BOOK III

• 1109bEditor’s Note Link 30(III. 1) Since, then, excellence has to do with affections and actions, and in
• Link 31response to what people do that is voluntary we praise and censure them,
• Link 32whereas in response to what is counter-voluntary we feel sympathy for them,
• pg 123Editor’s Note33and sometimes even pity, those inquiring into the subject of excellence must
• Link 34presumably determine the boundaries of the voluntary and the counter-
• Link 35voluntary; and to do so is also useful for those framing laws, when it comes to
• 36fixing honours and methods of forcible correction. The counter-voluntary,
• 1110a Link 1then, seems to be what comes about by force or because of ignorance; and
• Link what comes about by force seems to be that of which the origin is external,
• i.e. such that the person acting, or the person having something done to him,
• Link contributes nothing, as for example if a wind were to carry him somewhere,
• or human agents who had him in their power. As for what is done because of
• Link 5fear of greater evils, or because something fine is at stake (suppose, for
• Link example, that a tyrant gave one orders to do something shameful, when he
• had one's parents and children in his power, and they would be kept alive if
• Link one did as ordered, but put to death if not)—such cases make one doubt
• Link whether they are voluntary or counter-voluntary. Something of this sort also
• arises when it comes to throwing things overboard in a storm: no one throws
• 10goods away voluntarily, if it is just a matter of throwing it away, whereas if it is
• Editor’s Note Link a condition of saving oneself and the rest of what is on board, any sensible
• Link person would do it. Such actions, then, are mixed, but they look as if they
• Link belong more to the class of the voluntary, for the actions in question are
• Link desired at the time of acting, and the end for which actions are done varies
• with the occasion; so we must assign both 'voluntary' and 'counter-
• Link 15voluntary', too, with reference to the time when one acts. And a person acts
• Editor’s Notevoluntarily in the cases in question; for in fact in actions of this sort the origin
• Editor’s Note Link of his moving the instrumental parts is in himself, and if the origin of some-
• Link thing is in himself, it depends on himself whether he does that thing or not.
• Link Doing such things, then, is voluntary, but just in themselves they are presum-
• ably counter-voluntary; for no one would choose anything of this sort for
• Link 20itself. And for actions of this sort, people are sometimes even praised, i.e.
• Link whenever they put up with something shameful or painful in exchange for
• Link great and fine consequences, while if they do it in exchange for what is neither
• Link great nor fine, we censure them; for putting up with the most shameful things
• Link as a condition of getting something not at all fine, or something only moder-
• ately so, is a vile person's behaviour. In some cases it is not praise we accord
• someone, but sympathy—cases where a person does the sorts of things one
• Link 25shouldn't do because of what is such as to over-extend the natural capacity of
• Editor’s Note Link 26human beings—what no one could withstand. But perhaps in some cases
• 27there is no such thing as 'being constrained', but one should rather accept the
• 28most agonizing death: the things that 'constrained' Euripides' Alcmaeon to
• 29commit matricide are plainly ludicrous. But it is sometimes hard to make out
• 30what sort of thing to choose in exchange for what, and what to put up with in
• 31exchange for what—and harder still to abide by what one has determined, for
• 32mostly what we are expecting in such cases is something painful, and what we
• 33are being constrained to do is shameful, which is why there is praising and
• pg 1241110b Link 1censuring in the case of those who have or have not been constrained. What
• kinds of things, then, should we say are forced? Or is it that things are
• Link unqualifiedly forced if their cause lies in the externals, and the agent contrib-
• utes nothing, whereas ones which, considered in themselves, are counter-
• voluntary but desirable on this occasion and in exchange for these particular
• Link 5results, given that the origin is in the agent—these are counter-voluntary
• considered in themselves, but on this occasion and in exchange for these
• particular results, they are voluntary? And they look more like things that are
• voluntary; for actions are located among particulars, and these are voluntary.
• Link But as to what sorts of things one should choose in return for what, it is not
• easy to supply an answer, for there are many differences among particular
• 10situations. If someone were to say that pleasant things and fine things force us,
• on the grounds that they constrain us, and are external, he will get the result
• Link that everything is forced; for these two things motivate everything everyone
• Editor’s Notedoes. And those who are forced, and act counter-voluntarily, are distressed at
• what they do, whereas those who act because of what is pleasant and fine do
• so with pleasure. It is ludicrous too to put the responsibility on external
• objects, rather than on oneself for falling an easy victim to such things, and to
• Link 15put it on oneself for fine things, but on the objects that please for shameful
• ones.
• What comes about by force, then, appears to be that of which the origin is
• Link external, with the person forced contributing nothing. What comes about
• Editor’s Notebecause of ignorance, for its part, is all non-voluntary, whereas being counter-
• voluntary belongs to what causes the agent pain and involves regret; for the
• Link 20person who has done whatever it is because of ignorance, if he feels nothing
• Editor’s Noteby way of discomfort at his action, has not acted voluntarily, in so far as it was
• something he didn't know he was doing, but he has not acted counter-
• Editor’s Notevoluntarily either, in so far as he is not distressed at it. What comes about
• Editor’s Note Link because of ignorance, then, seems to fall into two types: someone who feels
• regret seems to have acted counter-voluntarily, while the one who does not
• feel regret—well, since he is distinct from the other person, let him be 'non-
• voluntary'; for since he is different, it is better that he should have a name to
• Link 25himself. Acting because of ignorance also appears to be distinct from acting in
• ignorance; for the person who acts while drunk or angry does not seem to act
• Editor’s Notebecause of ignorance but because of one of the things just mentioned,
• Link though not knowing what he is doing, but in ignorance of it. Now it is true
• that every worthless person is ignorant of what one should do and what one
• should abstain from, and it is because of this sort of mistake that there come
• 30to be unjust people, and bad people in general; but 'counter-voluntary' is not
• Editor’s Note Link 31meant to cover the case where someone is ignorant of what is to his
• Link 32advantage—for ignorance in decision-making is not a cause of something's
• Link 33being counter-voluntary; rather, it is a cause of worthlessness, nor is ignor-
• 34ance at the level of the universal a cause of the counter-voluntary (people are
• pg 12535censured for that sort of ignorance), but rather ignorance at the level of
• 1111a1particular things, which are where action is located and what action is about.
