G.I and M.II

Two of Hopkins's notebooks, G.I and M.II, deal with Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. It was a book he studied carefully with a number of tutors, writing essays which relate to it for Walter Pater, Robert Williams (who was soon to publish a translation), and T. H. Green, and mentioning James Riddell in a way which suggests he was lecturing on the topic. A note in his diary for 1865 indicates that Hopkins in March 1865 was studying Aristotle's Ethics with Henry Wall, who also lectured on Aristotle.¹ Robert Williams published his translation of the Nicomachean Ethics in 1869, and, since Williams was Hopkins's tutor at some stage, it is not impossible that Hopkins would have studied the text with him, though Riddell probably gave the lectures he attended.

Shortly after the diary entry noting study with Wall, there is another entry: 'Aristotle's Ethics, but what edition?' In his edition, Williams noted that the text he followed was 'that of Bekker, as given in the small Oxford edition of 1867', and of the Ethics that 'there is no work extant at once of equal brevity and worth'.² Hopkins seems to be using, or at least referring to, James E. Thorold Rogers' edition of Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea (1865).³

One of Hopkins's essays for Robert Williams was on 'Connection of Aristotle's metaphysics with his ethics'⁴ and another had the title 'The relation of Aristotelian ϕρόνησις‎ to the Modern moral sense and προαίρεσις‎ to Free Will'; as Lesley Higgins notes in Volume IV of this edition, 'The contents of G.I substantiate and provide a context for essays in D.IX, D.X. and D.XI. That G.I was found tucked inside G.Ia (the Dublin Notebook) is not surprising—GMH no doubt referred to this study when preparing lectures.'⁵ The period from late 1866 to late 1867 (the date of his essays) is the time when Hopkins refers most frequently to Aristotle, but his undergraduate essays, and indeed the whole Oxford curriculum, show the pervasive influence of Aristotle's work.

pg 210Aristotle was an author he particularly admired, as he admitted to Baillie three months before his graduation in May 1868:

This reminds me to say that I find myself in an even prostrate admiration of Aristotle and am of the way of thinking, so far as I know him or know about him, that he is the end-all and be-all of philosophy.⁶

He had not changed his mind when he told Bridges in 1875 that:

it was with sorrow I put back Aristotle's Metaphysics in the library some time ago feeling that I could not read them now and so probably should never. After all I can, at all events a little, read Duns Scotus and I care for him more even than Aristotle and more pace tua than a dozen Hegels.⁷

He continued to notice work on Aristotle, and mentioned to Francis de Paravicini that 'there is a new translation of the Nic. Ethics: why will not Robert Williams's do?'⁸ Whether he read the book again or not, its phrases were in his mind, and he noted that 'one swallow does not make a spring'⁹ in a letter to Bridges.

G.I and M.II should be studied together and against the background provided by Volume IV. G.I is a systematic commentary on and analysis of difficult or problematic passages in the Nicomachean Ethics and contains notes on much of bks 1–10, but not in order. It is a scrupulous and tidy manuscript, and the pages have some characteristics of notes taken in lectures or classes: for example, the omission of verb and article in the opening phrase: 'This treatise first systematic work on morals'; and on fo. 3 Hopkins questions a suggested meaning by writing in parenthesis '(who cd. have thought it meant that?)' His inattention at lectures, which he records in his confessional notes, is rather belied by the care which these notes show, but it is impossible to know whether they are preparations for lectures (he mentions preparing for lectures in a letter to his mother on 22 April 1863),¹⁰ or notes made during the lectures themselves; or perhaps the most likely explanation, given the neatness and lack of correction of the handwriting and layout, and the authority of the material, is that they are notes written up after the lectures.

M.II is a thorough, though incomplete, summary of Aristotle's arguments, perhaps notes taken down during classes where the text was closely studied, although they too are almost too neat and uncorrected for this. They could be the result of a pg 211private attempt to summarize the book, but the fact that sections are left out suggest that the gaps may be the result of classes which he missed and hoped to write up later.

Balliol tutor James Riddell is mentioned twice, on folios 17 of G.I and 37^r of M.II, so it seems likely that the class was given by him.

G.I

Notebook 22.5 x 27.5 cm, with light-brown covers; binding is entirely gone; thin paper. 34 leaves.The first page is missing the top four inches. Only the rectos are numbered. This large notebook is physically identical to G.I.a. (the Dublin Notebook) and similar to G.II. Parts of folios 1, 2, 8, 9, and 10 have been carefully cut out; others have been removed altogether. Some leaves have been left half-blank, Hopkins undoubtedly thinking he would return to the manuscript at a later date and expand or complete specific sections. Undated; but evidently from his time at Oxford. The handwriting is clearly mid-1860s.

In G.I Hopkins begins to use his abbreviations for 'th', 'the', 'and', and 'of', though he does not do so systematically; we have expanded them here, as elsewhere in our transcriptions.

[fo. 1]

The Nicomacheian Ethics.¹¹

This treatise first systematic work on Morals, in other wds. Aristotle first tried to make a distinct science of it. Even he had not fully unravelled the idea of it fr. the Political Science. Thus, the student of it is called ὁ πολιτικός‎. And the last chapter of the work slides off into his Politics. The latter had before been a science, as in Plato's Commonwealth. Aristotle's work in history of science is the disentangling of the two things.

The purpose of the book must be thought of thus, — with us principle of duty, or more definitely principle of responsibility (to God), a guide to action. The latter form not known, or very vaguely, to Greeks; the other form not understood by Aristotle, idea of duty not present to him. This, with wd. δεῖ‎ as moral command, due to the stoics.

pg 212The problem came to him thus. — There must be a principle on wh. life shd. be formed for the individual, as well as right principles (as those wh. Plato had undertaken to find in his book) for the state. There was a right and wrong practice, there must be a right and wrong theory, as distinguished fr. a wrong too.

He tells us certain unscientific principles had occurred to people before as motives of virtue, e. g. happiness — and happiness is no doubt a guide in action. This was systematised by Plato into the philosophic life, thus refining the principle otherwise dangerous.

Socrates, great reformer of the schools, had thrown out an idea on the subject, not a science, like Aristotle, but an idea. It was (fr. one pt. of view), to act for yr. own interest. Good he said meant nothing unless it was "good for you", "good for me" etc. In him this principle of course led to no harm, but in itself it was insufficient for morals. But his explanation is of a higher nature and a corrective to this. Here he applied γνῶθι σεαυτόν‎ {know thyself }. See what yr. faculties are, what are the ends of yr. existence; for he held [the] belief in a Creator, one God. If you realise what he meant you for you rea [page torn] [fo. 2] [wh]at is is best for you. This an argum. from final causes.

These three notions, of happiness being the end of life, and the subdivided notion of Socrates of acting for yr. own interest and of yr. interest being the end for wh.you were made, are embodied by Aristotle in this treatise.

Before beginning the first chapter of the first bk. it is well to turn to chap. xiii. 8, where he analyses the nature and make of the soul. But see the notes for this in their regular order.

Bk. 1,i.

The first question asked in anything is εἰ ἐστὶ‎ {if it is}. Here this is at first assumed.

There is an end or object of every actio course of action. The multiplicity of ends converges in one end. Life is the sum of all actions; happiness of all ends.

Henceforward to end of chap. iii the εἰ ἐστὶ‎ is treated, with the three questions (iii, 8) τί προτι‎ τί προτιθέμεθα‎, πῶς ἀποδεκτέον‎, περὶ ἀκροατοῦ‎. {remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and the purpose of the inquiry}.

pg 213With chap. iv begins the τὶ ἐστὶ‎, μὴ λανθανέτω‎ — ἀχρήϊος ἀνήρ‎¹² being a parenthesis.

These two questions belong to every scientific investigation. So here it we must inquire (i) whether there is a theory by wh. to direct life, a science of life; (ii) what that theory or science is.

The first three chapters may then be analysed —

• i, 1. Universal existence of ends

  • 2, 3. Multiplicity of ends.

  • 4. Their subordination.

• ii, 1. Their finite character.

  • 2. Benefit of knowing the highest end.

  • 3–5. Province of human knowledge to wh. the end belongs.

• iii, 1. In dealing with general matter, altera^er^ing with special circumstances, we must be content with general conclusions.

  • 5–8. The study of ethics wants reason not passion.

πᾶσα τεχνὴ καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος‎, ὁμοίως δὲ‎ ^πρᾶξίς τε‎^ καὶ προαίρεσις‎ {every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit}. The two first members of these couplets are the more complete and regular. μέθοδος‎ is the empirical stage of ἐπιστήμη‎.

ἀπεϕῄναντο‎ {proclaimed}. Contrary of proof. It is to declare one's opinion wh. one does not care to prove or lay down more than arbitrarily. Hence technically used of arbiters.

ἔργον‎ {function} effect of ἐνέργεια‎, process; but the latter may exist without the latter [sic], as divine worship, life, seeing, are not means to further ends but their own ends.

Chap. ii

Besides the multiplicity and convergence, actions must not be infinite, or in others words they really must converge.

[fo. 3]

1. τἀγαθὸν‎ as absolute good is higher than τὸ ἄριστον‎, the best of what we have got

6. ἡ πολιτικὴ‎ is the science under wh. the highest end comes, but in itself it treats of the good of the many, Ethics of the good of the individual.

8. 8 τὸ τῆς πόλεως‎ ruled by λαβεῖν‎ and σώζειν‎.

iii Chap iii

2. διαϕορὰν‎ {variety}, fr. the nature of the case, because you cannot give all the accessories, relations, conditions.

pg 214πλάνην‎ {irregularity, variety}, where people are at sea about them.

ὥστε δοκεῖν‎, so that people (not the speaker) come to think.

