actors for the two authorised theatres. By 1667 there were probably two nurseries, one in Fig Tree Court (to the west of the later Play House Yard and south from the middle of the Barbican) for the Duke's Company under Davenant, the other in Hatton Garden for the King's Company under Killigrew. The latter was opened in that year under Capt. Edward Bedford, and moved in 1668 or early 1669 to the former theatre of the King's Company in Vere St, Lincoln's Inn Fields. [See also Theatre] (R)