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AS: The Athenian Stranger
K: Kleinias
M: Megillus
Editor’s NoteAS. 884After assaults, let one comprehensive legal principle such as the following be stated covering acts of violence: No one is to carry off or lead away anything belonging to others, or use anything of one's neighbor, if he has not persuaded the owner. For all the evils mentioned have been, are, and will be dependant on such Editor’s Notethings. Gravest of the remaining [evils] are the unrestrained and hubristic acts of the young, and these are gravest of all when they affect hallowed things, and especially grave when they affect what is public and sacred—or common according to parts [of the 885city], being shared by a tribe or some other such [group]. Second and second gravest is when they affect private sacred things and tombs, and third, when someone is hubristic toward his parents (apart from what was discussed earlier). A fourth kind of hubris is when someone, ignoring the rulers, leads away or carries off or uses something of theirs without persuading them, and a fifth Editor’s Notewould be being hubristic with respect to the political rights of individual citizens in a way calling for legal justice. A law should be applied to each of these in common. For temple robbery has been discussed in summary—what the punishment ought to be, whether done violently or by stealth—but what the punishment ought to be for someone who (either by speaking or by acting) is hubristic towards the gods in word and in deed must be specified, Editor’s Noteonce the exhortation has been laid down. Let it be as follows:
'No one who believes that the gods exist, according to the laws, has ever willingly committed an impious deed or uttered an illegal word, unless he is suffering from one of three things: pg 12either this, he does not believe what I just said [i.e. that the gods exist]; or second, he believes they exist but do not take thought for humans; or third, he believes they are easily won over when influenced by sacrifices and prayers.'
AS. Good man, let us first listen to them—to what I divine they say in derision and contempt for us.
K. What's that?
AS. They would probably say this, in their banter:
'Athenian Stranger, and Lakedaimonian, and Knossian, what you say is true. For some of us in no way believe in the gods at all, while others believe they are as you say. So we expect, just das you expected concerning the laws, that before you threaten us harshly, you first try to persuade and teach us that the gods exist, presenting adequate proof, and that they are too good to be charmed by some gifts into being turned away from justice. For now, hearing these and other such things from those said to be the best of the poets, orators, prophets, priests, and myriad upon myriad of others, most of us are not inclined to avoid unjust acts, ebut to do them and then attempt to make amends. So from legis-lators who claim to be not savage but gentle we expect persuasion first be used on us. If you do not speak much better than the others about the existence of the gods, but are in fact better with respect to the truth, then perhaps we might be persuaded by you. But try, if we say something reasonable, to reply to what we propose.'
Editor’s NoteK. Well, stranger, doesn't it seem easy to speak the truth and to say that the gods exist?
AS. 886How?
K. First, there's the earth and the sun and the stars and the whole universe, and the beautiful, orderly procession of the seasons, divided into years and months; and then there's the fact that all Greeks and barbarians believe that the gods exist.
Editor’s NoteAS. Blessed man, I am afraid—I would never say that I'm ashamed —lest the wicked will somehow look down upon us. For youp1 don't know about the cause of our disagreement with them, pg 13rather youp believe that it is solely through a lack of control of bpleasures and desires that their souls are impelled to the impious life.
K. But what besides these would be the cause, stranger?
AS. One which youp, living completely outside [their influence], would hardly know, but which would escape yourp notice.
AS. A certain very grievous ignorance that seems to be the greatest wisdom.
K. What do you mean?
AS. There are among us [i.e. the Athenians] accounts set out in cwriting, which do not exist among youp (because of the virtue of your political system, I understand), that speak about the gods (some with meters, others without): the most ancient say that the first nature of the heavens and the rest came into being, and, proceeding a bit beyond the beginning, they [i.e. the most ancient accounts] go through the birth of the gods, and how having come into being they [i.e. the gods] associated with one another. As to whether these [writings] do anything else fine or not fine to those who hear them, it is not easy to evaluate, because they are ancient; however, as to services to and honors ddue parents, I at least would never recommend them as beneficial or as what is spoken completely truthfully. Now let us dismiss the ancient material and bid it farewell, and let us speak about it in whatever way is dear to the gods; but what comes from our modern wise men let us censure to the extent that it is responsible for vicious things. Now the arguments of such people accomplish the following: when you and I present proofs that the gods exist, bringing forth these very things—sun and moon and stars and earth—as gods and divine beings, those misled by these wise emen would say that these things are earth and stone and are not able to think about human affairs, but have somehow been well wrapped up in plausible stories.
Editor’s NoteK. Difficult indeed, stranger, is the argument you have described, even if it were one alone; but as there are in fact very many arguments, it is even more difficult.
pg 14AS. So what now? What do we say? What should we do? Shall we defend ourselves, as though someone were accusing us before impious people, who say to the accused, with respect to legisla-887tion, that we are doing terrible things in passing laws that the gods exist? Or shall we allow them to bid farewell, and [ourselves] return to the laws, lest our prelude become longer than the laws? For the discussion would not be brief if it were prolonged to provide those who desire to be impious with adequate arguments about the things they demanded we address, and cause them to fear and make them feel uneasy, and only then lay down the relevant laws.
K. bBut stranger, often (at least in our brief time together) we have said this very thing, that in the present case it is not necessary to honor the short speech more than the long—for no one hastens to pursue us, as the saying goes—and clearly it is ridiculous and base to appear to choose the shorter over the best. And it makes no small difference that somehow our arguments—that the gods exist and are good, honoring justice more than humans do—have some persuasiveness. For this would be just about our cfinest and best prelude on behalf of all the laws. So without being disgusted or rushed, and without holding back whatever capacity for persuasion we have from such arguments, let's go through them as sufficiently as possible.
AS. It seems to me that the argument you have just mentioned Editor’s Notecalls for a prayer, since you urge us on so eagerly. We should delay no longer in speaking. Come, then, how should someone speak without anger about the existence of gods? For it is indeed dnecessary to be harsh to and to hate those who have been and are now responsible for these arguments coming to us, as they do not believe the stories which, from the time they were young children still being nourished on milk, they heard from their nurses and mothers, presented like an incantation, sometimes playfully and sometimes seriously. They heard them in prayers at sacrifices, and they saw them in spectacles which are most pleasant for the young man to see and hear when accompanying the performance of sacrifices, and they saw their own parents, with the utmost eseriousness, on behalf of themselves and their children, engaged in dialogue (through prayers and supplications) with gods who pg 15certainly did exist. And at the rising and the setting of the sun and moon they heard and saw the prostrations and adorations of both the Greeks and all the barbarians, in all sorts of misfortune and in prosperity, not as if they [i.e. the gods] do not exist, but as if they certainly exist and in no way give rise to any suspicion that they are not gods. Those people have contempt for all of this, and without a single sufficient argument (as those who have even a little intelligence would affirm), and they now compel 888us to say what we are saying. How could someone, with mild arguments, admonish and at the same time teach these people first of all that the gods exist? Still, it must be dared. For [both sides] ought not to be maddened at the same time: the one by gluttony for pleasure, the other by anger at such men. So let an introductory speech run as follows, without anger, for those who are in this way corrupted in thought, and let us speak mildly, Editor’s Noteextinguishing our anger, as if in a dialogue with a single one of them:
b'Boy, you are young, and time as it passes will make you change many of the opinions you now hold into their opposites. So wait till then before becoming a judge about the greatest things; and the greatest, which you now regard as nothing, is to think correctly about the gods in order to live nobly—or not. First, in revealing to you some one great thing about them, I would never utter a falsehood. It is this: Neither you alone nor your friends are the first and foremost to have held this opinion about the gods, rather people who have this disease—many or few—are always appearing. And I, who have come across many of them, ccan tell you this: no one ever embraced from youth this opinion about the gods—that they don't exist—and continued into old age, steadfast in this way of thinking. The two other afflictions concerning the gods, however, do remain (not with many, but they remain with some): that the gods exist, but think nothing of human beings; and the one after this, that they do think about them, but are easily won over by sacrifices and prayers. You will wait, if you're persuaded by me, until a position concerning these things becomes as clear as possible to you, examining whether dthings are thus [i.e. as you now believe] or otherwise, inquiring from others and especially from the legislator; and during this time you won't dare do anything impious concerning the gods.
pg 16Let he who sets up the laws for you attempt, now and in the future, to teach how these very things stand.'