3. τἀγαθά‎, not as we say, morally good actions, but actions done for some end held good or advantageous, or rather the ends of those actions, the advantages.

4. τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ‎, things only generally true; ἐκ τοιούτων‎, fr. such premises. So παρὰ τὸν χρόνον‎, on account of also ἐκ‎ of premises, περὶ‎ of conclusions.

7. παρὰ τὸν χρόνον‎, on account of time.

Definiton of εὐδαιμονία‎, iv–vii.

Chap. iv.

5−end is a parenthesis, a consideration of arguments wh. will have to be used, a digression on the method pursued. He does not confine us either to ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν‎ or ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς‎ {from or to first principles} but says we must start ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων‎ {with what is known}. This is a μέθοδος‎, a tentative science.

See the tree in my book opposite chapter iv.¹³

αἱ ἀρχαί‎ are the principles of a science, ἀρχή‎ a starting point.

6 τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς‎, to have been well trained in his habits.

7 τὸ ὅτι‎, the fact. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι‎. ^for^ the fact is the beginning. Plato however uses ἀρχὴ‎ as Aristotle αἱ ἀρχαί‎.

ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται‎, not casts it about in his mind (who cd. have thought it meant that?) but takes it to heart as we say.

Chap. V.

3 τυγχάνουσι λόγου‎, their view meets with consideration.

pg 2154 μαντευόμεθα‎, we feel by instinct.

6 ἀτελεστέρα‎, inadequate, because man's proper end and essence is action.

τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις‎, the ordinary text-books, part of the curriculum [fo. 4] of knowledge.

7 Of the θεωρητικὸς βίος‎ {contemplative life} we scarcely hear more till the Xth book.

The exceptions having been raised there remain this and th θεωρητικὸς βίος‎ and the right action of the πολιτικὸς βίος‎ {public life}.

8 καταβέβληνται‎, have been drawn up in support of them — metaphor taken fr. foundations of a house.

About the χρηματιστὴς‎ {man of business} see Plato's Phaedo. The meaning is that money-getting is a slavery, reversing the normal tendency of man's constitution, wh. is that the lower shd. subserve the higher.

vi. treats the Platonic doctrine of universals and ideas in three arguments —

1, 2 〈There can be no common idea for the absolute and for the conditioned and relative ^good^ of a thing〉;

3 〈There can be no common idea for the several ^different^ cases, conditions, or kinds of a thing〉; — the categories in fact — of good〉;

4 〈There is no one science for the ^these^ different ^categories —^ cases, conditions, kinds — of a thing ^good^, as there ought to be if there is one idea〉.

5 Here a new criterion is applied 〈— What is the meaning [or] fact of the thing in itself? how does it differ fr. the thing ? — αὐτοάνθρωπος‎ {the ideal man} fr. ἄνθρωπος‎? {man}〉.

Then come answers to Platonic objections —

〈(i) 6 that the idea ἀ‎ is ἀΐδιον‎, independent of time: makes it no better or wors ^he answers, this^ makes it no better or worse, is not to the point;

(ii) If, as he ^is^ first shows ^concluded^ in 11, 12 we must look for the idea of Good only in the things wh. are good in themselves (the distinction is premised in 8−10), and even here they are called by one name not in virtue of any one principle of good, τἀγαθοῦ λόγον‎ in them, they will appear (12) to have the same name only accidentally: he throws out in answer three suggestions — they may be called so either fr. having one source, τῷ ἀϕ᾿ ἕνος εἶναι‎, or fr. making up one result or whole, πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν‎, or best of all by their analogy, μᾶλλον κατ᾿ ἀναλογίαν‎ — but without pursuing them further gives up the^at^ question for a time (13) as irrelevant, as also the Idea generally because being pg 216detached from the concrete things οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ‎, it is not to be realised by man, wh. is what is now wanted, νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται‎;

(iii) 14 Even in that case it will serve as a pattern, παράδειγμα‎ [fo. 5] both in the science and the practice of morals : 15, 16 he answers that this is not borne out by the analogy of other τέχναι‎ and ἐπιστήμαι‎.〉

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12 τοῖς γε ἀπὸ‎ τῆς‎ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις‎ {things called the same merely by chance}. These are real aequivoca: the analogues will be aequivoca ad unum.

14 εἰδῶμεν‎ is the subj. of οἶδα‎, but the accent anomalous.

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But wi

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〈But with regard to his criticism on Plato, 〈as to the ideas having not τὸ πρὸτερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον‎ {before and after}〉 see the Timaeus, where the ζῶον‎ {being} of the universe is not one of a series but comprehends all the terms of the series.

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vii. The arg 〈εὐδαιμονία‎ {happiness} wh. is the end of man is pursued in this chapter by means of the〉 argument fr. final causes.

ἔργον‎ is used practically as = ἐνέργεια‎ {activity, operation}, not as in chap. i.

〈μέθοδος‎ {inquiry} for finding the end of man # (beginning in 10).

Everything has its ἔργον‎, to realise which is its τέλος‎ {end} (10, 11):

12 Life is in in [sic] a sense the ἔργον‎ of man, but definition is needed:

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viii 1 συμπεράσματος‎ : the conclusion meant is the definition of εὐδαιμονία‎.

2 καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο‎, namely the same definiton.

3 ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι‎, and again it is right in that etc.

γίνεται‎ governed by εὐδαιμονία‎ understood.

pg 2175 τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν‎, the points required as constituents of happiness.

7 ἀλλ᾿ ἕν γέ τι ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν‎, but to be right in the main or in one point.

8 ἀρετήν‎, excellence.

[fo. 6]

11 τοῖς δὲ ϕιλοκάλοις‎. It is the beauty, not the morality 〈then of the good virtue wh. makes it pleasureable〉.

15 ἀχορηγητὸν ὄντα‎, without the necessary means.

17 τὴν εὐτυχίαν‎ and τὴν ἀρετήν‎ are put in as the two extreme views about happines εὐδαιμονία‎.

ix 1−6 He says there is no incompatibility betw. virtue being the result of a course of conduct and its being κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν‎.

5 οὕτω‎ prob. wholly indefinite. 〈 so as to be rendered in such and such a way ?〉– If we are to be happy in such and such a way likely that we shd. be formed for such and such a way of happiness. It is Socrates' optimist principle "whatever is is best", i.e. whatever normally is is best.

6. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον‎ etc qualifying. Happiness is may be a divine gift but must then be πολύκοινον‎; to make it merely a chance thing ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ‎ going too far. — This is a heathen conception; to us living within a dispensation gifts are judged to be allotted equally. cf. also bk. x, ix, 6.

8. ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς‎, of a certain moral character and good.

The rest of the chapter gives only the popular view of εὐδαιμονίας‎, not Aristotle's.

x. So

Chap. X. Solon in his dictum meant of course one thing and not the other but Arist. chooses to discuss to some extent both views, shewing ἀπορίας‎ to arise either way.

1. οὐδ᾿ ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων‎ looks back to Priam or some other such extreme case.

2 ἢ τοῦτό γε‎ Aristotelian way of bringing in the view we are to adhere to, by way of contrast to the other one.

ἄτοπον‎ that for wh. we can find no place, no means to dovetail it on to other facts, rather than absurd.

3 ἔχει‎. Instance of ἔχειν‎ used as according to grammarians for παρέχειν‎.

pg 218εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ‎, as indeed may happen to a living man who is not sensible of it. cf. Jeremy Taylor's case of the old man ignorant of his son's shipwreck till he is washed ashore.¹⁴

4. κατὰ λόγον‎, accordingly.

τοῖς ἀποστήμασι‎, at successive epochs of time, i.e. by varying fortunes at successive epochs.

5 συνικνεῖσθαι‎, to converge so as to reach at last.

[fo. 7]

7 We have two conflicting views of εὐδαιμονίας‎, one that is stable, μόνιμόν τι‎, the other that it consists in good fortune. The first Ar. holds, the latter rejects.

9 ἢ τὸ μέν‎ like as in 2 above, τὸ‎ . . ἐπακολουθεῖν‎, a theory wh. wd. make happiness depend on fortune, like οἵ ῥεόντες‎¹⁵ for those who maintained πάντα ῥεῖ‎.¹⁶

προσδεῖται‎. The stress of the sentence lies on the προς‎.

κύριαι‎, what determines happiness .… τῆς εὐδαιμονίας‎, what determines happiness.

10 τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν‎, the question now before us. He means it testifies to happiness being μόνιμόν τι‎.

τούτων δ᾿ αὐτῶν‎. This means prob. the ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ᾿ ἀρετήν‎, not the ἐπιστήμας‎, but it is hard to tell. The meaning is that men ^those pg 219who^ practise them ^do it^ more persistently and continuously than men do with other things. Hence they are μονιμώτεραι‎.

11 ὅ γ᾿‎, the nominative repeated. τετράγωνος‎ square not cube.

About forgetting the sciences see Plato's Συμπόσιον‎.

Of the good man Aristotle says first he has a root of stability in himself, still (12) he is in some degree liable to change, that is, his μακαριότης‎ is, but not really his εὐδαιμονία‎, for he adds something to his definition of the latter.

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Chap. xiii the last division of the bk. is the greatest step after the def. of happiness.

The bk. has 4 parts (1) i–iii, introduction; (1 2) iv–vii 〈,definition etc of Happiness:〉; (3) 〈further exam. of Happiness esp. fr. τῶν λεγομένων‎,〉 viii–xii; (4) xiii, transition to next bk., wh. is on ἀρετῆς‎.

ἀρετή‎ is not so much Virtue as man at his best. Here we get in matter as well as form, a new view of it coming in. Hitherto it has meant the best condition of the faculties of the soul, now, more completely, the faculties in their best condition.