• For both pity and sympathy depend on particulars; it is the person who is in
• Link ignorance of one of these that acts counter-voluntarily. Perhaps, then, it is no
• bad thing to determine what these particular factors are, and how many they
• are. So: there is the matter of who is acting, what he is doing, in relation to
• 5what or affecting what, sometimes also with what (as for example with a tool),
• Editor’s Notewhat the action is for (e.g. saving someone), and how it is done (e.g. gently or
• vigorously). Now no one, unless he were mad, could be ignorant of all of
• Link these things, and neither, clearly, could anyone be ignorant of the person
• acting; for how could that be, given that it is himself? But someone might be
• ignorant of what he is doing, as when people say 'it just came out', in conver-
• Editor’s Note Link 10sation, or 'I didn't know the subject was prohibited', as Aeschylus said about
• the Mysteries, or 'I let it off when I meant to demonstrate it', as the man said
• who let off the catapult. And someone might also think her son to be one of
• Editor’s Notethe enemy, as Merope did, and that the spear had a button on the end of it
• when it did not, or that the stone was a pumice stone; and one might give
• someone a drink to save him but end up killing him, and mean to give
• 15someone a touch, as in sparring, but land a blow on him instead. Given, then,
• that ignorance is possible in relation to all these factors, in which action is
• located, it seems that the person who was ignorant of any one of these things
• has acted counter-voluntarily, and most of all if the ignorance is related to the
• things that most determine the nature of the action; and these are what things
• are affected and what the action is for. In the case, then, of what is said to be
• 20counter-voluntary on the basis of this sort of ignorance, the action must in
• addition cause distress to the agent and involve regret.
• Link So, given that 'counter-voluntary' applies to what comes about by force and
• what comes about because of ignorance, the voluntary would seem to be that
• Link of which the origin is in oneself, when one knows the particular factors
• that constitute the location of action. For presumably it is not right to say that
• Editor’s Note Link 25things done because of temper or appetite are counter-voluntary. For in the
• Editor’s Note Link 26first place none of the other animals will act voluntarily, nor will children; and
• 27secondly, is nothing we do because of appetite and temper done voluntarily, or
• 28are the fine things done voluntarily and the shameful ones counter-
• 29voluntarily? Or is that ridiculous, given that one and the same thing is the
• Link 30cause in all cases? One would think it strange to assert that things we should
• 31desire are counter-voluntary; and one should be angry at certain things and
• 32have an appetite for certain things, like health and learning. The counter-
• 33voluntary also seems to be distressful, whereas what falls under appetite
• 34seems to be pleasant. Again, what difference is there, in respect of counter-
• 35voluntariness, between things we get wrong through acting in accordance
• 36with rational calculation, and those we get wrong through temper? For both
• 1111b Link 1are to be avoided, but the non-rational affections seem to be no less typical of
• pg 1262human nature, so that actions deriving from temper and appetite will belong
• 3to human beings too. Strange, then, to count these things as counter-voluntary.
•  
• Editor’s Note Link 4(III. 2) Now that the voluntary and the counter-voluntary have been defined,
• Link 5the next task is to discuss decision; for decision seems to be something highly
• Editor’s Note Link 6germane to excellence, and to indicate the differences between people's char-
• Editor’s Note Link 7acters more than actions do. Decision, then, is clearly something voluntary,
• Link 8but is not the same thing as the voluntary, for the voluntary is a wider type:
• Link 9the voluntary is shared in by both children and the other animals, whereas
• Editor’s Note Link 10decision is not, and things done on the spur of the moment we say are
• Link 11voluntary, but not done from decision. Those who say that it is appetite,
• Link 12temper, or wish, or a sort of judgement seem not to be correct. For decision is
• Editor’s Note Link 13not something shared by non-rational creatures, whereas appetite and temper
• 14are. And the person without self-control acts from appetite, but not from
• Link 15decision; conversely the self-controlled person acts from decision, but not
• Editor’s Notefrom appetite. Next, appetite goes contrary to decision, whereas appetite does
• not go contrary to appetite. Again, we have appetite for what is pleasant and
• Link what brings pain, whereas decision is neither for what is painful nor for what
• Editor’s Note Link is pleasant. Still less is decision temper; for things we do because of temper
• seem least to be from decision. And yet neither, for that matter, is it wish,
• Link 20although it appears quite closely related to it; for there is no decision for
• Link 21impossible things, and if someone were to say he was deciding on one of
• Editor’s Note22these, he would be taken for an idiot—whereas there is wish for the impos-
• 23sible⁸ as e.g. for immortality. And there is wish also in relation to the sorts of
• Editor’s Note24things that could in no way be brought about by one's own agency, as for
• 25example that a particular actor or athlete should win; whereas no one decides
• Editor’s Note Link on things of this sort, only on those one thinks could come about by one's
• Link own agency. Further, wish is more for the end, whereas decision is about what
• forwards the end, as e.g. we wish to be healthy, whereas we decide on the
• things through which we shall be healthy, and we wish to be happy, and say
• that we wish it, whereas it is out of keeping to say 'we decide to be happy'; for
• Link 30generally decision appears to be about things that depend on us. It will not,
• Link 31then, be judgement either; for judgement seems to be about anything, and no
• 32less about the eternal and the impossible than about the things that depend on
• Link 33us; and we divide judgements into false and true, not into bad and good,
• 1112aEditor’s Note1whereas decisions we divide more in the latter way. So perhaps no one even
• claims that decision is the same thing as judgement in general. But neither
• Link should it be identified with a certain kind of judgement; for what makes us
• people of a certain quality is deciding for, not making judgements about,
• good things or bad ones. And we form a decision to take or avoid some such
• thing, whereas we make a judgement about what it is, or to whom it is of
• 1112apg 127Editor’s Note5advantage, or how; we certainly do not 'make a judgement' to take or avoid
• Link something. Again, decision is praised more by reference to its being for what it
• Link should be, or to its being correctly made, whereas judgement is praised by
• reference to how true it is. Again, decision is for what we most know to be
• good, whereas we make judgements about what we do not know at all to be
• good; and it seems that those who make the best decisions and those who
• 10make the best judgements are not the same people—but rather that some
• people make better judgements, but because they are bad choose things other
• than those they should. If there is judgement preceding the decision, or
• following it, this makes no difference; for we are not considering that point,
• Link but rather whether decision is the same thing as a certain kind of judgement.
• What then, or what sort of thing, is it, since it is none of the things we have
• mentioned? Well, it is clearly something voluntary, but the voluntary is not all
• Editor’s Note Link 15a matter of decision. So is it, at any rate, what has been reached by prior
• Editor’s Note Link deliberation? In favour of this view is that decision is accompanied by reason-
• ing and thought—and even the name indicates that what we decide to do is
• Editor’s Notechosen before other things.
•  
• (III. 3) Do people deliberate about everything, and is everything an object
• of deliberation, or are there some things about which there is no deliberation?