K. What's been said so far, stranger, is fine with us.
Editor’s NoteAS. Completely, Megillus and Kleinias. But without noticing it, we have been exposed to an amazing argument.
K. Which do you mean?
AS. eThe one thought by many to be the wisest of all arguments.
K. Explain this more clearly.
AS. Some people say that all things that come into being, have come into being, and will come into being do so by nature, by art, or through chance.
K. Isn't that right?
AS. 889It's likely, at least, that the wise men speak correctly. At any rate, let's follow them and investigate whatever the men on that side really happen to think.
K. Absolutely.
AS. It's likely, they claim, that the greatest and finest things are produced by nature and chance, while the smaller are by art, which takes over from nature the source of the greatest and primary works, and forms and crafts all the smaller things which we call artificial.
K. What do you mean?
AS. bI'll state it more clearly still, as follows. They claim that fire, water, earth, and air all exist by nature and by chance, but none of these exists by art; and the bodies that come after these—those making up the earth, sun, moon, and stars—in turn came into being through these completely soulless beings. Each [element] is moved by chance, by the power each has; as they fell together, harmonizing in suitable ways—hot with cold, or dry in relation cto wet, and soft in relation to hard, and all such things which, by mixing with their opposites according to chance, have from necessity been mixed together—in this way, and according to these means, the entire heavens and all that is in the heavens were born, as well as, next, all the animals and plants, when all the seasons had come to be out of these, not through reason, they say, nor through some god nor through art, but, as we were pg 17saying, by nature and chance. Art is late, coming to be later from dthese [i.e. animals]. Itself mortal from mortals, it later gave birth to certain playthings, which do not much share in the truth, but are images akin to the arts themselves, such as painting produces and music and whatever arts are ancillary to these. But some of the arts do in fact produce something that is serious—the ones whose capacities cooperate with nature, such as medicine, farming, and gymnastics. And, in particular, they say that some small part of politics cooperates with nature, but most of it is eby art; and so, too, all legislation—whose enactments are not true—exists not by nature but by art.
AS. The first thing these people claim about the gods, blessed one, is that they exist by art—not by nature but by certain laws—and that these [gods] are different in different locations, according to whatever each group agreed among themselves in laying down the laws. And in particular they claim that there are beautiful things by nature, though these differ from what is [beautiful] by law, while the just things do not exist by nature at all, rather that people continue to disagree with one another and are always altering these things [i.e. what are considered just], and whatever 890they alter and when, each is authoritative at that time, having come into being by art and by laws but certainly not by some nature.
This, my friends, is all from wise men—according to young people—who are prose writers and poets, who assert that what is most just is whatever can triumph by force; from which come the impieties that afflict young people, who hold that the gods are not such as the law commands they should be understood to be; and civil conflict occurs because of this, owing to those who drag people towards the 'correct life according to nature', which is in truth to live dominating the rest and not being a slave to others according to law.
Editor’s NoteK. bWhat an account you've gone through, stranger, and what ruin for young people, both in cities as public places and in private households!
AS. You speak the truth, Kleinias. So what do you think the legislator ought to do, given that these views have been current for a long pg 18time? Is he simply to stand up before the city and threaten all the people that unless they affirm that the gods exist, and think and believe that [the gods] are such as the law affirms (and cthe same could be said about the beautiful and the just and about all great matters and whatever aims at virtue and vice, that it is necessary to act in this way [i.e. as the law affirms] while thinking in whatever way the legislator has instructed in writing)—that whoever does not show himself obedient to the laws, in one case must die, in another be punished with a beating and imprisonment, in another with dishonors, and in other cases with poverty and exile? But what about Persuasion for the people—should he, at the same time that he establishes the laws for them, refrain from adding arguments to make them as gentle as possible?
K. dNot at all, stranger, but if there happens to be even some small persuasion concerning these matters, the legislator of even a little worth should in no way grow tired, but should 'let loose his whole voice', as the saying goes, and become an ally of the ancient law's argument*2 that the gods exist and all that you just now went through; in particular, he should support law itself and art, as existing by nature or by something not inferior to nature, if they are offspring of reason, according to the correct account. That is what you seem to me to be saying, and I believe you now.
AS. eMost eager Kleinias, what now? Isn't it difficult to follow arguments in this way, when they are presented to crowds; and, further, don't they possess an immense length?
K. What, stranger? We put up with ourselves speaking at such length about drunkenness and music, but we're not going to endure this when it's about gods and such things? Further, it [i.e. a lengthy argument] is presumably a big help for prudent legislation, since 891the commands of law set down in writing remain completely the same, and ready to submit to examination for all time. So if they are difficult to listen to at the beginning there's no need to fear, because the slow learner will be able to return often and pg 19examine them; and if they are lengthy but useful it is in no way reasonable or holy, it seems to me, for any man not to support these arguments as much as possible.
AS. bCertainly, Megillus, we should do as he says. Indeed, if such arguments were not sown among all of mankind, so to speak, none of the arguments in defense of the gods' existence would be needed; but now they are necessary. So with the greatest laws being destroyed by vicious humans, who better to come to their defense than the legislator?
AS. cBut tell me again, Kleinias, for you must share in the arguments: the one saying these things apparently believes that fire and water and earth and air are first among all things and names these very things 'nature', while soul comes out of these later. But it's likely that this isn't merely apparent, but that he explicitly asserts these things to us in his argument.
K. Certainly.
AS. Now then, by Zeus, have we discovered something like a source of the unreasonable opinions of all those humans who have ever undertaken investigations into nature? Consider and examine dthe entire argument. For it is no small matter if those who handle impious arguments and lead others to them appeared to employ these arguments not well but erroneously. In fact, this seems to me to be the case.
K. You're right. But try to explain in what way [they're erroneous].
AS. Well, it's likely that rather unfamiliar arguments must now be handled.
K. There is no need to hesitate, stranger. For I understand that you think we'll be going outside legislation if we handle such earguments. But if there is no other way than this to come to an agreement that what are now described as gods according to law are correctly so described, then, you amazing man, it's necessary Editor’s Noteto speak in this way.
AS. So it seems I must now present this fairly uncustomary account: the arguments that produce the soul of the impious have declared pg 20that this—what is the first cause of the generation and destruc-tion of all things—is not first but has come into being later, while what is later is earlier. This is why they have erred concerning the real existence of the gods.
K. 892I don't understand.
AS. It's soul, comrade, that nearly everyone seems to have misun-derstood: what it is, the power it has, and particularly (apart from other things about it) its generation—that it is among the first things, coming into being before all bodies, and that it more than anything governs their changes and all of their transformations. If this is how it is, then wouldn't what is related bto soul necessarily come into being before what belongs to body, since soul itself is older than body?