9 ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις‎, in the popular textbooks not in my popular etc — not exoteric doctrine: books are meant wh. all may use, written apart fr. the doctrine of any particular philosophy.

For the division of the soul spoken of see the Laws 863.

10 περιϕερείᾳ‎ rather curved surface than curved line.

11 εὐλογώτερον ἢ ἄλλην τινά‎, for it is more reasonable to assign this than any other cause.

12 ϕαίνεται‎ means what there is evidence for, however slight. δοκεῖ‎ is what ex used of that appearance wh. exists only to one's own thoughts and expresses belief, conviction, opinion. A historian may say δοκεῖ‎ that Nicias ruined the Sicilian expedition but the opinion is expression in itself wor is worth nothing, if he says ϕαίνεται‎, that is there is evidence he did. But in psychology etc δοκεῖ‎ is the stronger and comes to mean we must think, whereas ϕαίνεται‎ is merely it looks as if.

13 ᾗ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ ϕαύλη‎, so far as prevents our distinguishing good or bad, good or bad.

ψυχῆ‎ in Ar. is all the non-material part of man.

15 ἀτεχνῶς‎ simply; ἀτέχνως‎, unartistically.

18 ἔχειν λόγον‎, rationem habere, untranslateable in English.

pg 220ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν‎; the genit. depends on the conjunction, as in ὥστε τέκτονος‎ (Soph. Trach.),¹⁷ ὥς νόμου‎ (the Choeph.),¹⁸ ὥς θεοῦ‎ (Ajax).¹⁹

His an

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His analysis then is to shew that there are two kinds of ἀρετῆς‎, ἠθική‎ and διανοητική‎. Bk. ^Bks^ [fo. 8] IV–V II–V treat the former, bk. VI the latter.

There are then 3 parts of the soul, he says. These are τὸ ἄλογον‎ and τὸ λογον ἔχον‎: the latter is double, λόγον ἔχον κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ‎ and λόγου μέτεχον‎. The last reappears in each division and so we may speak of three parts.

subdivision of the soul —

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Bk. II, Chap. i, 1. ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους‎: Plato gave the hint for this in the Laws 792

2 ἐθίζῃ‎ : force of present shd. try to accustom.

3 οὔτ᾿‎, ἄρα ϕύσει οὔτε παρὰ ϕύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί‎ important, and useful to remember as the Aristotelian view. He

In 4 he says nature gives us faculties; the use of these is a step in advance of nature.

ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα‎, when we got them we first used them. This is the way to import the meaning of the aorist into a wd. like χρῆσθαι‎,

ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν‎, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν‎ often quoted wds. of his.

The steps are δύναμις‎ — ἐνέργεια‎ — ἕξις‎.

6 ϕθείρεται‎ (πᾶσα ἀρετὴ‎) is for (more correctly) γίγνεται πᾶσα κακία‎.

For the time being he assumes ἀρετὴν‎ and κακίαν‎ to be ἕξεις‎; He proves it afterwards.

The treatment of moral (ἠθικής‎) excellence is ἐθισμός‎, not διδασκαλία‎.

pg 221iii 3 2 Πλάτων‎: The passage most like this is in the Laws 622A–636D and there is something like it in the Republic.

3 εἰ ἀρεταί εἰσι‎, if these are virtues etc.

4 He means punishment is an artificial accompaniment of actions and proves that pleasure accompanies bad actions by supplying the opposite as a corrective or counterpoise.

See Mill's Logic, ii 417.²⁰

6 Meaning of ἡ τοιαύτη‎ doubtful; prob. it means a so–and–so (he afterwards defines it).

7 Hitherto he has spoken of motives; he now argues fr. objects.

To the three objects of desire, ^which are^ καλόν‎, συμϕέρον‎ (Socratic, and at times his own, ἀγαθόν‎), ἡδὺ‎, belong 3 ὀρέξεις‎, καλοῦ‎ (to this he never distinctly gives an ὄρεξιν‎: θυμός‎ comes nearest it), συμϕέροντος‎ (βούλησις‎), ἡδέος‎ (ἐπιθυμία‎).

10 καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ‎, and in fact virtue is here of a higher order. For ἡδονή‎ refers to lower emotions, θυμός‎ to higher, or rather, for there is a confusion of terms, ἡδονή‎ and λύπη‎ are attached to all emotions and so ἡδονή‎ being more prominent in the lower than in the higher ones is used to express these lower: θυμός‎ of course is itself an emotion.

iv 1, 2. In the arts we say ποιεῖν‎, ποίησις‎, in moral actions πράττειν‎, πρᾶξις‎.

6 τὸν λόγον‎, theory.

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So far in this bk. we have heard how virtue is acquired; fr. v and vi we are to hear what it is.

Bk. 1 gives us the def. of εὐδαιμονίας‎, this of ἀρετῆς‎, that is moral, not intellectual, virtue: though the latter is ἀρετή‎ too.

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v gives the ποι‎η‎ότητας‎, qualities, of the mind. δυναμι‎ In the Categories viii he names four ποιότητας‎: they are δύναμις‎, ἕξις‎, πάθος‎ (i.e. παθητικὴ ποιότης‎), σχῆμα‎.

2 rightly distinguishes betw. the πάθος‎ and the accompanying pleasure or pain, but he is not always so clear.

vi 3 gives the best differentiam of ἀρετῆς‎ 〈ἕξις ἀϕ᾿ ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀϕ᾿ ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει‎〉; that in pg 22215 〈ἕ‎. προαιρετική ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ κ‎. ὡς ὁ ϕρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν‎〉 is not so good.

4 συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ‎ gives genus and species — continuous and divisible things. See the De Caelo²¹ where he says that of ὀ‎ δέκα‎ is ten, τά δέκα‎ ten things the συνεχές‎ is always divisible: somewhere else he says it is that of wh. there is a common term of all the parts. Of διαιρετοῦ‎ there are two kinds, συνεχές‎ and διωρισμένον‎,

6 δέκα‎ is ten, τά δέκα‎ ten things

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vii 〈calls the excess, the defect, and the mean quality〉 διαθέσεις‎. This word is used by Aristotle (i) of ἕξεως‎ as its active or passive condition 〈, e.g. the habit of truthfulness may be considered actively as something wh. disposes the subject always to speak truth or passively as a series of acts th wh. are all disposed in the direction of truth〉; (ii) as τῆς‎ ἔχοντος μέρη‎ τοῦ ἔχοντος μέρη τάξεως‎, the internal condition of that wh. has parts. διάθεσις‎ is wider than ἕξις‎ and a διάθεσις‎ exists before a ἕξις‎ is formed.

4 ἐλευθεριότης‎, liberality wh. gives people the comforts of life. Not till after this is supplied does μεγαλοπρέπεια‎ step in. The latter is to clothe with something like with something like does μεγαλοπρέπεια‎ step in. The latter is to clothe life with something like the beauty wh. art gives.

9 κατὰ τὸν ὑϕηγημένον τρόπον‎, according to the path laid down.

12 Truth here is not objective but with ref. to oneself.

13 About ἡδὺ‎, the intellectual pleasure (τοῦ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἡδέος‎) is εὐτραπελία‎, in the other case the pleasure is rather fr. courteousness.

ἄρεσκος‎ is courtier-like as opposed to courteous.

15 νέμεσις‎ is joy at deserved misfortunes, displeasure at undeserved good. But a truer account of it is in his Rhetoric, where we are told that both these things, ϕθόνος‎ and ἐπιχαιρεκακία‎, are its excess side. Indifference wd. be the defect, the διάθεσις‎ on the defect side.

ix 4 κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον ϕασί πλοῦν‎ is fr. Menander.²² It means the second best, that is, taking to oars when the wind drops.

8 ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει‎, on the appreciation of the particular case.

pg 223Bk. iii.

Two things²³ to be said. The subj. is ἀναγκαῖον‎ for the πολιτικός‎, that is, the moral philosopher, lawyer, or statesman. Next that it is χρήσιμον‎.

The obj. of iiird bk. to settle meaning of προαίρεσις‎, wh. belongs to the defin. of ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθική‎. προαίρεσις‎ is species of genus

Value of this bk. in hist. of morals. Primary law sees nothing betw. homicide and murder. The next stage sanctuary, asylum, as in Greece, Rome, Israel, (Middle Ages). The next stage, as with Socrates, was the knowledge of what is right as criterion of virtue. Aristotle's advance was to bring forward προαίρεσις‎ instead of αἰδως‎ knowledge. These are the steps towards the philosophy of the will (wh. is the subj. of this bk.)

It is asked how far Aristotle had our conception of the will? We may say he knew and named the processes of volition but had not our notion of the will as a faculty. This was completed by the Stoics: There is no classical word for it, ἀρχὴ‎ nearest. Had Aristot. been asked what was the faculty wh. προαιρεῖται‎ he wd. most likely have said νοῦς‎ — νοῦς‎ θεω‎ πρακτικός‎ as opp. to ν‎. θεωρητικός‎.

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Man is conceived of as the ἀρχή‎ of action and as such is ἑκούσιος‎.

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I 10 Here as often, Aristotle avoids casuistry, as he says he will do

〈13–19 discusses and divides action in ignorance.〉

Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando, is the line of the schoolmen for the cases of ignorance²⁴

pg 224_____

Man is ἀρχή‎ of action but as he is only one inter alias ἀρχάς‎ it is very important to see what are the phenomena really hanging on this ἀρχῇ‎, what on other causes.

〈This chapter begins the enquiry by examining〉 τὸ ἑκούσιον‎ 〈wh.〉 is the genus of προαιρέσεως‎ : the differentia of the latter is given in ii.