• 20Presumably one should say 'object of deliberation' with reference not to what
• an idiot or a madman might deliberate about, but to what a sane person
• would. Well, no one deliberates about eternal things, as for example about the
• universe or about the fact that the diameter and side of a square are incom-
• mensurable. But for that matter neither does anyone deliberate about things
• which involve change, but which always occur in the same pattern, whether
• 25from necessity, or indeed by nature, or through some other cause (e.g. turn-
• Editor’s Note Link 26ings and risings of celestial bodies); nor about things that happen sometimes
• 27one way, sometimes another, like droughts and rainstorms; nor about things
• Link 28that happen from chance, like discovering a cache of treasure. But there is no
• 29deliberation, either, about all human affairs, as for example no Spartan delib-
• Link 30erates about how Scythians might best manage themselves politically—for
• Link 31none of these things will come about through our agency. What we do
• 32deliberate about are the things that depend on us and are doable; and these are
• 33in fact what is left once we have been through the rest. For the causes of
• Link 34things seem to be nature, and necessity, and chance, and then, in addition to
• 35these, intelligence and everything that occurs through human agency; and
• 36among human beings, each group deliberates about what is doable through
• 1112b Link 1their own agency. And in relation to those forms of knowledge that are precise
• Editor’s Note Link and self-contained, there is no deliberation, as e.g. with writing (for we are not
• Link in two minds about how to write); but those things that come about through
• Link us, but not in the same way on every occasion—these are the things we
• deliberate about, as e.g. we do about things falling within the spheres of
• pg 1281112b5medicine and business, and in relation to navigational expertise more than to
• that of athletic training, to the degree that the former has been less precisely
• Link worked out, and again deliberation is involved similarly in the remaining
• Link cases, but more, too, in relation to productive than to other forms of know-
• ledge, for we are more in two minds about the productive forms. Deliber-
• ation, then, occurs where things happen in a certain way for the most part,
• but where it is unclear how they will in fact fall out; and where the outcome is
• 10indeterminate. For large projects, we get people to provide us with advice,
• Link because we do not believe we have the capacity ourselves to see our way
• Link through. But we deliberate, not about ends, but about what forwards those
• Editor’s Note Link ends. For a doctor does not deliberate about whether he'll make his patients
• Link healthy, nor a public speaker about whether he'll persuade his audience, nor a
• political expert about whether he'll bring about good government—and nei-
• Link 15ther do any of the others deliberate about the end, but rather they take the
• Link end for granted and examine how and by what means it will come about; and
• Link if it appears as coming about by more than one means, they look to see
• through which of them it will happen most easily and best, whereas if it is
• Editor’s Notebrought to completion by one means only, they look to see how it will come
• about through this, and through what means that will come about, until they
• Link 20arrive at the first cause, which comes last in the process of discovery. For the
• 21person who deliberates seems to investigate and to analyse in the way we have
• Link 22said, as if with a diagram (and while not all investigation appears to be
• 23deliberation, as e.g. mathematical investigations are not, all deliberation is
• Link 24investigation); and what is last in the analysis seems to be first in the process of
• 25things' coming about. And if people encounter an impossibility, they desist, as
• Link e.g. if money is needed, and there is no possibility of providing it; while if it
• Link appears possible, they set about acting. Things are possible that might come
• about through our agency; for what comes about through our friends in a way
• comes about through us, since the origin of it is in us. What is sought is
• sometimes the tools for what is to be done, sometimes how they are to be
• Editor’s Noteused; and similarly in the other cases too, what is sought is sometimes the
• Editor’s Notething to do the job with, sometimes how it is to be done or by what means. It
• Link seems, then, as has been said, that a human being is the origin of his actions;
• Editor’s Noteand that his deliberation is about those things that are doable by him, while
• Editor’s Notehis actions are for the sake of other things—for it will not be the end that is
• deliberated about but the things that forward ends. So there will not be
• 1113a1deliberation about particulars either, as e.g. about whether this is a loaf, or
• Editor’s Note Link whether it has been cooked as it should; for these belong to the sphere of
• perception. And if a person deliberates at every point, he will go on for ever.
• Link What we deliberate about and what we decide on are the same, except that
• what is decided on is, as such, something definite; for it is what has been
• 5selected as a result of deliberation that is 'decided on'. For each person ceases
• 6to investigate how he will act, at whatever moment he brings the origin of the
• pg 1297action back to himself, and to the leading part of himself; for this is the part
• Editor’s Note8that decides. This is clear also from those ancient forms of government that
• Link 9Homer used to represent in his poems: the kings would announce to the
• Editor’s Note Link 10people what they had decided. Given that what is decided on is an object of
• Link deliberation and desire among the things that depend on us, decision too will
• Link be deliberational desire for things that depend on us; for it is through having
• selected on the basis of having deliberated that we desire in accordance with
• our deliberation. Let this, then, stand as our outline treatment of decision—
• both of what sorts of things it has to do with, and of the fact that what we
• decide about are the things that forward our ends.
•  
• Editor’s Note Link 15(III. 4) That wish is for the end, we have already said; but to some it seems to
• be for the good, whereas to others it seems to be for the apparent good. The
• Link consequence, for those who say that the object of ⁹ wish is the good, is that
• what the person making an incorrect choice wishes for is not wished for (for if
• Link 20it is wished for, it will also be good; but in fact it may have been bad); while for
• Link those who say that the apparent good is wished for, the consequence is that
• Link there is nothing naturally wished for, only what seems an object of wish to
• Link each particular person; and different things appear so to different people,
• Link perhaps even contrary ones. But if, then, we are not content with these views,
• should we say that the good is without qualification and in truth the object of
• wish, whereas what appears good to a given person is the object of wish for
• Link 25that person? We shall then be saying that for the person of excellence the
• 26object of wish is the one that is truly so, whereas for the bad person it is as
• Editor’s Note27chance will have it, just as on the physical level too the things that are truly
• 28healthful are healthful for people in good condition, whereas a different set of
• Link 29things is healthful for those that are diseased; and similarly too with bitter,
• Link 30sweet, hot, heavy, and every other sort of thing; for the good person dis-
• Link 31criminates correctly in every set of circumstances, and in every set of circum-
• Link 32stances what is true is apparent to him. For each disposition has its own
• Link 33corresponding range of fine things and pleasant things, and presumably what
• 34most distinguishes the good person is his ability to see what is true in every set
• 35of circumstances, being like a carpenter's rule or measure for them. But most
• 36people are deceived, and the deception seems to come about because of
• 1113b1pleasure; for it appears a good thing when it is not. So they choose what is
• Link 2pleasant as something good, and they avoid pain as something bad.