K. It is necessary.
AS. So opinion and supervision and reason and art and law would be prior to hard things and soft things and heavy things and light things. Indeed, the great and first works and actions would be those of art, being among the first, while 'nature' and the things that are 'by nature', which they incorrectly name in this way, would be later and governed by art and reason.
K. cIn what sense 'incorrectly'?
AS. By 'nature' they mean the generation [or source] of the first things; but if soul turns out to be first, not fire or air, and soul is among the first things to have come into being, then it may well be most correct to say that it especially is by nature. This is how things are if someone can demonstrate that soul is older than body, but not otherwise.
K. That's perfectly true.
AS. dSo shouldn't we next get ready to do just this?
K. Of course.
AS. Let us guard against a completely deceitful argument, lest in some Editor’s Noteway we, who are old, are taken in by its novelty, and it eludes us and makes us look ridiculous, in seeming to take on great things but to fail at smaller ones. So consider: Suppose we three had to cross a rapidly flowing river, and I, who happened to be the youngest of us and experienced with many currents, said that I pg 21eshould try first by myself, leaving you in safety, and investigate whether it is fordable for you older men as well, or however it is, and if it appears to be such I'll call to you and help you with my experience to ford it, but if it's not fordable for you the risk would fall to me—I would seem to speak reasonably. Indeed, the argument now coming up is very rapid and probably not fordable 893given your strength. So lest [the argument], going by and asking [questions of] you who are unaccustomed to answering, makes you dazed and dizzy, putting you in an unpleasant, undignified, and unseemly position, it seems to me that I should now do the following: first I'll question myself, while you listen in safety, and after this I'll answer myself in return, and I'll go through the entire argument in this way, until it has completely covered what concerns the soul and demonstrates that the soul is prior to body.
K. You seem to us to have spoken excellently, stranger. Do what you say.
AS. bCome, then, if ever we should summon a god for help, let this be done now—let us summon them in all seriousness, at the demonstration of their own existence—and, holding on as if to some security rope, let us enter into the present argument.
Editor’s NoteWhen I am questioned about such matters, and asked such things as the following, it seems safest to answer in this way. When someone says, 'Stranger, is everything stationary and nothing in motion? Or is it completely opposite to that? Or are csome things in motion and some at rest?'—'Presumably some are in motion', I'll reply, 'and some are at rest.'—'Then surely there is some place in which the stationary things are stationary and the things in motion are in motion.'—'How could it be otherwise?'—'And some would presumably do this [i.e. move] in one spot while others would do this in many?'—'Do you mean those things that have the power of standing still in the middle', we'll say, 'and to move in one place, just as the circumferences of circles said to stand still revolve?'—'Yes.'—'And we understand that in the case of this rotation, the largest circle and the smallest dgo around at the same time, and such motion distributes itself to the small and the large proportionally, being less or more according to proportion. This is why it [i.e. circular motion] has pg 22become a source of all sorts of wonder: at the same time it imparts to large and small circles slowness and swiftness in harmony, an occurrence that one would expect to be impossible.'—'That's absolutely true.'—' "What moves in many locations" appears to me to mean whatever moves in a motion by which it always changes to another place, sometimes possessing a base of one epoint, sometimes more (by rolling). Each time they [i.e. moving objects] encounter each other, they are split apart by the ones standing still, whereas with the others that come and are borne from the opposite direction, they combine and become one thing intermediate between the two [in nature].'—'I say that this is the way it is, as you say.'—'Further, when they combine there is growth, but when they separate there is decay, for 894as long as the established state of each thing remains; but if it doesn't remain, there is destruction by means of both [i.e. combination and separation]. Now when anything comes into being, what is it that happens? It is clear that when the principle, receiving growth, proceeds to the second change, and from this to the next and proceeds as far as the third, it provides perception to perceivers. Everything comes to be by changing and transforming in this way; and it is really being, as long as it remains the same; but if it changes into another state it is completely destroyed.'
bSo, friends, haven't we stated and numbered all forms of motion, except two?
K. Which two?
AS. My good man, those two for the sake of which virtually our entire present investigation is undertaken.
K. Speak more clearly.
AS. Presumably, it was for the sake of soul?
K. Certainly.
AS. So let there be one motion that is always capable of moving others but incapable of mov-ing itself, and another that is always capable of moving itself and others, by combinations and separations, growths and the opposite, and generations and cdestructions—another one among all the motions.
K. Let this be so.
pg 23AS. Therefore, the one that always moves another and is changed by another we will make the ninth, while the one that moves itself and others—in harmony with all actions and all experiences, and accurately called the change and motion of all beings—this we will say is pretty much the tenth.
K. By all means.
AS. dWhich of our approximately ten motions would we judge most correctly to be the most influential of all and especially effective?
K. Presumably, we should assert that the one capable of moving itself excels in myriad ways, while all the others are inferior.
AS. That's right. So, shouldn't one or even two of our incorrect statements just now be changed?
K. Which are you talking about?
AS. What was said about the tenth was pretty much stated incorrectly.
K. How?
AS. According to our argument, it is first in generation and in einfluence. And the one after this we hold is second to this, though oddly it was just now said to be ninth.
K. What do you mean?
Editor’s NoteAS. This: If we hold that one thing changes another, and this other yet another, forever, will one of these changes ever be first? And how will that which is moved by another ever be first among the things that are altered? For that's impossible. But when something having moved itself alters another, and this other 895another, and in this way thousands upon thousands of things being moved come into being, what will be a principle of all of their motions except the change from what has moved itself?
K. Excellently put; there should be agreement with this.
AS. Let us speak further, in the following way, and again answer ourselves. If somehow everything were to come together and stand still, just as most of those men venture to say, which motion of the ones we spoke of would necessarily be the first to bcome to be among them? Surely the one that moves itself. For it would never be changed by another that is prior, since there is among them no prior change. So, as the source of all motions, and the first to come to be among what was standing still and pg 24to exist among what moves, we shall assert that the one that moves itself is necessarily the oldest and most powerful change of all, while the one that is altered by another and moves others is second.
K. That's perfectly true.
K. What?
AS. If we should see that this [i.e. self-moving motion] had come to be in something made of earth or water or what has the form of fire—separated or even mixed together—whatever would we say is the condition of such a thing?
K. Are you asking me if we'll say something is living when it moves itself?
AS. Yes.
K. Living—how could it not be?
AS. Well then, when we see soul in certain things, is it anything but the same in such cases? Should we agree that it's living?
K. It's nothing else.
AS. dHold on, by Zeus. Wouldn't you be willing to recognize three points concerning each thing?
K. What do you mean?
AS. One is the being, one is the definition of the being, and one is the name. Further, there are two questions you could ask about every being.
K. Why two?
AS. Sometimes each of us puts forward the name by itself and demands the definition, other times he puts forward the defini-tion by itself and asks for the name. So, do we intend to say the following now?*
K. What?
AS. ePresumably, being divisible into two exists in other things and also in number. The name for this in the case of number is 'even', and the definition is: 'a number divisible into two equal parts'.
pg 25K. Yes.
AS. I'm talking about that sort of thing. Aren't we referring to the same thing in either case, whether when asked for the definition we give the name, or asked for the name we give the definition? By the name 'even' and by the definition 'number divisible into two', aren't we referring to the same being?
K. Absolutely.
AS. So what is the definition of the thing the name of which is 'soul'? 896Do we have another besides the one just now stated: 'motion capable of moving itself'?
K. Do you claim that the definition 'to move itself' holds for the same being which we all refer to by the name 'soul'?
Editor’s NoteAS. I claim this. And if this is so, do we still regret that we have not sufficiently demonstrated that soul is the same being as the first generation and motion of what exists, what has come to be, and bwhat will be, and further of all of their opposites, since it has been shown to be the cause of all change and of motion in all things?