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21, 24 25 ἴσως‎ — ἢ γελοῖον‎; Arist. speaking — 25 δοκεῖ‎, people think; a quoted opinion. It must be remembered that the whole of this treatise is a dialogue without the dramatic element. Like all anct. ethical works it is aporetic, not dogmatic.

26−27 gives the strongest of his arguments for ἐπιθυμίαν‎ and θυμόν‎ being voluntary, viz. that they are ἀνθρωπικὰ‎ just as λογός‎ is: this is contrary to Plato

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Origin of wds — like Duty, Obligation in our ethics is to be sought in the gt. influence of the Rom. law; though of course the idea of Duty, debitates, τοῦ τὰ ὀϕε‎‎ιλόμενα ἀποδιδόναι‎, did as a useful metaphor exist in Greece.²⁵

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ii 3

ἢ‎ θυμός‎ in Plato wide — the active principle in man; in Ar. narrow, almost physical — resentment.

βούλησις‎ fully discussed shortly (in iv), but there is an ambiguity abt. it. Here it is the special wish, in th later the tendency of our character.

The identification of προαιρέσεως‎ and δόξης‎, seemingly little needful, was agst. the Socratics.

13 ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς‎, or for its being rightly made. ἢ‎ or, not than : this a fault in speech.

iii 3, ἀϊδίων‎ eternal.

7 Causes are perh. fullest classified here — ϕύσις‎, ἀνάγκη‎, τύχη‎, νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι᾿ ἀνθρώπου‎. See also VI. ἀνάγκη‎ wd. seem to refer to necessary truths, mathematics, a priori physics; ϕύσις‎ is the principle of things wh. have power [fo. 11] of moving in themselves; τύχη‎ is not all chance but things as apart fr. design or ἀνάγκης‎. The division is incomplete and unscientific — rough and for the time,

8 In the Aristotelian view the certainty or uncertainty of sciences etc depends not on us but on the things themselves.

pg 225πῶς γραπτέον‎, what symbol we shall use to express a particular sound.

11 Process of βουλεύσεως‎ — θέσθαι τέλος τι‎, then to analyse, cause by cause, till we reach the ἀρχήν‎, wh. is ourselves.

ἀρετή‎ (bk. VI), βούλησις‎ (here, 19), and νοῦς‎ or αἴσθησις‎ (De Anima)²⁶ are all considered as setting the τέλος‎ of βουλεύσεως‎.

17 τὸ ἡγούμενον‎. We seem to find νούς‎ is τὸ ἡ‎ (ἀνθρώπου‎): See X vii 8, 9 and IX x 4, where the mind, νοῦς‎, is said to be the man :. See the whole question in De An. III iii. — with the Stoics τὸ ἡ‎, or τὸ ἡγεμονικόν‎ has become the title for the will.

See Pol. I v 6 for another such parallel betw. man and the state.

19 κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν‎. See De An. III x 4, where βούλησις‎ (? 〈?〉 and ἐπιθυμία‎ are taken as aims at good and bad respectively.

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v 19 τὸ δι᾿ αὑτὸν‎, individuality

The arg. of this part is — Objected that man cannot get beyond his nature; his ϕαντασία‎ leads him, by nature, to whatever he does: answer — He is responsible for his ϕαντασίᾳ‎, or hypothecially allowing the objection true yet virtue and vice are equally voluntary or involuntary, whichever it is; they stand on the same ground.

For ϕαντασίᾳ‎ (17) cf. ϕαντάξειν‎, bk. 1 near end 〈?〉 and De An. I iii 〈III iii 13 or III viii 3 ?〉. It is the power wh. images things to us, differing fr. αἰσθήσεως‎ in being active, not passive, and as being possibly wrong while αἴ‎ αἴσθησις‎ is always right.

This question of ϕύσεως‎ under a covered form appears in I ix. A good nature is a necessary condition of virtue but not itself virtue. Cf. X ix 6 and Rep. VI 492 A and II 366 C. Plato prefers to speaks [sic] of Θείας μοίρας‎ (almost Grace), Aristot- [fo. 13] le of ϕύσεως‎.

22 There are degrees of voluntariness. This is important.

23 Here we begin almost a new book, the central pt. of the former part being προαιρέσεως‎. Now we discuss the virtues specifically. We have been limiting ἀρετήν‎ step by step throughout, first as excellence, then as human, then as psychical, then as moral, now as specific virtues.

pg 226How far is the morality wh. follows methodical? How far the true summary of Gk. ethics and feeling? How far of modern?

Of the first we must remember that this treatise unlike the Rep. is inartistic and is unfinished. Moreover it differs fr. mod. works in its tentativeness.

What internal evidence is there of his principles of arrangement. Explicitly III x 1 〈?〉 is the only place.

Of Gk. morality what follows is a pretty complete account. With regard to modern of course the social and political character of anct. ethics is what marks them off. For ours cf. εὐτραπελίαν‎, μεγαλοψυχίαν‎, μεγαλοπρέπειαν‎, and ἀλήθειαν‎, wh. is really a sort of politeness, not to be an αὐθέκαστον‎, a literalist, nor an εἴρωνα‎. Duties are not to our fellow men as men but to the state.

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viii 6 κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου‎. see Thuc. IV xxvi 〈?〉. Tacitus says inania belli.

The justification for Soc. in saying courage is an ἐπιστήμη‎ is that knowledge makes us despise sham dangers (τὰ κενά‎) and use our courage to the best adantage.

This ἐμπειρία‎ is the common point of military and of true courage

10 Spirit, θυμός‎, too has been thought courage, the justification being that courage is or often is accompanied by it.

He shd. have treated this first, for it is the ϕυσικὴ ἀρετή‎. He afterwards treats of ϕυσικῶν ἀρετῶν‎ as the foundations of κυρίων ἀρετῶν‎. 〈Or is chapter ix meant or anything in qui fact later than chap viii 10?〉

ix 4−6. cf. ix viii 9 for a negative instance argument of Aristotle's absence of any sanction fr. the expectation of immortality.

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Bk. IV

i 1 ἡ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης‎. Sometimes Ar. uses μεσόττ‎ with regards to the emotions it balances between, sometimes, as here, the objects, subject-matter.

It appears that an exhaustive division being implied if not made ἐλευθερία‎ falls under σοϕίαν‎, ϕρόνησιν‎ rather than any of the other cardinals.

Fr. his not noticing benevolence as a motive we see (as generally) his defect in psychology.

pg 22711 οὐδέ‎ . . πάνυ‎ quite another thing than ^from^ οὐ πάνυ‎.

18 σϕόδρα‎ belongs to ὑπερβάλλειν‎. With σ‎. καὶ τὸ ὑ‎. cf. οὕτω καὶ‎ etc.

20 Love of parents and poets to their own ἔργα‎ cf. IX vii 3, Rep. I 330.

24 ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις‎. This illustrates a usage of P. and Ar., τοιοῦτος‎ being a pronoun wh. merely recalls the attention. Here it is for ἐπιεικής‎.

27 Simonides: in Rhet he quotes him as saying it is better to be πλούσιον‎ than σοϕόν‎, and again he said

•                               πράξας δ᾽ἀνὴρ εὖ καλός‎, εἰ δὲ μη κακός‎.

Aristoph. in the Peace quotes him, and of course Plato, οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος‎, not liking, not agreeing with.

29 δαπάνη‎ is given for an equivalent, δόσις‎ not. δα‎. is spending money on oneself.

30 οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι‎, and these seem to be properly ἄσωτοι‎.

34 ὀλιγώρως‎, ungraciously: nothing makes men so selfish as spending in this way. 〈?〉

38 διατείνει ἐπὶ πολύ‎, it is very common.

39 κίμβικες‎: in a gloss of Hesychius κιμβάζειν‎ is sa explained as διατρίβειν καὶ στραγγεύεσθαι‎ 〈?〉. κίμβιξ‎ is one who haggles.

42 ὀνείδη‎ jeers, not shame: "populus me sibilat, at mihi plaudo / Ipse domi".²⁷

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ii 6 τὸ ὡρισμένον‎, their definiteness rather than definition.

κήδη‎, funerals. 7.

9 κατακλίσει‎ is giving place at dinner.

χρῆσιν‎ is use, service.

10 en ὁμογενῶν‎, cognate cases probably. So in categories he says a mountain may be small, a κέγχρος‎²⁸ millet seed, great, by comparison with ὁμογενῆ‎.

iii 4 οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ᾿ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς‎, They will not have these feelings toward each other.

pg 228iv endeavours to give deeper insight into friendship, shewing it is self-conscious and regards in the friend what he regards in himself, and to this end contrasts the self-consciousness of the bad and good man.

τὰ ϕιλικὰ‎ meant to be vague to include πράξεις‎ and πάθη‎.

3 # τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν‎, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ‎ is a more definite acct. of individuality than we get in the Xth bk.

4 ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον‎. cf. τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας‎, end of last chapter. Construe no one who has become other than he was wishes that the thing that was (his old self) shd. have all good indiscriminately. The good alone can wish to keep his present εἶναι‎, for the bad man wishes good for himself but with a change of εἶναι‎.

ἀλλ᾿ ὢν ὅ τι ποτ᾿ ἐστίν‎. This Riddell takes # as describing going on with ὁ θεὸς‎, not making that clause a parenthesis.

5 θεωρημάτων εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ‎, he abounds in subjects of contemplation for his thought.

For 6 δύο ἢ πλείω‎, see V vi.

10, last sentence, has more action than anything in the Ethics.

v 1 διάτασιν‎, intensity.

^2^ 3, v. 2 μεταϕέρων‎, metaphorically, that is by a play, ^on the word^ ἀργὴν‎ for ἀρχὴν ϕιλίας‎,

^vi 2^ 2. Πίττακον‎. He was αἰσυμνήτης‎²⁹ at Mitylene 490−480 and then resigned

ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ‎, but with reference to the same person.

καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται‎, as in Plato's 2nd Alcibiades.

3 ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντ‎ων‎^ες‎^ = τ‎ ἐϕιέμεν‎ων‎^οι‎^ τῶν αὐτῶν‎.

vii 1 Epicharmus also said χαλεπὸν ἐκ μὴ καλῶς ἐχόντων λέγειν καλῶς‎.

See also bk. X ix 23 — ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σῴζει‎ etc, for ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους‎.

3 Abt. the poets see IV i 20 and Rep. somewhere

4 ἐνεργείᾳ δὴ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως‎. The paraphrast most likely right in saying the author is in a sense his own work, and he says ἡ γὰρ οἰκοδομικὴ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ‎³⁰ (— the trans. is clearer tho' thus — the work is the doer projected in act —) καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὴ ἡ οἰκία ὁ τεχνίτης ἐνεργείᾳ‎.

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viii The resolution of the ἀπόρημα‎ (whether self love is right) is that their^re^ are two senses of ϕίλαυτος‎.

1 οὐθὲν ἀϕ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ πράττει‎, he does nothing disinterestedly cf. ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος‎ and some other uses of ἀπό‎.

2 ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ‎ prob. is genitive of αὐτό‎, it, viz. the relation to oneself.

7 πάντ᾿‎ . . τὰ δέοντα‎. The discharge of their duty, brachylogy.

9 τυχόντως‎, ordinarily, like ὁ τυχών‎.

ix Arguments for the need of friends in 3 classes, 1–4 rhetorical, 5–7, 1st sentence, moral considerations, thence to end, psychological ones.

The quotation (1) is fr. the Orestes.

4 τί‎ . . λέγουσιν‎; what is the worth of what they say?

5 ἄμϕω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ ϕύσει ἡδέα‎. for they have both the elements of pleasure, viz. that they are good and that they are appropriated — that is because the κοινὰ τὰ ϕίλων‎. See next verse εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας‎.

6 ὃ δεῖ‎ prob. means τὸ ἡδεῖαν εἶναι τὴν ἐνέργειαν‎.

7 The quotation is made verbatim in part in xii 3 — εσ‎ ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ᾿ ἐσθλά‎ — wh. goes on

ὡρισμένον γάρ‎, τὸ δ᾿ ὡρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ ϕύσεως‎. 〈For it is definite^terminate^ and the determinate is of the essence of the good, see II vi 14.

9 τὸ δ᾿ ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα‎ = τὸ δ᾿ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα‎.

x The whole line is πολ‎ μητὲ πολύξεινον μήτ᾿ ἄξεινον καλέεσθαι‎,³¹ Hesiod. Ἔργα‎ι‎ καὶ ἡμ‎.

2 τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶς περίεργοι‎. Better to understand ἐχόντων‎ than to take ἱκανῶς‎, as Grant,³² with περίεργοι‎, but the other reading is ἱκανῶν‎.

3 In the Politics he says 10,000 is the ideal no. for a city.

5 διόπερ‎ shd. not have a full stop before it.

6 ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων‎, in fact.

This πολιτικὴ ϕιλία‎ is better than the being ἄρεσκος‎

4. ^xi 4^ ὑπερτείνῃ‎ must have for subj. the same as ὑπομένει‎. He means It means, if he is not excessively stern.

5 ἅλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν‎ is not found anywhere.

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v 2 ὀργή‎: see VIII [2 cm space],³³ where he says it is ἐπὶ ϕαινομένῃ ἀδικίᾳ‎. Notice that it is a painful emotion: in the Rhet. it is defined as ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας ϕαινομένης‎.³⁴

8 ᾗ ϕανεροί εἰσι‎, in the way that is characteristic of them: you see the worst of them therefore — odd.

vi Three virtues of social life now follow — Courtesy, Candour (both nameless in Greek), and εὐτραπελία‎. The pleasure given by the first is — well, that pleasure wh. courtesy gives; εὐτραπελία‎ gives intellectual pleasure, the pleasure wh. belongs to παιδίᾳ‎, amusement; the other gives scarcely a distinguishable kind of pleasure, being itself almost colourness.

See IX x 6 for another mention of this ϕιλικοῦ‎ (the Courteous) as a πολιτικοῦ ϕίλου‎. He is one who has εὐνοίαν‎, not τὸ στέργειν‎.

4 τὸν ἐπιεικῆ ϕίλον‎, the genuine friend.

8 τοῖς δ᾿ ἀποβαίνουσιν ἐὰν ᾖ μείζω‎, συνεπόμενος‎ and taking account of results, if they outweigh 〈the advantage of his agreeable temper〉.

vii 1 τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος‎, the elements of character.

12 ἐν τῇ δυνάμει‎. He means his vice does not lie in the act but in the object proposed to the mind.

15 οἱ‎ . . τὰ μικρὰ καὶ τὰ ϕανερὰ προσποιούμενοι‎, those who make their claims to (that is, and only to) small things and what no one doubts they have got.

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Bk. vi.

i, 1. ἀνίησιν‎, lit. slackens.

5. It was a principle throughout (Philoloas the Pythagorean, Empedokles γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν‎. ὕδατε ὕδωρ‎ {we know earth by earth and water by water}) Gk. philosophy that we apprehend like by like.

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τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι‎. In Ethics the sphere of human agency. See III, iii, 7.

τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν‎ are facts ^laws^ of science — not facts of nature.

ii. 1,2. τρία‎ — πρακτική‎ explan. of the λογιστικόν‎

3. Explan. of the ἐπιστημονικόν‎.

pg 2314. Explan. and restatement and analysis of προα‎ προαίρεσις‎ — to explain conn. of the intellectual part with the non-intellectual.

iii, 1 ἐπιστήμη‎, νοῦς‎, σοϕία‎ are one, τέχνη‎, ϕρόνησις‎ the other divis. of the mind. ϕρόνησις‎ is wisdom, practical wisdom, if σοϕία‎ is philosophy.

ὑπόληψις‎ the most general word of all includes all those and δόξα‎: apprehension.

2. μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ὁμοιότησιν‎ not to be led by the mere analogical or metaphorical uses of the word.

ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν‎ out of our ken.

ἀΐδιον‎ independent of time, rather than eternal.

3. διδασκαλία‎ has a meaning of demonstrable^tes^ knowledge or truth.

About ἐπαγωγή‎, induction, notice that it can give no necessity to anything, except so far as the mind impresses necessity. Grant³⁵ says experience is the condition, but not the cause, of necessary truths.

Def of nec. truths ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος‎.

And he says Eth. ii, 11th chap, we know anything when we can give the αἰτία‎

iv, About τύχη‎ etc. τύχη‎ is nearest of the four causes to τὸ ἀνθρωπινόν‎, for both remodel nature and so these also are secondary causes, ϕύσις‎ preexisting

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v. 5 σῴζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν‎, viz. about τὰ ανθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ ἤ κακά‎.

The etymology of ϕρόνησις‎ is fr. Plato's Cratylus:

6. ὥστ᾿ ἀνάγκη‎, ἀνάγκη‎ generally logical reason, logical necessity.

7. ἕξιν ἀληθῆ‎ —

pg 2327. ϕρονήσεως δ᾿ οὐκ ἔστιν‎, because ϕρόνησις‎ is perfect of itself, an ἀρετὴ‎ of itself. For τέχνη‎ has no more element. An art may be good as an art and yet bad of itself (as forging?)

ϕρόνησις‎ and σοϕία‎ are the two ἀρεταί‎ of the two divisions of the λόγον ἐχόν‎ part of the soul spoken of at the end of chap. ii this book.

8. Loose use of δὀξα‎, wh. elsewhere means unpractical opinion wh. begins and ends in thought without action.

ἀλλὰ μὴν‎ etc. cf. I, x, 10. The reason why ϕρόνησις‎ is more μονιμὸς‎ than ἐπιστήμη‎ is because it must always be being exercised.

vi, 1. οὐδὲ δὴ σοϕία τούτων ἐστίν‎, nor are these the special province of philosophy —

He says On the Soul that νοῦς‎ is the mental representation of ideas, αἴστησις‎ of αἰσθητῶν‎.

vii τε‎ answered ungrammatically only by δέ‎: 2

3. ἀληθεύειν‎ shd. be infallible.

4. τὸ‎ . . εὖ θεωροῦν‎, the being that does so, not the faculty.

At 6 we begin again with ϕρόνησις‎, and this is in fact a division of the bk. Fr. here to end of viii we have the object matter of ϕρόνησις‎, then to xi, 1 a psychological analysis.

4. το‎ ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν‎ fr. the (formal, not material) constituents of the universe. ϕανερώτατα‎ most evidently not most evident.

5. περιττὰ‎, curious, out of the common beat.

Θαλῆν‎. His name became proverbial for an unpractical philosopher

6. κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν‎, in the way of calculation

Six coordinate kinds of ϕρόνησις‎, viz.

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viii, 1. τὸ εἶναι‎, the concrete existence, not at all = τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι‎. It almost = then their concrete manifestations.

2. to make the Gk. symmetrical we shd. have to say ὡς τα‎-καθ‎-εκαστ‎-ική‎.

pg 2332. τὸ γὰρ ψήϕισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον‎, the decree is an alternate detail.

4. He takes exceptions to ϕρόνησις‎ being a part of γνῶσις‎, but strictly he allows it is.

After μετασχεῖν‎ add

•                               τῷ σοϕωτάτῳ τύχης‎;
•                         οὐδὲν γαρ οὕτω γαῦρον ὡς ἀνὴρ ἔϕυ‎,

and after πλέον‎

•                     τιμῶμεν ἄνδρας‎ ο‎τ᾽ἐν πόλει νομίζομεν‎,

fragm. of the Philoctetes.³⁶

πῶς δ᾿ ἂν ϕρονοίην‎; How shd. I care to be wise

Nom. to ζητοῦσι‎ is οἱ περὶ αὑτοὺς εἰδότες‎.