•  
• Editor’s Note Link 3(III. 5) Given, then, that what is wished for is the end, while what we deliber-
• Link 4ate about and decide on are the things that forward the end, the actions
• 5relating to the latter will be based on decision and voluntary. But the activities
• Link 6that constitute the excellences are concerned with these. Excellence too, then,
• pg 130 Link 7depends on us, and similarly badness as well. For when acting depends on us,
• Link 8not acting does so too, and when saying no does so, saying yes does too; so
• 9that if acting, when it is a fine thing to act, depends on us, not acting also
• Link 10depends on us when it is shameful not to act, and if not acting, when it is a
• Link 11fine thing not to act, depends on us, acting when it is a shameful thing to act
• Editor’s Note12also depends on us. But if it depends on us to do fine things and shameful
• Link 13things, and similarly not to do them too, and this, it is agreed, is what it is to
• Editor’s Note Link 14be, respectively, a good person and a bad one, then being decent people, and
• 15being worthless ones, will depend on us.¹⁰ To say that no one is vicious volun-
• 16tarily, or counter-voluntarily blessed with happiness, looks false in one way,
• Editor’s Note Link 17true in another; for no one is blessed counter-voluntarily, but badness is some-
• 18thing voluntary. Or should one dispute what has just been said—should one
• Link 19say that a human being is not an origin, or begetter, of his actions as he is of
• Link 20children? But if he obviously is, and we are unable to trace actions back to
• Link origins beyond their origins in us, then, in so far as they are things that have
• their origins in us, they themselves, too, depend on us and are voluntary.
• Link Testimony to this effect seems to be provided by the practice both of different
• Link sorts of private groups and of lawgivers themselves; for they forcibly correct
• and impose penalties on wrongdoers, provided they did not act under force,
• 25or because of ignorance for which they are not themselves responsible, while
• 26they honour those who perform fine actions, in order to encourage the latter
• 27and put a stop to the former. By contrast no one encourages us to do the
• 28things that neither depend on us nor are voluntary, on the assumption that
• 29nothing is gained by getting someone persuaded not to become hot, or feel
• Link 30pain, or hunger, or anything of this sort; we shall be affected just the same. In
• Editor’s Note Link fact ignorance itself constitutes grounds for penal correction, if the agent
• Link seems to be responsible for his ignorance—as when penalties are doubled for
• Link people acting while drunk; for the origin is in the agent; it was in his power
• not to get drunk, which was cause of his ignorance. And they correct people
• who are ignorant of something laid down in the laws—one of the things one
• 1114a Link 1should know, which are not difficult either; and similarly too in the other cases
• Link 2where people seem to be ignorant through carelessness, on the grounds that it
• Link 3depended on them not to be ignorant; for it was in their power to take the
• Link 4appropriate care. But perhaps the agent is the kind of person not to take care?
• 5But we are ourselves responsible for having become this sort of person, by
• living slackly, and for being unjust or self-indulgent, in the first case by treating
• Link people badly, in the second by passing our time in drinking and that sort of
• thing; for it is the sort of activity we display in each kind of thing that gives us
• Link the corresponding character. This is clear from those who practise for any sort
• of competition or performance: they go on and on actually doing whatever it
• is. So only a thoroughly stupid person could fail to know that the dispositions
• 1114apg 131 Link 10come about as a result of the sort of activity we display in relation to each
• Editor’s Note Link kind of thing. But again it runs counter to reason to suppose that the person
• Link engaged in unjust action does not wish to be unjust, or that the person
• Link engaged in self-indulgent action does not wish to be self-indulgent. But if
• Link someone does, not in ignorance, the things that will result in his being unjust,
• he will be unjust voluntarily—and yet he will not stop being unjust, and be
• Editor’s Note Link 15just, merely if he wishes it. For no more will the sick person be healthy merely
• for wishing it; and it may be that he is ill voluntarily, by living a life in weak-
• willed disobedience to his doctors. Previously, then, he had the option not to
• Link be ill, but once he has let himself go, he no longer has it, any more than it is
• Link possible for him to retrieve a stone after it has left his hand; but all the same it
• depended on him that it was thrown, for the origin of it was in him. So too at
• 20the beginning the unjust person and the self-indulgent one had the option not
• Link to become like that, and hence they are voluntarily unjust and self-indulgent;
• Editor’s Notebut once they have become like that, it is no longer possible for them not to
• be. Not only are bad states of the soul voluntary, but with some people those
• of the body are so too, and these people too we blame; for while no one
• blames those who are naturally ugly, we do blame those who are ugly through
• 25lack of training and through neglect. Similarly with physical weakness, and
• disability; for no one would find fault with someone born blind, or blind as a
• result of disease or a blow—one would rather pity him; whereas everyone
• would blame someone whose blindness resulted from drunkenness or some
• other form of self-indulgence. As for bad physical states, then, for those that
• depend on us people find fault with us, whereas for those that do not depend
• 30on us they do not. But if this is so, in the other cases too the bad states that
• Link 31people get blamed for will be ones that depend on us. Suppose someone said
• 32that while every one of us aims at what appears to us good, we are not in
• 1114b Link 1control of the appearance, but rather the sort of person each of us is, what-
• ever that may be, determines how the end, too, appears to him. Well, if each
• of us is himself somehow responsible for causing his disposition in himself, he
• will also be somehow responsible for the appearance in question. If he is not
• somehow responsible for his disposition, no one is responsible for its being the
• case that he himself does bad things; he does these things because of ignor-
• Link 5ance of the end, thinking that by means of them he will get what is best. In
• Link 6this case aiming at the end will not be self-chosen, but one must be born with
• 7the capacity for a kind of sight by which to discriminate well and choose what
• Link 8is truly good, and the person who has this capacity by nature will be the one
• 9who counts as 'naturally well endowed'; for it is the greatest and finest of
• Link 10things, and something it will not be possible to get from anyone else, or to
• Editor’s Note Link 11learn from anyone—rather, one will have it in just the form in which it was
• 12born in one, and to have been born well and beautifully endowed in this
• 13respect will be to be naturally well endowed in the full and true sense. If, then,
• 14all this is true, how will excellence be any more voluntary than badness? For
• pg 132whether the end appears to us by nature, or however its appearance is to be
• explained, it appears and is fixed in the same way for both, i.e. the good
• 15person and the bad one, and since they act by referring everything else to the
• Link end, the same explanation—whatever it is—will apply to their action.