K. No, it has been demonstrated most sufficiently that soul, being the source of motion, is the oldest of all things.
AS. So isn't the motion that comes to be in one thing because of another, but that itself never causes anything to move by itself, second, or however many numbers farther down someone would wish to count it, really being a change of soulless body?
K. Correct.
AS. So we spoke correctly, authoritatively, most truly and perfectly csaying that soul has come to be prior to body, while body is second and later, and that soul rules, while body is ruled, according to nature.
K. That is most true.
AS. Now remember what we agreed to earlier: if soul were shown to be older than body, then the things of the soul would be older than the things of the body.
K. Certainly.
AS. dHabits, moral characteristics, wishes, calculations, true opinions, supervision, and memory would have come into being prior to pg 26length of bodies, width, depth, and strength, if soul is prior to body.
AS. So, after this, isn't it necessary to agree that soul is the cause of good things and bad, beautiful and ugly, just and unjust, and of all the [sets of] opposites—if we are going to posit it as the cause of all things?
K. How could it not be?
AS. eIndeed, since soul manages and resides in all things that anywhere are in motion, isn't it necessary to assert that it also manages the heavens?
K. What else?
AS. One soul or more than one? More—I'll answer for both of you. At any rate, we should assume no fewer than two: one that does what is good, and one capable of doing the opposite.
AS. Very well. So soul drives all things in the heavens and on earth and in the sea through its own motions, the names of which 897are wishing, investigating, supervising, deliberating, believing correctly and falsely, rejoicing and feeling pain, being bold and feeling fear, hating and loving, and through all of the related or primary-work motions, taking over the secondary-work motions of bodies, they drive all things to growth and decay, separation and combination, and to what follows these: heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hard and soft, white and black, bitter and sweet. Soul uses all of these, and every time it joins with reason—'god' correctly for the gods*—it guides all things toward what is correct and happy, but when it associates with lack-of-reason it produces in all things the opposite of these. Shall we set these down as being this way, or do we still suspect that it might be otherwise?
AS. So then which kind of soul should we claim is in control of the heavens and earth and the whole cycle? The one prudent and cfull of virtue, or that which possesses neither? Do you want us to answer these questions as follows?
pg 27K. How?
AS. We should say: If, my amazing man, the entire course and movement of the heavens and of all the beings therein has the same nature as the motion and revolution and calculations of reason, and proceeds in a related way, then it is clear that one ought to claim that the best soul supervises the whole cosmos and leads it along just such a course.
K. Correct.
AS. dBut if they proceed in a frantic and disorderly way, then it's the vicious soul.
K. This too is correct.
AS. So, then, what nature does the motion of reason have? This question, friends, is difficult to answer prudently, which is why taking me on now to help with your answer is just.
K. You speak well.
AS. Therefore, let us not come up with the answer head-on from the opposite direction, like looking into the sun and bringing on night in the middle of the day, as if with mortal eyes we ecould ever see reason and know it sufficiently. It is safer to see by looking at an image of what is being asked about.
K. What do you mean?
AS. Let us take as the image the motion (of those ten motions) which reason resembles. Recalling it with you, I'll come up with our common answer.
K. What you say is most fine.
AS. So do we still remember this from what was said earlier, that of all things some are in motion and some at rest?
K. Yes.
AS. 898And, of those in motion, some move in one place, some move in more than one.
K. That's right.
AS. Of these two motions, the one moving always in one place must necessarily move around some midpoint, being an imitation of wheels turned on a lathe, and in every way it has the greatest possible kinship and likeness to the orbit of reason.
pg 28K. What do you mean?
AS. Certainly, if we said that in both cases—reason and the motion moving in one place—moving was (1) in relation to the same things, (2) in the same way, (3) in the same place, (4) around the same things, (5) toward the same things, and (6) according to bone formula and one order, and illustrated both by the motions of a sphere turned on a lathe, we would never appear to be poor craftsmen of beautiful images in speech.
K. What you say is most correct.
AS. But wouldn't the motion that never moves (1) in the same way, nor (2) according to what is the same, nor (3) in the same place, nor (4) around the same things, nor (5) toward the same things, nor (6) in one place, nor (7) in an arrangement or order or some formula, be akin to complete lack-of-reason?
K. Most truly it would.
AS. cSo now it is no longer difficult to say right out that since according to us soul is what leads everything around, it ought to be claimed that the orbit of the heavens is led around from necessity, being supervised and ordered either by the best soul or by the opposite kind.
K. But, stranger, judging from what has now been said, it isn't pious to say anything other than that soul—one or more—having Editor’s Notecomplete virtue leads things around.
AS. dKleinias, you have listened to the arguments brilliantly. But further attend to this.
K. To what?
AS. If soul leads around all of these—sun and moon and the other stars—then doesn't it [lead around] each one?
K. Of course.
AS. Let us produce the arguments for one of these, which we find obviously applies to all of the stars.
K. Which one?
AS. The sun. Every human sees its body, but no one sees its soul—nor indeed the soul of the body of any other living beings, whether eliving or dying. But there is a good reason to expect that this kind of thing, which is completely imperceptible to all bodily senses, pg 29exists by nature all around us, but is intelligible through reason alone. Indeed, through this and understanding, let us grasp the following concerning soul.
K. What?
AS. If soul does lead the sun, we will not be far off if we say it does this in one of three ways.
K. Which ways?
AS. Either soul resides within this visible round body, and as such conveys it everywhere, just as our soul carries us around every-899where; or from somewhere outside it procures for itself a body of fire or some kind of air (as is the view of certain people), and by force pushes body with body; or third, being itself void of body, but having some other extremely amazing powers, it guides [the sun].
K. Yes, this is necessary: that soul does at least one of these to lead all things.
AS. Now hold it. All men ought to regard this soul as a god, whether it leads light to all of us by being in the chariot of the sun, or from the outside, or however or in whatever way. Or what?
K. bYes, anyone who hasn't reached the ultimate in lack-of-reason.
AS. Indeed, concerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning years and months and all the seasons, what other account will we present but this same one: that since soul or souls—good ones with respect to complete virtue—appear to be the causes of all of these, we will claim that they are gods, whether they order the entire heavens by existing in bodies, being living beings, or in whatever way and however they do it? Is there anyone who could agree with this and still not hold that all things are full of gods?
K. cStranger, there is no one so deranged.
Editor’s NoteAS. Now then, Megillus and Kleinias, to the one who hitherto did not believe in the gods let us state our terms and dismiss him.
K. What terms?
AS. Either to demonstrate to us that we aren't speaking correctly when we posit soul as the first genesis of all things (and everything else that we said followed from this), or, if unable to speak better than us, to be persuaded by us and to live believing in the gods pg 30dfor the rest of his life. So let us see whether what we said about the gods existing to those who don't believe in the gods is already sufficient, or whether it's inadequate.