τὰ μεν οὐ πιστεύουσι‎. These are the empirical (not mathematical) truths.

7. ϕρόνησις‎ is concerned with the ultimate details of action and of t perception (tho' not with principles).

9. τῶν ἰδίων‎, of single sensations.

A distinction he draws here betw. sensation and perception. The latter is a complicatation of the former and gives us a complicated apprehension of any thing.

ἀλλ᾿ οἵᾳ‎, but similar to that by wh. — See VII, viii, 4.

στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ‎, for these too demonstration will stop. στήσεται‎ sort of impersonal. See Apol. Soc. οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ‎ (a certain bad custom) ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ‎.

ϕρόνησις‎ he means to say finally does not give us these ultimate details (that αἴσθησις‎ does) but uses them, etc.

_____

Now we have a psychological exam. of ϕρόνησις‎ thro' its parts, e.g. ϕ‎υλ‎ εὐβουλία‎.

εὐβουλία‎ is ὀρθότης βουλῆς ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική δι᾿ οὗ ἔδει κατὰ τὸ ὠϕελιμὸν πρὸς τὸ τέλος‎.

It is defined τὸ γνῶναι περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου‎ ^καλῶς‎^ ἀθρόον καὶ ἄνευ μελετῆς‎. Post. Anal. xxxiv, 1st bk. — ἀγχίνοια‎ refers to only the abstract kind of questions, whereas εὐστοχία‎ is math.cal as well. He pg 234defines ἀγχίνοια‎ as ἄσκεπτος ἀπόδοσις τοῦ μέσου‎ (τοῦ μέσου‎ being governed by ἄσκεπτος‎),

3. δόξα οὐδεμία‎ is to exclude those who said all was δόξα‎ and some the best we cd. get was δ‎. ἀληθής‎.

ὥρισται ἤδη‎, it has been already settled in the mind, opposed to βούλευσις‎.

οὔπω ϕάσις‎. For διάνοια‎, thought, is antecedent to judgment.

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ὃ προτίθεται ἰδεῖν‎, wh. he sets before himself as a σκίπος‎

5. ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ‎ etc. but that the middle term shd. be wrong. that is : since strictly a term cannot be false.

x. 2. ἐπιτακτικὴ‎ and κριτική‎. This is from the Politics — ϕρόνησις ἐπιτάσσει τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη‎.

1. τῶν γιγνομένων ὁτουοῦν‎. any kind of things that come into being. That is it is abt. τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ‎ human agency, not by ϕύσις‎ or τύχη‎.

xi, 1. τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς‎, of what is fair. This is shewn by τοῦ ἀληθοῦς‎. wh. must refer not to a man but to a thing.

τὸ ἐπιεικὲς‎ implies is right dealing with others, thus γνώμη‎ is considerateness. and therefore the ϕρόνιμος‎ must consider others as well as himself.

σύνεσις‎ is κρίσις‎ for yr. own sake therefore

γνώμη‎ – — others' .

The diff. of γνώμη‎ and συγγνώμη‎ is not touched here. συγγνώμη‎ is allowance for injury.

4. τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων‎, gives the and primary grounds.

The final cause is τὸ ἀγαθόν‎, but as we cannot gain this all at once we have a particular aim in each particular act. The good must be realised in small particulars.

5. ϕυσικά‎, natural faculties.

6. ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία‎ = the young.

ταῖς ἡλικίαις‎, different ages. Youth has νοῦς‎ and γνώμη‎. Age has ἐκ τούτων‎.

ἐκ τούτων‎ etc. for demonstration is fr. the object of νοῦς‎ and abt. the object of αἴσθησις‎.

pg 235ἐκ τούτων‎, i.e. objects of νοῦς θεωρητικός‎. περὶ τούτων‎, i.e. objects of νοῦς αἰσθητικός‎. ἀπόδειξις‎ comes betw. the 2 kinds of νοῦς‎.

xii, 1. γενέσεως‎, either πρᾶξις‎ or ποίησις‎.

τῷ ἁπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι‎, fr. being symptoms of the state of health.

2. τοῦ γίνεσθαι‎, for the sake of you wise.

3. κυριωτέρα‎ = ἐπιτακτική‎.

xii, 5. καὶ ποιοῦσι‎. Tho' this plural is restricted to σοϕία‎.

Here he mentions 4 μόρια‎ of the soul, the nutritive or vegetative (θρεπτικόν‎), the ὀρεκτικὸν‎, and the mind in two divisions θεωρητικὸν‎ and λογιστικόν‎.

There are two things, πῶς ἔχειν‎ and πῶς πράττειν‎. The first belonging to ἀρετή‎, the other, ἑτέρας δυνάμεως‎.

8. ἐπιστήσασι‎ (understand τὴν διάνοιαν‎) for it is transitive strictly), pausing, or attentively

10. The eye of the soul is ϕρόνησις‎.

τοῦτο δ᾿ εἰ‎ etc. There should be no capital.

ἀρχὴν‎ their pre ^etc.^; have for their premise — whatever is the chief good

xiii. Meaning of 1st sentence is that ϕρόνησις‎ is related to δεινότης‎, so virtue has its relations, viz. etc.

1. διαϕέρει‎, this makes all the difference to it in action.

4. εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἅ ἐστι‎, specifying also its object.

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Bk. X.

vi 2 See 1 v 〈6〉. where he says εὐδαιμονία‎ is not an ἀρετή‎.

ἀναγκαῖαι‎ here in the pop. sense of what is prescribed by our needs.

3 ἀϕ᾿ ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται‎, fr. wh. no results are looked for.

παιδιά‎ is amusement.

4 ἀποσχολάζειν‎: ἀπο‎ here and in ἀποκαλεῖν‎, ἀποχρῆσθαι‎, etc has a bad sense, as in use.

σπουδαῖος‎ here is applied to what is good of its kind.

6 σπουδάζειν‎ sqq. See Laws 803

δοκεῖ δ᾿ ὁεὐδαίμων βίος κατ᾿ ἀρετὴν εἶναι‎. εὐδαιμονία‎ is ἀρετὴ τῆς ψυχῆς‎.

8 εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου‎ prob. means Unless you raise him to a level with yourself. There is a proverb in the Pol. οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις‎; for leisure is pg 236what an Athenian free man especially claimed for himself. The Romans used vacare in the same way. See vii 6.

vii Ar. divides θεωρίαν‎ into three things — θεολογικήν‎, ϕυσικήν‎, μαθηματικήν‎.

1 νοῦς‎ must here be taken as suggesting the whole of σοϕίας‎. The quality wh. δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι‎ must be nearer σοϕίᾳ‎ than ϕρονήσει‎, for we are told at end of VI that ϕρόνησις‎ acts ἕνεκα ἐκείνης‎, that is, τῆς σοϕίας‎.

2 καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν‎, περὶ ἃ ὁ‎ νοῦς‎, and of the subjects of knowledge (those are the highest) abt. wh. νοῦς‎ is.

7 λαβοῦσα μῆκος‎. So ὕψος λαμβάνειν‎ etc.

8 ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν‎, he is a man.

τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν‎. And the converse is given by Plato in Rep. IV, that τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν‎ takes up the most room, is πλεῖστον‎.

viii is parenthetical abt. the πολιτικὸν βίον‎.

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ix 21 εὐσυνετώτεροι‎ sqq. This clause we shd. have put first.

22 Notice ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρωπινὰ ϕιλοσοϕία‎.

23 ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων‎, in the light of the collection.

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ix, 21 εὐσυνετώτεροι‎ etc. This clause we shd. have put first.

22 Note ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρωπινὰ ϕιλοσοϕία‎.

23 ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων‎, in the light of the collection.

___

X, 1. See II. iii and last, III, x (division of pleasures) and VII, iv (another), xii – end (disquisition like this in bk. X) and a division at X, v. This one better than in VII.

No partic. reason why μετὰ ταῦτα‎ shd. be said, why it shd. be here particularly.

τῷ γένει ἡμῶν‎, to us as men.

2. Antisthenes allowed ἡδονὰς τὰς μετὰ πόνου‎, pleasures earned. He said μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην‎,³⁷ but he meant as a pursuit.

3. τοιαύτην οὖσαν‎, legitimate is meant.

4. ἐπέλθωμεν‎, ἐπελθεῖν‎ is to review.

pg 237ii, 2. καὶ αὔξεσθαι ΔΗ‎. This is prop. neither stated by Eudoxus nor accepted by Aristotle but drawn out by him to disprove it.

3. Plato's argument is fr. the Philebus, 20−22 abt.

4. οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν‎, that may share, as not an ideal merely good

5. Eudoxus had used the argum. περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου‎. And Speusippus (see VII, xiii) answered him. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται‎,³⁸ and this is the opposition.

iii begins strangely, but it seems that as Eudoxus was criticised just before so the Cynics here.

Aristotle comes to conclusions something like Plato's, especially he agrees that ἡδονή‎ is a γένεσις‎ and a κίνησις‎, that it is μικτή‎, and ?

³⁹iii, 1. Plato seems (see Theaet. 182 A) to have invented ποιότης‎. See also Phileb. 55 B where

see also Phileb. 55 B. The argum. there was drawn out by the Cynics.

9. ϕυσικῶς‎ may be translated psychologically rather than ph metaphysically.

ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία‎, where the province and sense begins.