• Link Whether, then, it is not by nature that the end appears to each person in
• Editor’s Notewhatever form it does, but this is also to an extent under his control, or
• whether the end is natural, but because the good person acts voluntarily in all
• other respects, his excellence is voluntary—in either case badness too will be
• Link 20no less voluntary; for 'through him' applies to the bad person too, in respect
• Link of his actions even if not of his end. If, then, as people say, the excellences are
• Editor’s Notevoluntary (for we ourselves are partly responsible, in a way, for our disposi-
• Editor’s Note Link tions, and it is by virtue of being people of a certain sort that we suppose the
• 25end to be of a certain sort), bad states too will be voluntary; for they come
• about in a similar way.
• So now we have discussed the excellences in a general way, giving an
• outline of their genus, i.e. that they are intermediates, and that they are
• dispositions; saying that the kinds of things by which they come about are the
• kinds they dispose us to do, i.e. in accordance with themselves; that they
• depend on us and are voluntary; and that they relate to actions that are such as
• 30the correct prescription lays down. (But actions and dispositions are not vol-
• 31untary in the same sort of way; for we are in control of our actions from
• 32beginning to end, because we know the particulars involved, whereas we only
• 1115a Link 1control the beginning of our dispositions, and the process of incrementation
• Link is not something we are aware of in its particulars, any more than we are
• when we are becoming ill; but because it depended on us either to react to
• Editor’s Note Link things in such-and-such a way, or not in that way—this makes them volun-
• tary.) Now let us pick up our subject again and discuss each of the excellences
• individually, saying what they are, what things they relate to, and how; and it
• will be clear, too, at the same time, how many they are.
• 5First, let us discuss courage.
•  
• Editor’s Note(III. 6) Well, that it is an intermediate state relating to fearing and being bold
• has already become apparent; and clearly, what we fear are fearsome things,
• Editor’s Noteand these are, broadly speaking, bad things—which is why people define fear
• Link 10itself as expectation of what is bad. Now we fear all bad things, e.g. loss of
• reputation, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death; but courage seems not to be
• Link to do with all of them, since there are some things which we actually should
• fear, and fearing them is a fine thing, while not fearing them is shameful, e.g.
• loss of reputation, for someone who fears this is a decent person and has a
• sense of shame, whereas the one who does not fear it is shameless. But some
• 15do call the latter person courageous, in a transferred sense; for he has a certain
• Link resemblance to the courageous person, in so far as the courageous person too
• Editor’s Note Link is in a sense fearless. On the other hand there is presumably no requirement
• pg 133 Link on one to fear poverty, or disease, or in general the sorts of things not due to
• Link badness, or to one's own agency. But neither is the person who is fearless
• about these things courageous, although we do call him, too, courageous,
• 20picking out a resemblance; for some people who are cowardly in face of the
• Link 21dangers of war are open-handed, and so altogether bold when it comes to
• Editor’s Note Link 22losing money. Nor, then, is a person cowardly if he fears assault on his chil-
• Editor’s Note Link 23dren and wife, or fears grudging ill will, or anything like that; nor is he
• 24courageous if he is bold when facing a whipping. So what sorts of fearsome
• Link 25things is the courageous person courageous about? Or is it the greatest of
• Editor’s Note Link them? No one, after all, is better at withstanding what is frightening. And the
• most fearsome thing is death; for it is an end, and there seems to be nothing
• any longer for the dead person that is either good or bad. But neither would
• courage seem to have to do with death under any set of circumstances: e.g.
• death at sea, or from illness of some sort. Death under what circumstances,
• 30then? Or is it under the finest? Such deaths are deaths in war; for then
• 31the danger is greatest and finest. In agreement with these conclusions are the
• 32honours accorded in cities, and where there are monarchs in power. In the
• Link 33primary sense, then, the courageous person will be said to be the one who is
• 34fearless about a fine death, or about sudden situations that threaten death; and
• Link 35those that occur in war are mostly of this sort. Of course the courageous
• 1115b Link 1person is fearless on the sea too, and when affected by disease, but not in the
• 2way people familiar with the sea are: whereas others have given up hope of
• Editor’s Note Link 3survival and find this sort of death hard to stomach, these are optimistic
• 4because of their experience. Again, the situations in which people really show
• Link 5courage are those in which one can put up a fight, or, if that fails, the death is
• a fine one; and neither feature obtains when one perishes in situations like the
• Link ones just described.
•  
• (III. 7) What is fearsome is not the same for everyone; but there is a sort of
• Link thing we say it is actually beyond human capacity to endure. This, then, is
• fearsome to everyone—everyone, that is, who has any intelligence; but the
• things that are within the capacity of human beings differ in magnitude, i.e. in
• 10being more fearsome or less, and similarly too with the things that make for
• Link boldness. But the courageous person is as unshakeable as a human being can
• Link be. So he will be afraid of those sorts of things too, but he will withstand
• Link them in the way one should, and following the correct prescription, for the
• sake of achieving what is fine; for this is what excellence aims at. But one can
• fear these things more and one can fear them less, and in addition one can fear
• 15the sorts of things that are not fearsome as if they were. Of the ways people
• 16go wrong in these cases, one occurs because they fear what one shouldn't,
• Link 17another because they don't fear in the way one should, another because they
• 18don't fear when one should, or something else of this sort; and similarly, too,
• 19with the things that make for boldness. So the person who withstands and
• pg 134fears the things one should and for the end one should, and in the way and
• when one should, and is bold in a similar way, is courageous; for the courage-
• Editor’s Note20ous person feels and acts as the occasion merits, and following the correct
• Link prescription, however it may direct him. But in every case, an activity's end is
• the one that accords with the corresponding disposition. This, then, holds for
• Link the courageous person too. Now, courage is something fine.¹¹ So the end, too,
• Link is such, since each thing is distinguished by its end. So it is for the sake of
• achieving the fine that the courageous person stands firm and acts in those
• ways that accord with courage. Of those who go to excess, the person who
• Editor’s Note25exceeds in fearlessness is nameless (we have said in our earlier discussions that
• Link 26many qualities are nameless), but he would be some sort of madman, or
• 27someone immune to pain, if he feared nothing, not even an earthquake or
• Link 28stormwaters—like Celts, as people say; whereas the person who goes to
• Link 29excess in being bold about what is fearsome is rash. The rash person seems
• 30also to be an impostor, and to be the sort of person who pretends to courage;
• at any rate he wishes to appear to be as the courageous person actually is in
• relation to the fearsome, and so mimics him in those situations in which he
• can. Hence most rash people in fact combine rashness with cowardice, for
• while they brazen it out in circumstances that allow it, they do not withstand
• what is actually fearsome. The person who goes to excess in fearing, on the
• Link 35other hand, is cowardly; for he fears the sorts of things one shouldn't and in a
• 36way one shouldn't, and every other feature of this sort goes along with his
• 1116a1disposition. He is deficient, as well, in boldness, but the excess in the distress
• 2he experiences is the more obvious. The coward, then, is a kind of person
• 3who lacks hope, because he is afraid about everything. The brave man is in the
• Link 4contrary condition; for someone who keeps up hope has a bold attitude. So
• 5the cowardly person, the rash one, and the courageous one all have to do with
• the same things, but relate to them in different ways; for the first two display
• excess and deficiency, whereas the third is in an intermediate condition, and is
• as one should be. Again, rash people are impetuous, and for all their willing-
• ness in advance of the dangers they pull back when the dangers arrive; cour-
• ageous people by contrast are energetic when it comes to doing things but are
• Link 10quiet beforehand. As has been said, then, courage is an intermediate state
• Link relating to things that make for boldness and things that make for fear, in the
• circumstances we have stated, and it makes its choice and stands firm because
• Link doing so is fine, or because not doing so is shameful. Dying to escape from
• poverty, or sexual passion, or something painful, is not a feature of courage
• but rather of cowardice; for it is softness to run away from things because they
• Editor’s Note Link 15are burdensome, and the person in this case accepts death not because it is a
• fine thing to do, but because he is running away from something bad.