K. Stranger, it least of all is inadequate.
Editor’s NoteAS. Then let this be the end of our arguments with these people; however, we must now exhort the one who believes that the gods exist, but that they don't think about human affairs. We'll state:
'Best of men, that you believe in gods is likely some kinship with the divine that leads you to what is of the same nature eand to honor and believe in its existence. But the private and public fortunes of vicious and unjust humans lead you to impiety, when in truth they are not happy, though they are improperly thought to be extremely happy—among the Muses who incorrectly sing their praises and according to all kinds of accounts. Or perhaps you see humans nearing the end of old age, 900leaving behind grandchildren in high honors, and now you are disturbed observing in all these cases (either through hearsay or even by seeing it all with your own eyes) that there are some who have engaged in many terrible acts of impiety, and through these very acts have gone from humble beginnings to tyrannies and pre-eminence. The result of all of this is that although owing to your kinship you are clearly unwilling to blame the gods as the cause of such things, you are led—by poor reasoning and an inability to condemn the gods—to this present condition of yours: it seems that they exist, but that they despise and neglect human affairs. Therefore, in order that the belief you now hold not worsen your impious condition, and if somehow we are able as it were to ward off this belief with arguments when it approaches, let us try to connect the next argument to the one we discussed thoroughly from the beginning against the person who did not believe in gods at all, and make use of this latter in the present case.'
cBut you, Kleinias and Megillus, on behalf of the young man, take his place in answering, just as you did in the previous case. If something difficult comes up in the arguments, I will take over from you two, as I did just now, and take [you] across the river.
K. Well spoken. You do these things in this way, and we'll do what you say to the extent that that's possible.
pg 31AS. But perhaps it would not be difficult to prove this* at least, that the gods supervise small matters no less* than the especially dbig matters. For presumably he heard and was present at what was just said: that, being good with respect to every virtue, the supervision of all things is perfectly appropriate to them.
K. He certainly heard this.
Editor’s NoteAS. So, after this, let them examine with us in common what virtue of the gods we meant when we agreed that they [i.e. the gods] were good. Come, do we claim that being moderate and possessing reason are characteristic of virtue, while the opposites are characteristic of vice?
K. We claim that.
AS. eWhat else? That courage is characteristic of virtue, and cowardice of vice?
K. Certainly.
AS. And will we claim that some of these are shameful, while others are noble?
K. Necessarily.
AS. And whichever of these are base befit us, if anyone, whereas we say that neither the great nor the small of such things dwell among the gods?
K. Everyone would agree that this, too, is the case.
AS. What else? Will we attribute neglect and laziness and luxury to virtue of the soul, or what do you say?
K. What indeed?
AS. But to the opposite?
K. Yes.
AS. 901And the opposites of these to the opposite?
K. The opposite.
AS. So what then? Would everyone who is luxurious and negligent and lazy be according to us the sort the poet says are most 'like stingless drones'?3
K. Spoken most correctly.
pg 32AS. Then the god should not be said to have just the sort of character that he himself hates, and anyone who attempts to utter such a thing should not be allowed to.
K. No he shouldn't. How could he be?
AS. bIt belongs to someone to act and to have special supervision over something, and his reason supervises the great things but neglects the small ones: according to what argument would we praise such a man and not strike a completely false note? Let's consider this as follows: Doesn't the one who acts in such a way act according to either of two forms, whether he is a god or a man?
K. Which ones do we mean?
AS. Either (1) he thinks it makes no difference to the whole if che neglects the small things, or (2) he neglects them through indolence and luxury, though it makes a difference. Or does neglect come to be in some other way? For, presumably, if it's impossible to supervise all things, then it won't be neglect of either small or great things, whether a god or some base person is unable to supervise them, being inferior and thus unable to supervise.
K. How could it?
AS. dNow let the two of them answer the three of us. (They both agree the gods exist, though the other says they're appeasable through prayer, while this one says they neglect small things.) 'First, do you both claim that the gods know and see and hear everything, and that nothing of which there are perceptions and knowledge can escape them?' Is this the way these things are said to be,* or how?
K. This way.
AS. What else? Can the gods do whatever is possible to mortals and immortals?
K. How could they not concede that this too is so?
AS. eFurther, we five have agreed that they [i.e. the gods] are good—in fact, best.
K. Very much so.
pg 33AS. So isn't it impossible to agree that they do anything at all through indolence or luxury, if they are such as we agree? For according to us, at least, laziness is an offspring of cowardice, and indolence an offspring of laziness and luxury.
K. What you say is most true.
AS. None of the gods, then, is negligent from laziness and indolence, for presumably none shares in cowardice.
K. What you say is most correct.
AS. 902So what is left, if they do neglect the very small things in the universe: either they do this knowing that it is absolutely necessary † to supervise none†* of these things, or—what is left, except the opposite of knowledge?
K. Nothing.
AS. So which is it, very best of men: Should we put you down as saying that the gods are ignorant and through ignorance neglect what ought to be supervised, or that they know what they ought to do, as the basest of humans are said to do: they know it is bbetter to act otherwise than how they are acting, but don't do so, because they succumb to pleasures or pains?
K. How could that be?
Editor’s NoteAS. So don't human affairs share in the nature of the ensouled, and isn't the human himself the most god-revering of all ani-mals?
K. That's likely.
AS. Indeed, we claim that all mortal animals are possessions of the gods, as are the entire heavens.
K. How could this not be?
AS. cSo, then, let someone claim that these are small or great to the gods; for in neither case would it befit the owners to neglect us, since they are the most solicitous and the best. For let us consider the following, in addition to these points.
K. What?
AS. Concerning perception and power: are they not by nature opposite one another, with respect to ease and difficulty?
K. What do you mean?
pg 34AS. Presumably, it's more difficult to see and to hear what's small than what's big, while it's easier for everyone to carry and control and supervise what's small and few than their opposites.
K. dMuch more.
AS. If a whole [patient] is assigned to a doctor to treat, and [the doctor] wants and is able to supervise what's big, but neglects the small parts, will the entire [patient] ever fare well for him?
K. Absolutely not.
AS. Nor for captains or generals or household managers, nor for ecertain statesmen or any other such men, will the many and great fare well apart from the few and small; for the stonemasons claim that large stones do not lie well without small ones.
K. How could they?
AS. So let us never suppose that the god is inferior to mortal craftsmen who the better they are the more exactly and perfectly they execute with one art the small and the large aspects of the work that is proper to them; nor suppose that the god who is 903most wise and willing and able to supervise will not supervise any of the small things, which are easily supervised, but will supervise the large things, just like some lazy or cowardly person who is indolent in the face of toil.
K. Let us in no way accept such an opinion about the gods, stranger. For we would be thinking a thought that is in no way holy or true.
AS. We seem to me now to have had a completely reasonable* dia-logue with the one who likes to accuse the gods of negligence …
AS. … by forcing him, with arguments, to agree that he was not bspeaking correctly. Yet it seems to me that some mythic incan-tations are still needed.
K. Which ones, my good man?
AS. Let us persuade the young man, with arguments, that: 'The universe is put together with a view to the safety and virtue of the whole by the one who supervises the universe, and each part, to the extent that it can, does and has done to it what pg 35is fitting. Rulers have been positioned over the experience and activity of each of these parts, for all time, to the smallest detail, and they [i.e. the rulers] have achieved their goal to the utmost cfraction. Even your part is one of these, stubborn man, and it always strains to look toward the universe, even though it is altogether small. But you have forgotten about this very fact, that all generation comes to be for the sake of this: that a happy existence may belong to the life of the universe; and it does not come to be for the sake of you, but you for the sake of it. For every doctor and every skilled craftsman does all his work for the sake of all; he makes a part straining for what is best in common, for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of da part. But you are irritated, not knowing how what concerns you turns out best for the whole and for you as well, in virtue of the power of your common generation. Since soul is always put together with bodies—sometimes with one, sometimes with another—and undergoes all kinds of changes through itself or through another soul, no other function is left for the game-player except to transfer the character that is becoming better to a better place, and the one becoming worse to a worse place, according to what is appropriate to each of them, such that each eis allotted its proper fate.'