A δόξα‎ "περὶ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστα‎" is not a minor premise, not περὶ τινος τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστα‎.

ὅταν μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν‎, the two majors may coincide or may not

struggle in the ἐγκρατὴς‎ and ἀκρατής‎ but not in the σώϕρων‎ and ἀκόλαστος‎.

13. ἡ τελευταία πρότασις‎ must mean the last mental judgment before jud action, but this — τούτου οὐ δεῖ γένεσθαι‎ the man disregards.

Between this and Chap. viii —

We have already discussed sinning agst. knowledge,

Now chap. iv takes up περὶ ποῖα ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ἀκρατής‎

where ἀναγκαῖος‎ means pleasures wh. may only be indulged as far as nature demands.

And αἱρετὰ καθ᾿ αὑτά‎ eligible in the abstract case, tho' they might injure you or me.

pg 238Next he says that tho' ἀκρασία‎ is of bodily pleasures we must except fr. these the morbid or θηριωδεῖς‎.

vi gives an estimate of one ἀκρασία‎, that θυμοῦ‎, wh. is better than ἀκρασία ἁπλῶς‎.

Then come τρυϕὴ‎, μαλακία‎, ἀσθένεια‎, προπέτεια‎.

In vii 8. ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλί[ζονται]‎

viii, 1. ἡ δ‎ε‎᾿ ἀκρασία οὐ λάνθανει‎ means the ἀκρατὴς‎ knows all the time.

κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι‎ is a verbal contradiction to i, 4. What he means is that ἀκρασία‎ is not a species of κακία‎, or at least the proximate genus is not the same.

4. αἱ ὑποθέσεις‎ he uses in his technical sense of facts. It is the postulate of the existence of a thing, not same as θέσις‎.

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Bk. VII

i Besides the characters that lie in the plane of human nature he mentions those that lie above and below it.

3 Abt. the "σεῖος ἀνήρ‎" he borrows servilely fr. Plato.

4 ἀκρασία‎ is yielding to pleasure, μαλακία‎ to pain; τρυϕὴ‎ is a species of genus μαλακίας‎. See vii 1–5. So on the other hand ἐγκρατειὰ‎ refers to pleasure, καρτερία‎ to pain.

5 οὔτω‎, thereupon.

ii 10 εἰ γὰρ ἐπέπειστο ἃ πράττει‎, for if he had not been persuaded abt. his acts, viz. that they are wrong. It means, if he had no conviction he might have been persuaded into one. The connection is not well made out, because before we are told of a man who sins on conviction of its being right.

11 For this see Protag. 352 B.

12 He elsewhere⁴⁰ defines ἀπόρημα‎ as — well ἔνστασις‎ is a contradiction of a premiss, ἀπόρημα‎ and ἔλεγχος‎ of a conclusion and so as to pg 239prove an opposite one, ἔλ‎. being συλλογισμὸς διαλεκτικὸς ἀντιϕάσεως‎, ἀ‎. merely σ‎. ἀντιϕάσεως‎. Here he means we must overthrow one side and leave — that is, let stand, as true ) — the other. See Philebus. ἀπορία‎ differs fr. ἀπορήματος‎ as implying two opposite conclusions, while this latter means an opposite conclusion.

iii 2 ἀρχὴ‎ is the foundation of the enquiry, not the actual starting-point.

4 Heracleitus said ἕπεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ‎,⁴¹ this wisdom of the universe, universal reason, pantheistic reason, being the only real knowledge. But he added ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ‎.⁴²

6 ἀλλ᾿ εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε‎, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ‎, but whether the particular things belongs to the class he either does not apprehend or it does not act in him.

〈His conclusion then is —〉

ἐπίστασθαι μὴ χρῆσθαι‎ is possible,

And this 〈possibility〉 is applicable to τῇ κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστήμῃ‎.

And in the ἀκρατεῖ‎ the cause for this taking place exists.

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Bk. V —

On Justice, wh. comes here in its order of the cardinal virtues.

The method he speaks of (i 2) he uses afterwards (abt. pleasure, bk. X. etc) and before (abt. happiness). It is to exhaust first τὰ λεγόμενα‎ and τὰ ϕαινόμενα‎ and then to come down to a more scientific investigation.

He says nothing of the παθ‎η‎^ῶν‎^ wh. scarcely come in to questions of justice, and it is concerned with material, not spiritual good things. ὄρεξις ἀγαθοῦ‎ comes into it therefore but not καλοῦ‎.

5 μὲν οὖν‎, notwithstanding, nevertheless.

A ἕξις‎ is not capable, he says in 4, of developing δυνάμεις‎ for good and bad (for every ἕξις‎ develops a δύναμιν‎ or δυνάμεις‎ of it own, and not opposite ones), but for things not good or bad a ἕξις‎ is a δύναμις‎ merely and may be reasoned about as δύναμις‎.

Note that it is only in reasoning things that a δύναμις‎ is τῶν ἐναντίων‎ — water cannot run upwards because it has a δύναμιν‎ of running downwards.

pg 2408 ἄδικος‎ includes παράνομος‎ and ἄνισος‎, and ἄν‎. has a sub-species πλεονέκτης‎, for the ἄν‎. not only — as the πλεονέκτης‎ — takes too much, e.g. in sharing property, but also — and this is not true of the πλεονέκτου‎ — too little e.g. of any common toil.

9 ἁπλῶς‎, in the abstract case (not absolutely, positively) Cf. VI ix 7. These ἀγαθά‎ are afterwards enumerated in some degree.

15 Phocylides (fragm. 14) and Theognis repeating him give the line "ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ‎" etc. The morning and evening star is rather a common figure than a quotation.

20 For τὸ εἶναι‎ of De Anim. III vii 2 〈Rogers gives references III ii 4 and III xii 2〉,⁴³ where a good instance occurs, that of avoidance and pursuit.

ii He begins by answering εἰ ἐστὶ‎, then (in 8) 7 / ἔστι‎ and (12) divides into species, εἰ ἐστὶ‎, i. e. δικαιοσύνη ἐν μέρει‎, he shews by 3 reasons in 2, 4, 5. — very hard to distinguish the last of these fr. the first – perhaps by the word ἀδικήματα‎

4 προστιθεὶς‎. This is also used thus idiomatically in Euthyphro.

9 ὥστε καὶ‎ gives the virtual apodosis to ἐπεὶ δέ‎.

11 Division of Justice —

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iv 5 means the words κέρδος‎ and ζημία‎ come to be used when the case of injury comes to be measured, and to that end are translated by the law into terms of money.

12 τὸ ἐϕ᾿ ὧν ΓΔ‎, the line between the pts. at wh. (that is, strictly, the points) are ΓΔ‎.

After "ΒΒ τῷ ΓΔ‎" comes in the MSS a passage left out in Rogers a and printed where it is repeated in v 9 — ἔστι‎ — τοιοῦτον‎ wh. shd. be kept. Ar. makes the same sort of appeal to τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας‎ and speaks of something as found ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν‎ in Pol. III vi 7, xiii 21. An argument for its genuineness here is that we find much the same in Gorgias, applied too as here to corrective justice. It is more really difficult to see how it applies in V.

pg 24113 ἄδειαν ἔδωκεν‎, has left the parties to make their own terms. It was a question (IX I 9) whether the law shd. interfere as to ἑκ‎ ἑκούσια συμβολαῖα‎. See Rep. 506 A and the Laws.

14 αὐτὰ δι᾽αὐτῶν‎, literally themselves only acting on themselves the things in their normal conditions — used twice in Rep. (510 B, 511 C).

v 10 Meaning of ὥστε καὶ‎ etc is It measures things by themselves and also with ref. to other things.

11 οἷον‎ δ‎, a sort of. No need to put a stop before it.

εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν δέοιντο ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως‎. that is, If they do not want mutually — the architect wanting shoes but the cobbler not wanting a house.

12 ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυτοτόμον‎, The relation of the unit of value (say a sheep) of the farmer to that of the unit of value (say a pair of shoes) of the cobbler.

εἰς σχῆμα‎ etc means this. The ratio in the first case is

γεωργός σκυτοτόμος‎          ἔργον σκυτοτόμου‎          ἔ‎. γεωργοῦ‎

    3      :          1          =                        6              :          2

but after their exchange —

γεωργός σκυτοτόμος‎            σ‎.          γ‎.

    3      :          1          =        2    :        6

so that (now) the γεωργός‎ has the greater mathematical amount in both ratios.

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13 διδόντες σίτου ἐξαγωγῆς‎, willing to giv give it in exchange for leave to export corn fr. the other's country.

18 τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως‎, the whole result is the same (as when he was interested), viz. it is unequally distributed — τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ὁποτέρως ἔτυχε‎, but the violation of proportion, 〈in wh.〉 the injustice 〈lies〉, is as it may chance.

vi, vii Restriction of the sphere of justice — justice in the family, master and slave, etc.

vi 4 καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον κ‎. τ‎. πολιτικὸν δ‎., not so much the generic as the political (specific) justice.

καθ᾿ ὁμοιότητά τι δεσποτικόν πατρικόν οἰκονομικόν πολιτικόν‎ (δικαιοσύνη‎ proper)

9 (?) ἰσότης‎ is not numerical equality but one of ratio.

vii 1 μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι‎, Two μναῖ‎ was the common ransom. See Herod V 77, Thycyd.

pg 242αἶγα θύειν‎ may be illustrated fr. Herod. and Theocritus.

2. Fire among the Persians; fr. Plato, Minos 516.

4 The natural enactment wd. be where duty is backed up by a natural tendency.

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viii 8 ἀναγκαῖα ἢ ϕυσικά‎, necessary or otherwise natural. Cf. ἀναγκαῖα‎ and σωματικά‎ (VII iv 2). This ref. is not quite correct)

10 ὀργή‎ is a moral feeling like Butler's⁴⁴ "resentment."