• Link What courage is, then, is something like this;
•  
• pg 135 Link (III. 8) but there are also other 'courages', so called, which take five forms.
• First there is the 'civic' kind—for this has the greatest resemblance to real
• courage. For citizens seem to withstand the dangers facing them because of
• the penalties inflicted by the laws' and people's reproaches, and because of
• 20the honours; and it is because of this that the most courageous peoples seem
• 21to be those among whom cowards are dishonoured and the courageous
• 22honoured. Individuals of this sort one finds portrayed by Homer too, e.g.
• Editor’s Note23Diomedes and Hector—as in

• 24               Polydamas will be first to lay up disgrace against me,

• Editor’s Note25and

•                For one day Hector will speak out among the Trojans, and say
• Link                'By me was the son of Tydeus …'.

• Editor’s Note Link This 'courage' has the greatest resemblance to the one described before
• because it comes about through excellence; for it comes about through shame
• and through desire for what is fine (because for honour), and in order to
• 30escape reproach, because that is something shameful. One might also put in
• Link the same category those acting under constraint from their commanders; but
• these are inferior, to the extent that they do it not through shame but through
• fear, and in order to escape not what is shameful, but what is painful—for the
• Editor’s Noteones applying the constraint have control over them, just like Hector:

• But any man I find cowering, away from the battle,
• 35               Make no mistake—he will be meat for the dogs.

• 1116b1And those who issue orders and beat anyone who retreats are doing the same
• Link thing, as are those who draw up their men in front of ditches or things of that
• Link sort; for they are all using constraint. But one should not be courageous
• Editor’s Note Link because of constraint; one should be courageous because it is fine to be so.
• People also think of experience in each particular sphere as courage; this is
• 5also why Socrates thought courage to be expert knowledge. There are differ-
• Editor’s Noteent people like this in different spheres, but in the sphere of warfare it is the
• soldiers; for there are many situations in war that contain nothing to be afraid
• of, and soldiers have the best perspective on these; so they appear courageous,
• because everyone else lacks the knowledge of what sorts of situations these
• are. Again, their experience gives them the greatest ability to inflict damage
• 10and avoid it themselves, since it gives them the ability to use weapons and
• 11provides them with the kinds of weaponry that will have the greatest power,
• 12both for inflicting damage and for avoiding it; so when they fight it is as if
• 13armed men are fighting with unarmed ones, and trained athletes against non-
• 14athletes, for in contests of this sort too it is not the most courageous people
• Link 15that are the most effective fighters but those with the greatest strength and in
• 16the best physical condition. But soldiers turn cowardly when the danger is
• pg 13617extreme and they are at a disadvantage in terms of numbers and equipment;
• 18for they are the first to run away, while the citizen elements stand and die
• Editor’s Note19(which is what actually happened at the temple of Hermes). For to the latter,
• 20running away is something shameful, and death is more desirable than saving
• oneself in that sort of way; whereas the soldiers from the very beginning were
• ready to face the dangers because they believed they had the advantage, and
• Link once having seen they do not, they run away, because they fear death more
• Link than the shameful. But the courageous person is not someone of this sort.
• People also count temper as courage; for the courageous are thought also to
• 25include people who act through temper, like wild animals that rush at the
• 26people who have wounded them, because courageous people too are strong-
• Editor’s Note27tempered; for temper especially strains to go out and meet dangers, which is
• 28what explains Homer's 'he infused their temper with strength', 'aroused their
• 29force and temper', 'and in his nostrils, bitter force', and 'his blood boiled'—all
• Link 30such expressions seem to indicate the arousal and impulse of temper. Well
• Link then, courageous people act because of the fine, and temper cooperates with
• them; by contrast, the wild animals in question act because they are
• distressed—after all, it is because they have been hit by a weapon, or because
• they are frightened (since they do not approach if they have the cover of a
• wood). That they are driven out by distress and temper and so impelled
• 35towards the danger, without seeing in advance any of the frightening aspects
• 36of the situation—that, then, does not make them courageous, since at that
• 37rate even donkeys would be brave when they are hungry; after all beating
• 1117a1them doesn't stop them from feeding. Adulterers too go through with many
• Editor’s Notedaring things because of their appetite. But the 'courage' that comes about
• Editor’s Note Link 5through temper does seem to be the most natural form, and to be courage
• once the factors of decision and the end for the sake of which have been
• added. Human beings too, then, are distressed when angry, and take pleasure
• in retaliating; but people who fight from these motives are effective in fighting,
• Link not courageous, since they do not fight because of the fine, or as the correct
• prescription directs, but because of affection. But they do have something that
• resembles courage. Nor, then, are people who act because they are optimistic
• Link 10courageous, for they are bold in dangerous situations because they have
• defeated many people and on many occasions; and while they are comparable
• with the courageous, because both sorts of people are bold, courageous
• people are bold because of the factors mentioned before, whereas optimistic
• people are so because they think that they are strongest and that no harm will
• come to them. (When people are getting drunk they behave in the same sort
• 15of way—they become optimistic.) And whenever they find things not turning
• 16out as they expect, they run away; but as we said, it is characteristic of the
• Link 17courageous person to withstand those things that are and appear frightening
• Link 18to human beings, because doing so is fine and not doing so is shameful. This is
• Link 19why a person also seems more courageous if he is fearless and undisturbed in
• 1117apg 137 Link 20the face of sudden fears than of ones that are foreseen; for it was more the
• result of a disposition, in so far as it was less the result of preparation. For in
• the case of what is clearly foreseen, one can decide also as a result of calcula-
• Editor’s Notetion and reasoning about it; with what comes suddenly one decides according
• to one's disposition. Another set of people who appear courageous are those
• who act in ignorance, and they are not far removed from the optimistic sort,
• but they are inferior to the extent that they have no expectations of them-
• 25selves, whereas the others do. This is why the others stand firm for a time;
• Editor’s Notewhereas if those who are deceived about the situation recognize that it is not
• what they guessed it to be, they run away (which is what happened to the
• Argives when they fell in with the Spartans, thinking they were Sicyonians).