K. In what way do you mean?
AS. The way in which the supervision of the universe by the gods would be easy—this is what I seem to be explaining. For if someone, failing always to look to the whole, were to mold all things by changing their shapes—for example, having ensouled [or 'cold'] water come from fire, and not many things from one 904or one from many—then once they [i.e. all things] have taken part in a first or second or third generation, there would be an unlimited number of transformations in the arrangement of the cosmos. But in fact it is marvelously easy for the one who supervises the universe.
K. Again, what do you mean?
AS. This: 'Our King saw that all actions involve soul, and there is much virtue in them, but also much vice, and that, having come to be, soul with body is indestructible but not eternal, like the gods that exist according to law—for there would never pg 36bhave been generation of living beings if either of these two had been destroyed—and he grasped that whatever in soul is good is always naturally beneficial, while the vicious is harmful. Seeing all this, he presumably designed the position of each of the parts so that virtue would be victorious in the universe, and vice defeated, in the easiest and best way. Indeed, he has designed, with a view to this universe, that when a certain sort [of person] comes into being, it must always take a certain place and reside cin certain locations. But he leaves the cause for the coming to be of each particular sort of person to the will of each of us. For as one desires, and as one is with respect to soul, so (pretty much in every case) is the sort of person each of us becomes, for the most part.'
K. That's likely.
AS. 'So all things that are sharing in soul change, possessing within themselves the cause of the change, and in changing they are moved according to the order and law of destiny. When the change in character is smaller and less significant, there is smaller horizontal movement in space; when a change is more significant dand more unjust, the movement is into the depths and the places said to be below, which people call "Hades" and related names, which terrify them both in dreams while they are alive, and when they have been sundered from their bodies. But whenever a soul gets a larger share of vice or virtue, owing to its own will and to an increased influence from others, then, by mingling with a divine virtue it becomes exceptionally such; and it undergoes ean exceptional change of place and is transported along a sacred road to a better place elsewhere; but when the opposite happens it moves its own life to the opposite place. "This is the judgment of the gods who hold Olympus",4 O child or young man, who believes he is neglected by the gods: the one who becomes more vicious is conveyed to the vicious souls, while the one who becomes better is conveyed to the better souls, in life and in every 905death, to experience and to do what is appropriate for like to do to like. From this judgment of the gods* neither you nor anyone else who's become luckless will ever boast of having escaped. pg 37Those who ordered this ordered it to be above all judgments, and it should be regarded with absolute care. For you will never be neglected by this judgment—not if you were so small as to sink into the depths of the earth, or so high as to fly to the heavens—but you will pay them the appropriate penalty, either while you remain here, or after you've been brought through to Hades or been carried over to a place even more savage* than this. The same account, you know, would also apply to those you see going from smallness to greatness by doing unholy deeds or some such actions, whom you suppose go from wretchedness to happiness, and in whose actions, as in mirrors, you believe you have observed the neglect of all the gods, not knowing how their contribution helps the universe. But, bravest of all men, how can you think it's not necessary to know this? If someone does not know it he would never see an impression, nor be able to offer an account, of life with respect to both happiness and an unhappy fortune. So if Kleinias here and our whole Council of Elders persuade you about this—that concerning the gods you don't know what you're saying—the god himself would assist you nobly. But if you should still need some further argument, listen to us address the third opponent, if you possess any reason whatsoever.'
For that the gods exist and supervise humans I at least would claim has been demonstrated by us, not completely poorly. But that the gods can be appeased by the unjust, if they receive gifts, is not something one should agree with, and one should refute it in every way possible.
AS. eCome, by the gods themselves, in what way would they come to be appeased by us, if they could be? And what, or what sort, would they be? Presumably, they will necessarily be rulers, since they are to manage the entire heavens perfectly.*
K. That is so.
AS. But which of the rulers do they resemble? Or rather which [rulers] resemble them, of those we can compare to them, lesser to greater? Would drivers of competing teams [of horses] be such [as to resemble them], or captains of ships? Perhaps they might be compared to rulers of armies. Or they might even be like doctors pg 38906caring for bodies in the war on disease, or farmers awaiting in fear seasons that tend to be difficult with respect to the generation of crops, or even overseers of flocks. For since we have agreed among ourselves that the heavens are full of many good things, and also of the opposite, and that there is more of what is not good, this sort of battle, we claim, is immortal and requires amazing vigilance, and the gods and spirits are our allies, while we are the property of the gods and spirits. Injustice and hubris without prudence destroy us, while justice and moderation with prudence save us, and these reside in the ensouled powers of the gods, though one can clearly see some small amount of these residing in us as well. Now there are some souls residing on earth who have acquired unjust gain and are clearly beastly. Throwing themselves down before the souls of the guardians (dogs or shepherds or absolutely supreme masters), they persuade them with flattering speeches and prayers of enchantment of what the claims of the vicious men assert: it is possible for them to have too much among humans, and to suffer no hardship. But presumably we claim that the error just named—having too much—is called 'disease' in fleshy bodies, 'plague' in the seasons and years, while in cities and political systems this same thing, the name having been changed, is 'injustice'.
K. Absolutely.
AS. dThe one who says that the gods are always forgiving unjust humans and those who act unjustly, if one distributes to them some of what's been gained unjustly, must necessarily present this account: it's just as if wolves were to distribute to dogs a small part of what they've seized, and the dogs, tamed by the gifts, were to allow the wolves to tear the flocks to pieces. Is this not the account of those who claim that the gods are appeasable?
AS. So to which of those aforementioned guardians could any human favorably compare the gods and not become ridicu-elous? To captains who 'turn from their course by the libation of wine and the burnt offering',5 and overturn ship and sailors?
pg 39K. Not at all.
AS. And surely not to charioteers lined up for a race, persuaded by a gift to give over the victory to the other teams.
K. You would present a terrible image in giving this account.
AS. And surely not to generals or doctors or farmers or herdsmen, nor to the dogs charmed by wolves.
K. Silence! How could they be?
AS. 907But, to us, aren't all the gods the greatest of all guardians and over the greatest things?
K. By far.
AS. Then are we going to claim that those who guard the finest affairs, and are themselves distinguished with respect to virtue in guarding, are worse than dogs and average humans, who would never give over what is just for the sake of gifts given in an unholy way by unjust men?
K. bIn no way. This is an intolerable account, and anyone holding this opinion is in danger of being judged—most justly—the most vicious and most impious of all the impious, who are involved in every impiety.
AS. The three propositions—that the gods exist, that they supervise us, and that they in no way can be appeased so as to act contrary to justice—shall we perhaps claim that they have been sufficiently demonstrated?
K. How could we not? We, at least, vote for these arguments.
Editor’s NoteAS. Still, they were perhaps presented rather vehemently, owing cto our love of victory over vicious humans; and we felt this love of victory, dear Kleinias, for the sake of this: lest the vicious ones should ever believe that if they were more pow-erful in arguments they could act however they wished, in accordance with each and every belief they have about the gods. A zeal, because of these things, has made us speak with youthful vigor. But if we have made even some small contribu-tion to persuading these men in some way to hate themselves, dand somehow to like the opposite character traits, the pre-lude to the laws on impiety would have been well spoken by us.
pg 40K. There is hope; and if not, at least the kind of account will not Editor’s Notediscredit the legislator.
AS. Now then, after the prelude an account that is like an expounder of the laws would be right for us, forewarning all the impious to abandon their ways for pious ones. For those who do not comply, let the law concerning impiety be as follows:6
'If anyone is impious in words or in deeds, let the one who eencounters this defend [the law] by informing the magistrates, and the first magistrates who learn of it are to bring [the accused] before the court created to judge these cases according to the law. If some magistrate hears of it and does not do this, let him be brought to trial for impiety by anyone wanting to avenge the laws. If someone should be convicted, let the court assess 908one separate penalty for each of those who are impious. Let imprisonment be imposed in every case.'