11 καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ᾿ ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄδικος‎, and we have now arrived at the acts of injustice wh. he who does is of unjust character.

ix begins with shewing there is always a passive as well as active person concerned in just and unjust acts.

8 Distributive justice.

13 ἀδικήματος‎ here means the unjust gain.

ἐπ᾿ ἐκείνων‎, that is in the case of the dividers of the unjust gain.

14 τὸ ἀδικεῖν‎. Understand τε καὶ μή‎.

ὡδὶ ἔχοντας‎. of such a nature and such a nature, not of such a nature.

15 τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι‎, is the whole difficulty of being a doctor.

17 τοῖς δὲ μέχρι τοῦ‎. Understand μέτεστι‎. Cf. abt. what is said abt. πλεονεκτεῖν‎ only being possible where there is a limited supply of anything.

x ἐπιείκεια‎ comes here because the ἐπιεικὴς‎ is on the passive side of an act of justice. For further accounts of ἐπιείκεια‎ see IX, iv (where it is used in a more general sense) and VIII, I, 4.

6 ἡ ϕύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς‎. This abstract use of ϕύσις‎ unique in the Ethics.

For ἐπιείκεια‎ see Antiphon "ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπιεικέστερον ἢ δικαιότερον παρήσω‎", Oration 11, 118.⁴⁵

pg 243xi Down to end of vi 6 treats of a man injuring himself.

2 4 καθ᾿ ὃ ἄδικος ὁ ἀδικῶν μόνον καὶ μὴ ὅλως ϕαῦλος‎. The μὴ‎ shews ϕαῦλος‎ goes with ἀδικῶν‎ under ὁ‎, not with ἄδικος‎.

7 καὶ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινὸν ἰατρικῆς‎ etc, and the nature of the mean is the same as health in medicine etc.

9 οἰκονομικόν‎, relation of husband and wife.

καὶ δοκεῖ‎, there does seem.

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Bk. VIII

Various things contributed to bring subject of friendship prominently before the Gk. mind, smallness of states and conspicuousness and importance of the ἑταιρίαι‎ in them, alliances between states, ἀποδείξεις‎ of the Sophists on it, ἔρως‎ as a form of it (wh. is treated in Plato Συμπόσιον‎), ϕιλία‎ and ἐχθρὰ‎ in philosophy, etc.

Bks. VIII and IX do not divide the subj., wh. is quite continuous.

i. 1 ϕιλία‎ is an ἀρετή‎, moral excellence.

2 σύν τε δύ᾿ ἐρχομένω‎ comes fr. Il. x 204.⁴⁶

4 τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα‎, justice in the highest sense = equity, τὸ ἐπιεικές‎.

5 ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ ϕίλους‎. Serviceable, not holy, men are meant.

6 Abt. likeness and difference see viii, 5–7.

ὡς‎ τον‎ αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον‎ is Od. XVII, what line? ⁴⁷

κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιὸν ἱζάνει‎ is a saying of Epicharmus. It is quoted again Rhet. I, xi.⁴⁸

For the likeness theory of friendship see Plato and Empedocles, for the other view Hesiod Ἔργα‎, 23 — ζηλοῖ γὰρ γείτονι γείτων καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων‎.⁴⁹

Heracleitus said "παλίντονος γὰρ ἁρμονίη κόσμον ὥσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρας‎." And παλίντονα τόξα‎ generally are merely strung bows. This sort of harmony he said was καλλίστη ἁρμονίη‎.⁵⁰

7 The questions here started are answered somewhat incidentally throughout the treatise. He decides so much, that ϕιλία‎ is (i) ὄν ἀγαθοῖς‎ pg 244= δὶα τὸ ἀγαθόν‎, (ii) in cap. v that it is ἐν τῷ συζῆν‎ = ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ‎, (iii) a ἕξις‎, i.e. not a πάθος‎ merely, (iv) that it is πρὸς ἕνα‎, (v) also in cap. vi that it is a fit object for μακαρία‎, is τῶν μακαρίων‎. Then he discusses the relative condition of the parties in a friendship: it is either ἐν ἴσοις or κατ᾽ἀναλογίαν‎ (vi, vii chapters). viii the chapter discusses what is the maintaining principle of friendship, that is whether it is ἐν τῷ ϕιλεῖν‎ or ἐν τῷ ϕιλεῖσθαι‎. These are points (vi) and (vii). Then in chap. ix he discusses sphere of ϕιλία‎, as justice exists in a certain state of society. So ϕιλία‎ in κοινωνίᾳ‎, of wh. however there are various less perfect forms, as the political and family ties beside the perfect one, ἑταιρικὴ κοινωνία‎. This is a subsidiary point. Then fr. cap. xiii to IX iv the duties of friends (ix) are discussed. After chap. V ix (in v, vi, vii) he touches supplementary points, the feelings, πάθη‎, wh. resemble friendship, viz. εὔνοια‎, ὁ μόνοια‎, ϕίλησις‎ etc. What remains is solution of ἀπορίαι‎ or ἀμϕισβητητά‎.

In the categories he instances milk, snow, skin, as all white yet ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει‎.

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ii ἀγαθὸν‎ is not, like χρήσιμον‎ and ἡδονή‎, a result to be grasped but to be pursued thro' a life. Still friendship is a possession in every case.

In 3, 4 three points are roughly made. Friendship must be εὔνοια‎, wh. is ἐκείνου‎ (τοῦ ϕιλητοῦ‎) ἕνεκα‎, excluding ἄψυχα‎, secondly ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι‎, thirdly it must be μὴ λανθάνουσα‎.

4 ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι‎. betw. persons who are the objects of good will.

iii Those who love for th χρήσιμον‎ or ἡδονή‎ wish the beloved to remain χρήσιμος‎ or ἡδύς‎, not so those who love for ἀγαθόν‎. Those only fasten on the accident of a man.

See III ii 11 τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἢ‎ ^τὰ‎^ κακὰ ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν‎. Much the same ^in^ See Met. IV xiv.

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vii 3 τὸ κατὰ ποσὸν‎ is the amount one side is to receive. τὸ κατ᾿ ἀξίαν‎ what he deserves.

6 μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ᾿ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος‎. Cf. IX, iv, 4.

viii 2 ὡς δὴ‎ ορ‎ σημείῳ‎. In Rhet. τιμή‎ is defined as σημεῖον εὐεργετικῆς δόξης‎.⁵¹

ix. 4 αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι‎. But see xii 1.

pg 245In X he does not mention ἑταιρικὴ ϕιλία‎ (the genuine form), perh. because there is little to be said of it.

In his Politics he reduces πολιτεῖαι‎ to two only, δῆμος‎ and ὀλιγαρχία‎.

Bk. IV. iii 6 (1)

ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων‎. that on property qualifications.

κληρωτὸς ἄν τις βασιλεύς‎. The expression is fr. Plato. It means a man chosen king not by any superior aptitude (2).

καὶ ϕανερώτερον‎ etc The meaning of the comparative seems to be and this has the advantage of being clearly the worst.

5 αἱ γυναῖκες‎ etc. This was in Lacedaemon.

xi The analogies are βασιλεία‎ — πατρική ϕιλία‎, ἀριστοκρατία‎ — ἀνδρική‎, [fo. 34] τιμοκρατία‎ — ἀδελϕική‎, and under this head ἑταιρική‎. The first three are καθ᾿ ὁμολογίαν‎, by agreement, viz. the γο‎ forms of states. Then their analogous friendships.

xii In 3 he says ἡ γὰρ‎ etc is for their identifty with their regard to their parents identifies them with one another.

Wis

3 ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι‎, another self differenced by separation we shd. translate.

4 εἰσὶ δὴ ταὐτό πως καὶ ἐν διῃρημένοις‎, and they are in a sense the same in discontinuous proportion

xiii treats of the μέτρον‎ of friendship and Bk xiv and IX i–xiii as to friendship ἔν‎ ἴση καὶ ὅμοί‎η‎α‎, on xiv in friendship ἐν ὑπερόχῃ‎, IX i of ἀνομοιοειδεῖς ϕιλίαι‎

6 δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας‎. those who deal on credit shd. be content with what they get. See Rep bk. IX I 9 and also a passage in Plato's Commonwealth, VIII 556 A.

8 οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ συναλλάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει‎, he will complain of having been treated in one spirit when he made the connection and another when he discharged it on his part.

9 ἄκοτα‎ ἄκοντα γὰρ ϕίλον οὐ ποιητέον‎, you must not keep him as a friend if he does not wish to be. This however, he goes on to say, discharges the friendship and makes a business affair of it.

ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένῃ ἢ μή‎, that a man may allow himself to be benefited or not on these terms.

xiv 3 τὸ κοινὸν‎ is somewhat played on. o

ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει‎, for no one will consent to be loss all round.

pg 246In οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν‎ we return to friendship and in τῷ δὴ περὶ‎ again to friendship. In τῷ εἰς‎ τὰ‎ χρήματα‎ etc there is a change

In τῷ εἰς τὰ χρήματα‎ etc there is a change of construction.

4 After διωθεῖσθαι‎ there shd. be no full stop.

IX i 4 εἰς ἕω‎, in the morning.

ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει‎, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει‎, κἀκείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει‎. Notice the change of the pronouns.

6 "μισθὸς δ᾿ ἀνδρί‎ " ϕίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄρκιος ἔστω‎. Ἔργα καὶ Ἡμ‎.⁵²

7 The Sophists' pay does not seem to have been much really, 5 μναῖ‎ was the common thing. Some got extraordinarily as much as 50.