• Editor’s Note Link This, then, is our account of what sort of people the courageous are, and
• those who seem courageous.
•  
• (III. 9) Now while courage has to do both with being bold and with fearing,
• 30it does not have to do with the two things equally, but more with what is
• fearsome; for the person who is undisturbed in face of fearsome things and is
• Link in the condition one should be in relation to these is courageous, more than
• Editor’s Note Link the person who is so in relation to the things that make for boldness. It is by
• virtue of their withstanding what is painful, then, as has been said, that people
• are called courageous. Hence courage is also something that brings pain with
• Link 35it, and is justly an object of praise; for it is harder to withstand what is painful
• 1117b Link 1than to hold back from what is pleasant. All the same, the end that accords
• 2with courage would seem to be pleasant, but to be obscured by the circum-
• 3stances, as also happens e.g. in athletic competitions; for to the boxers the
• 4end—what they do it for, i.e. the wreath and the honours—is pleasant,
• 5whereas being punched hurts them, given that they are made of flesh, and is
• painful—and so is all the slogging; and because the painful aspects are many,
• Link its small size appears to leave the end for which it is all done without anything
• Link pleasant about it. If, then, it is like this with courage too, then while death and
• Link wounds will be painful to the courageous person, and counter-voluntary, he
• will withstand them because doing so is fine or because not doing so is
• Link 10shameful. And the greater the extent to which he possesses excellence in its
• 11entirety, and the happier he is, the more he will be pained at the prospect of
• 12death; for to such a person, most of all, is living worth while, and this person
• Link 13will knowingly be depriving himself of goods of the greatest kind, which is
• Link 14something to be pained at. But he is no less courageous because of that, and
• Editor’s Note Link 15perhaps even more courageous, because he chooses what is fine in war in
• Link place of those other goods. So not all the excellences give rise to pleasant
• activity, except to the extent that pleasant activity touches on the end itself.
• But presumably it is perfectly possible that the most effective soldiers will not
• be people of this sort, but rather the sort who while being less courageous
• possess nothing else of value; for these people are ready to face dangers, and
• pg 1381117b20put up their lives for sale for small profits. Let this much stand, then, as our
• account of courage; and from what has been said, it is not difficult to grasp
• what it is, at least in outline.
•  
• Editor’s Note Link (III. 10) After this excellence, let us discuss moderation; for these seem to be
• 25the excellences of the non-rational parts. Well then, we have said that it is an
• Editor’s Note26intermediate state relating to pleasures (for it relates less, and not in the same
• 27way, to pains); and self-indulgence too appears in the same context. So let us
• 28now determine what sorts of pleasures it relates to. Let there be a distinction,
• Link 29then, between pleasures of the soul, like love of honour and love of learning,
• 30and those of the body—since each of these two, the lover of honour and the
• 31lover of learning, delights in what he is a lover of without his body being
• 32affected at all, but rather his mind. People concerned with pleasures of this
• 33sort are not called either moderate or self-indulgent. Nor, similarly, are those
• 34who are concerned with the other non-bodily pleasures: if people love stories,
• 35are always telling how something happened, and spend their days on matters
• 1118a Link 1of no consequence, we call them chatterers, not self-indulgent; nor do we call
• 2someone self-indulgent if he is distressed about money or friends. It will be to
• 3the pleasures of the body that moderation relates—but not all of these, either;
• 4for those who enjoy what comes to us through sight, e.g. colours, shapes, or
• 5painting, are not said to be either moderate or self-indulgent; yet it would
• 6seem possible in these cases too to take pleasure as one should, or excessively
• 7or deficiently. Similarly too in the field of hearing: no one calls self-indulgent
• 8those who find inordinate enjoyment in singing or drama, or moderate those
• 9who enjoy them in the way one should. Nor are these terms applied when it
• Editor’s Note10comes to smells, except incidentally; for we do not call people self-indulgent
• who enjoy smells of apples, roses, or incense, but rather ones who enjoy
• Editor’s Note Link smells of perfumes or tasty dishes; for the self-indulgent do enjoy these,
• because through them they are reminded of the objects of their appetites.
• 15One will see other people too, when they are hungry, enjoying the smells of
• Link 16food, but to enjoy such things is characteristic of the self-indulgent person; for
• 17in his case these are objects of appetite. Pleasure does not occur from these
• Link 18senses among other animals either except incidentally. For again, it is not
• 19the scent of the hares that the hunting-dogs enjoy, but consuming them—the
• Link 20scent just told the dogs the hares were there; nor is it the ox's lowing that the
• 21lion enjoys, but rather eating it up, and he merely sensed through the lowing
• Editor’s Note22that the ox was nearby, so appearing to enjoy the sound itself; similarly, what
• Link 23pleases him is not the sight of 'a stag or a goat running wild', but that he is to
• 24get a meal. Moderation and self-indulgence relate to the sorts of pleasures
• Editor’s Note25that are shared in by all the other animals too, which is why they appear
• Link slavish and bestial; and these are touch and taste. But the extent to which they
• Link involve taste, too, is little or nothing; for it is the function of taste to tell one
• Link flavour from another, as people do when approving wines or preparing tasty
• 1118apg 139 Link 30dishes; but what people, or at least the self-indulgent sort, really get pleasure
• Editor’s Note Link 31from is not this but rather the consumption involved, which comes about
• Link 32wholly by means of touch, whether it is a matter of eating or of drinking or
• 33so-called 'venery'. This is why a certain individual, a gourmandizer, actually
• 34prayed for a throat longer than a crane's—so showing that it was the sense of
• 1118b1touch that he enjoyed. The sense, then, that is the most widely shared is the
• Link 2one connected with self-indulgence, which would justly seem a matter for
• 3reproach because it belongs to us not in so far as we are human beings but in
• Link 4so far as we are animals. To take enjoyment in such things, then, and to be
• 5attached to them more than anything, is bestial. For the touch-related pleas-
• 6ures most appropriate to free men lie outside the sphere of self-indulgence,
• 7e.g. the ones in gymnasia produced through rubbing and warming; for the
• Editor’s Note Link 8touching that is characteristic of the self-indulgent person has to do not with
• 9the whole of the body but only with certain parts of it.