There are three prisons in the city: (1) a common one near the marketplace for most prisoners, for the safekeeping of a number of bodies; (2) one near the meeting place of the Nocturnal Council, named the Sound-mind Center; and (3) one in the middle of the countryside, in some empty place that is as savage as possible, having as its name some word for punishment.
bSince the causes of impiety are three (which we have gone through), and there are two [kinds] for each of these causes, then concerning divine things there will be six kinds of offenders worth distinguishing, and these do not require equal or similar penalties. For a just character could come by nature to one who does not believe in the gods at all: they come to hate vicious people and from a loathing for injustice do not venture cto perform such actions, and flee from unjust humans and like the just. But others, in addition to the opinion that all things are empty of gods, may be afflicted by a lack of self control concerning pleasures and pains, and also have strong memories and sharp minds. Not believing in the gods is an affliction common in both, but with respect to the ruin of other humans pg 41the one would do less evil, the other more. For the former would be full of candor in speaking about the gods and about sacrifices and oaths, and by ridiculing others would perhaps dmake some of them such as he is, if he doesn't receive a penalty. But the latter, while holding the same opinions as the former, is called 'naturally gifted', and is full of cunning and treachery. From these are produced many diviners and men knowing all kinds of magic; and from this sort sometimes also come tyrants and demagogues and generals, and those who plot by means of private rites, and the machinations of those called 'sophists'. eMany forms of these [atheists] would arise, but those for whom it is worth establishing laws are two: (1) the dissembler commits faults that are worthy neither of one nor two deaths; (2) the other requires admonishment together with imprisonment. Similarly, the belief that the gods are neglectful also produces two different kinds, and the belief that they can be appeased produces another two. These having been distinguished in this way, [let the law continue]:
'The ones who have come to be impious through lack-of-909reason, without vicious anger or character, let the judge place, according to law, in the Sound-mind Center for not less than five years; and during this time let no other citizens meet with them except members of the Nocturnal Council, who are to associate with them for admonishment and for the preservation of the soul. When the time of their imprisonment has come to an end, if any one of them seems to be of sound mind, let him reside among those of sound mind; but if not, and he is again convicted on such a charge, let him be punished with death.'
But there are those who become like beasts, in addition to not believing in the gods or believing them to be neglectful or bappeasable. Despising humans, they lead the souls of many of the living while claiming to lead the souls of the dead and promising to persuade the gods, by bewitching them with sacrifices and prayers and incantations, and so they attempt to destroy utterly individuals and whole households and cities, for the sake of money.
'If one of these seems to be convicted, let the court punish chim with imprisonment, according to the law, in the prison in the middle of the country. No free man is ever to visit such men, pg 42but they will get food from slaves, as arranged by the Guardians of the Laws. When he dies, he is to be cast beyond the borders unburied; and if a free man should help bury him, let this person be brought to trial for impiety by anyone who wishes. If he [i.e. the convict] should leave behind children fit for the city, let the Supervisors of Orphans care for them as well, as if they were dorphans in no way inferior to the others, from the day their father is convicted at trial.'
Editor’s NoteA law should be laid down for all of these people in common, which would make many of them offend less against the gods by deed and by word, and particularly become less unreasonable, by not allowing them to deal in the divine contrary to the law. Let the following law be laid down for all of them without qualification:
'Let no one possess shrines in private households. When it occurs to someone to make a sacrifice, let him go to the public eones and sacrifice, and hand over his offerings to the priests and priestesses who supervise their consecration. Let him join in prayer along with anyone else he wants to join in prayer with him.'
Let these things happen for the following reasons: To found shrines and gods is not easy; to do this correctly requires some deep thought. It is customary for all women especially, and for those who are sick in any way or in danger or distressed (however one might be distressed), or, conversely, when they gain some prosperity, to sanctify whatever is in front of them at the time 910and to swear to offer sacrifices and promise to found shrines to gods and spirits and children of gods. And because of fears from apparitions seen when awake and from dreams, and similarly recalling many such visions, they make remedies against each of them by filling every house and every village with altars and shrines, founding them in clear places or wherever someone happened to have such experiences. For all of these reasons one should act according to the law just presented; and, in addition to these, so that the impious won't act deceptively in these matters by founding shrines and altars in private households, believing they can in secret make the gods agreeable through sacrifices and prayers, thus increasing injustice infinitely, and bringing the reproach of the gods against both the impious themselves and pg 43those who (though they are better than them) tolerate them, such that the entire city catches their impiety (in a way justly). The god will not blame the legislator, however, for let this law be laid down:
c'There is to be no possession of shrines to the gods in private households; and for anyone shown to possess and worship at shrines other than the public ones, if the person possessing [a private shrine]—man or even woman—has committed none of the grave and impious acts of injustice, let the one who perceives this report it to the Guardians of the Laws, who are to order the private shrines be carried off to the public ones. Let those who disobey be punished until the shrines are carried off. But if someone is shown to have committed an impiety not of a childish sort, but an act of impiety characteristic of unholy men—either by founding a shrine in private or by sacrificing in public to any dgods whatsoever—let him be punished by death for making a sacrifice while being impure. After the Guardians of the Laws judge whether it is childish or not, and bring the accused before the court accordingly, let them impose the penalty for impiety in these cases.'
pg 44
The first few pages of Book X … serve as an introduction to the main arguments on the existence and nature of the gods. Their chief purpose is to establish that these matters really are of concern to the legislator. They do this by arguing that atheism or incorrect religious belief is a serious cause of vice.
If a citizen is ever shown to have done such a thing—to have perpetrated one of the great and unspeakable injustices against gods or parents or city—let the judge consider this man to be already incurable, reckoning that even though he received an education and upbringing from childhood, he did not abstain from the greatest evils. The penalty for this man is death, the least of evils, and he'll become a model to help others, once he has disappeared without fame beyond the borders of the countryside. (854e1–855a2; cf. the Athenian attitude toward dealing with temple robbery, described by Xenophon, Hellenica 1.7.22.)
Let us suppose that each of us living beings is a puppet of the gods, either put together for their play or for something serious. We do not know which, but we do know that these passions are in us, like sinews or cords, drawing us along and pulling each other in opposite directions and toward opposite actions, where virtue and vice lie divided. For the argument (logos) claims that each person should always follow one of the pulling [cords] and in no way abandon it, pulling it against the other sinews: this is the golden and sacred pull of calculation (tou logismou agôgên chrusên kai hieran), called the common law of the city (tês poleôs koinon nomon). The others are hard and iron, while this one is soft because it is golden; and the others resemble many different forms. We should always assist the most noble pull of the law (têi kallistêi agôgêi têi tou nomou), for although calculation is noble, it is gentle and not forceful, and its pull needs helpers so that the golden kind in us may be victorious over the other kinds. (644d7–645b1)
(1) Atheism: not believing that the gods exist. (I follow the scholarly tradition in calling this atheism, though it would also include agnostics like Protagoras—in fact, there would seem to be more agnostics than atheists among the intellectuals Plato is targeting.)
(2) Deism: believing that the gods exist, but that they 'do not take thought for humans'. (Plato probably has in mind many of the theistic presocratics; for example, the early Ionians like Xenophanes, whose brand of 'natural theology' does not leave much room for religion.)