•  
• (III. 11) Of the appetites, some seem to be shared, others peculiar and
• Editor’s Note10acquired: so e.g. the appetite for nourishment is natural to us, since everyone
• Editor’s Note Link has an appetite for nourishment when they lack it, dry or liquid, or sometimes
• both; and for 'bed', in Homer's phrase, when one is young and in one's
• physical prime; but as for the appetite for this or that sort of food, not
• everyone has that—or an appetite for the same people. Hence it appears to be
• peculiar to us. All the same, it does have an element of the natural about it,
• since different things are pleasant for different individuals, and everyone gets
• 15more pleasure from certain things than from just anything. With the natural
• 16appetites, then, few people get things wrong, and only in one direction, that
• 17of excess; for eating or drinking whatever is to hand until one is overfull is to
• Link 18exceed the natural limit in quantity, since the object of natural desire is
• 19replenishment of the lack. (That is why these people are said to have 'belly-
• 20lust'—because they fill their belly more than is necessary. Those who are
• excessively slavish become people of this sort.) With the kinds of pleasures
• peculiar to us, on the other hand, many people get things wrong, and there
• are many ways of doing so. For given that people are called lovers of such-
• and-such either because they enjoy the sorts of things one shouldn't, or
• because they enjoy things more than most people do, or because they don't
• enjoy them in the way one should—well, the self-indulgent go to excess in all
• Link 25respects; for they too enjoy some things one shouldn't (being ones they should
• hate), and if there are some things of the sort in question that one should
• enjoy, they enjoy them more than one should and more than most people do.
• Excess in relation to pleasures, then, is clearly self-indulgence and a matter for
• 30censure; as for pains, the moderate person does not get his name for with-
• 31standing them, as the courageous person does, nor the self-indulgent person
• Link 32for not withstanding them—rather, the self-indulgent person is so called for
• 33being more distressed than one should be at not getting what is pleasant (the
• pg 140 Link 34pain, too, is caused for him by the pleasure), and the moderate person for not
• 1119a Link 1being distressed at its absence and for holding back from the pleasant. So the
• self-indulgent person, for his part, has an appetite for any pleasant things, or
• Link for the most pleasant, and he is driven by his appetite so as to choose these
• Link instead of anything else; this is why he is distressed both when he fails to get
• them and when he has the appetite for them—since the appetite is accom-
• 5panied by pain, though it seems a strange thing to be pained because of
• Link 6pleasure. People who are defective in relation to pleasures and enjoy them less
• 7than one should hardly occur; for to be insensate like this is not human—all
• 8the other animals too, after all, make distinctions between foods, and enjoy
• Link 9some but not others. If there is someone to whom nothing is pleasant, and
• 10nothing is preferable to anything else, he would be a long way from being
• human; and there is no name for him, because of the fact that he hardly
• Link occurs. As for the moderate person, he is in an intermediate state in these
• respects; for neither does he take pleasure in the things the self-indulgent
• Link person most enjoys, which actually disgust him, nor in general does he enjoy
• the things one shouldn't, or get intense enjoyment from anything of this sort,
• nor is he distressed at their absence—and neither does he have an appetite for
• 15them, or only a sober one, and not more than one should, or on the sort of
• Link 16occasion when one shouldn't, or generally anything of that sort. But such
• 17things as conduce to health or fitness and are pleasant he will desire moder-
• Link 18ately and in the way one should, as he will any other pleasures if they do not
• 19impede these, or are not contrary to what is fine, or not beyond his means. For
• 20someone disregarding these conditions is fonder of such pleasures than they
• Editor’s Note Link deserve; and the moderate person is not of this sort, but as the correct
• prescription lays down.
•  
• Link (III. 12) Self-indulgence looks more like a voluntary thing than cowardice
• does. For self-indulgence comes about because of pleasure, cowardice because
• of pain, and of these the one is something one chooses, the other something
• avoided; and while pain puts things out of joint and even destroys the natural
• state of the person who has it, pleasure does nothing of the sort. So self-
• Link 25indulgence is a more voluntary thing. Hence it is also more a matter for
• reproach; for it is also easier to acquire the habit of resisting pleasures, since
• Editor’s Notethere are many such things in one's life, and the occasions for habituation are
• without danger, whereas with fearsome things it is the reverse. But the dis-
• position of cowardice would seem to be voluntary in a way in which particu-
• lar acts of cowardice are not; for it is in itself painless, whereas they put things
• 30out of joint, through pain, even to the extent of causing the throwing down of
• 31weapons and the other sorts of disgraceful behaviour—which is why they also
• 32seem to be forced. For the self-indulgent person it is the reverse: the particular
• Editor’s Note Link 33acts seem voluntary, because they accord with his appetite and desire,
• 34while the thing as a whole appears less so, for no one has an appetite to be
• pg 141self-indulgent. The term 'indulgence' is one we also apply to the ways children
• 1119b1go wrong, for these have a certain resemblance to self-indulgence. Which is
• 2called after which makes no difference for present purposes, but clearly the
• Link 3later is called after the earlier. Nor does the transfer of usage seem inappropri-
• 4ate; for least to be indulged is the part of us that not only desires shameful
• 5things but can become big, and this characteristic belongs to appetite, and to
• the child, above all—since children too live according to appetite, and the
• Link desire for the pleasant is strongest in them. If, then, whatever desires shameful
• things is not ready to obey and under the control of the ruling element, it will
• grow and grow, for the desire for the pleasant is insatiable and indiscriminate,
• in a mindless person, and the activity of his appetite augments his congenital
• Link 10tendency; and if his appetites are strong and vigorous, they knock out his
• Link capacity for rational calculation as well. This is why they should be moderate
• and few, and offer no opposition to rational prescription (which is the sort of
• thing we mean by 'ready to obey' and 'not indulged'); for¹² just as a child should
• conduct himself in accordance with what the slave in charge of him tells him
• to do, so too the appetitive in us should conduct itself in accordance with
• Link 15what reason prescribes. Hence in the moderate person the appetitive should
• Editor’s Note Link 16be in harmony with reason; for the fine is goal for both, and the moderate
• person has appetite for the things one should, in the way one should, and
• when—which is what the rational prescription also lays down. Let this, then,
• be our account of moderation.