(3) Traditional theism: believing that the gods exist, but that they can be swayed by sacrifices and prayers. (This refers to the vast majority of ancient Greeks; an excellent example from Plato's own corpus is Kephalus, at Republic 1.330d1–331d10.)
Athenian Stranger, and Lakedaimonian, and Knossian, what you say is true. For some of us in no way believe in the gods at all, while others believe they are as you say. So we expect, just as you expected concerning the laws, that before you threaten us harshly, you first try to persuade (peithein) and teach us that the gods exist, presenting adequate proof, and that they are too good to be charmed by some gifts into being turned away from justice.… So from legislators who claim to be not savage (agriôn) but gentle (hêmerôn) we expect persuasion (peithoi) first be used on us. (885c5–e3; see also 899c2–d4)
- The earth and the sun and the stars—and the whole universe—exist.
- They must have a cause.
- Only gods could have caused them to exist.
- Therefore, gods exist.
- The beautiful, orderly procession of celestial objects, and the division of the year into seasons and months, can be explained only by some kind of conscious, intelligent organizer(s) of the universe.
- Only god(s) could fulfill this description.
- Therefore, god(s) must exist.
- Everyone (i.e. every Greek and barbarian) believes that the gods exist.
- Therefore, the gods exist.
Strong desires (e.g. for sex and wealth) → immoral actions → need for impious ideas that support such actions or are consistent with such actions → further impious actions.
Impious ideas → rejection of a proper religious and ethical outlook → lower (or no) resistance to acting on strong desires (e.g. for sex and wealth) → impious actions.
(a) stories they heard about the gods when they were very young;
(b) prayers they heard and spectacles they saw connected to religious rituals (and note that these spectacles tend to be pleasurable, especially to young boys, and that pleasure of this kind aids in a child developing the right ideas and character—see e.g. Laws 2.653a5–c9);
(c) the fact that their parents engaged in prayer to and supplication before the gods, who were definitely held to exist;
(d) in general, the fact that Greeks and barbarians (i.e. all people), in good fortune and in bad, treat the sun and moon as if they were definitely gods.
He [Plato] has in mind the most mature physical systems, including atomism; but he draws no fine distinctions and makes no honorable exemptions, for he is convinced that all those who sowed the materialist wind must be held responsible for the whirlwind, i.e., the conventional theory of justice … (1995a: 86 n. 177)
Atheism → moral relativism → corrupt conception of justice → impious acts.
Why do you think vulgar and manual labor bring reproach? Or shall we say it is for any other reason than that when the best part is by nature so weak in someone, it cannot rule the beasts in him, but can only serve them, and can learn only the things that flatter them? … Therefore, in order that such a person be ruled by something similar to what rules the best person, we say that he ought to be the slave of that best person who has the divine rule within himself. It is not to harm the slave that we think he ought to be ruled, as Thrasymachus supposed about the ruled, but because it is better for all to be ruled by what is divine and prudent, especially when one has it as one's own within oneself, but if not, then imposed from outside, so that as far as possible all will be alike and friends, governed by the same thing … (590c1–d6)
The theology advanced in Book 10 is based on what Plato takes to be true claims about divinity. Moreover, Magnesia's theology gives Plato a way to articulate a standard of objectivity that does not require full metaphysical detail. The main targets of Plato's attack on atheism are those who deny the objectivity of value. And in an implicit rejection of Protagorean relativism, Magnesians are taught that god, not man, is the measure of all things (Laws 716c). This is not, however, to make Euthyphro's mistake, since although the Athenian does not go into details, he makes clear that ethical standards are not dependent on god. (2002; 208)
(1) Force alone. Threaten all people that they must believe that the gods exist, and as described by law (see 885b4, 890a6), or be punished by death, beating, imprisonment, dishonors, poverty, or exile—depending on the nature of the infraction. The Athenian says that a similar case could be made for what the city believes about 'all great matters' (890b8)—i.e. beauty, justice, virtue. In all such cases one way to proceed would be to tell citizens: believe what the law decrees and act accordingly, or else.
(2) Persuasion (or, more accurately, force and persuasion). This is not an alternative to (1) but (at this point) a possible addition: persuading people 'at the same time that he [i.e. the legislator] establishes the laws for them … adding arguments to make them as gentle as possible' (890c6–8). Of course, what they are talking about are the preludes to the laws (and specifically the prelude to the law on impiety). It is crucially important to keep in mind that this does not replace force. There will certainly be contexts in which the legislators say to citizens: believe this or else—or else be killed, imprisoned, exiled, etc.
(1) How difficult it is for crowds to follow such arguments. (I take chalepa … sunakolouthein logois (890e1–2) to mean 'difficult [for people in a crowd] to follow arguments'. Some editors and translators (e.g. England (1921: 2. 459) interpret the line such that the difficulty refers not to the audience's understanding but to the speakers' presentation of their ideas—'difficult to address crowds, with arguments'. But I think my reading is supported by chalepa … akousein ('difficult to listen to') at 891a3.)
(2) The great length of such arguments.
(2′) We put up with lengthy discussions about drunkenness and music (in Laws 1–2), so we should not mind doing so about the gods—a much more important topic. And he adds later that length is not a problem if such arguments are beneficial.
(1′) The importance of written law, and particularly of setting down in writing the laws and the preludes to them:
(a) It ensures that the laws will remain completely the same. (On the importance of keeping laws stable, and on changes to the laws, see especially Laws 6.769a7–e2, 772a6–d4; 7.797a7–798e7; and Bobonich (2002: 395–408).)
(b) It provides for all time an opportunity for questioning, inquiry, and examination (elenchus). People who are unable to follow arguments in support of the laws initially can return often to examine them.
(1) What soul is. For example, atheists mistakenly think that soul is a special kind of matter, or arises out of a combination of matter.
(2) What power soul has. For example, atheists mistakenly think that soul can allow animals to find food and humans to do arithmetic and write plays but it cannot create or move planets.
(3) Soul's generation. For example, atheists mistakenly think that soul comes to be from matter, and is a result of the natural and chance attributes and actions of matter.
(1) What is 'related to soul' would 'necessarily come into being before what belongs to body' (892a8–b1).
(2) Opinion, supervision, reason, art, and law—the highest parts or attributes or manifestations of soul—would be prior to bodies and their attributes ('hard things and soft things and heavy things and light things', 892b5–6).
(3) The relationship between art and nature would have to be reconceived. Plato believes that if soul has primacy over matter, then art (technê, the intellectual capacity or virtue) is not some recent development in human culture (as the atheist thinks); it too must be prior to matter. And this is no small thing: 'the great and first works and actions'—which I take to refer to the formation of the cosmos—'would be those of art' (892b6–7).
(4) The usage of the word 'nature' (phusis) would have to be revised. Atheists call the four elements and the heavenly bodies and living things 'natural' because these were all among the first things, and according to them can be contrasted with what exists by art—man-made things, which obviously arrived relatively recently from the point of view of the history of the universe. This does not mean that Plato will reject the designation 'nature' for matter, heavenly bodies, the bodies of living organisms, etc. He seems to agree with the atheist that 'nature' should refer to what are among the first things, including the material constituents of physical reality and the rest. He differs from the atheist in where he fits art and reason and the other attributes of soul generally into this scheme: if 'soul is among the first things to have come into being, then it may well be most correct to say that it especially is by nature' (892c3–5). (See Carone (1994; 276–7).)
Fording a river
1. The best qualified—the most experienced at river crossing and the youngest—should first make the attempt alone, and test the waters.
2. The reason for this precaution: the safety of the older men, but also to spare them any embarrassment.
3. The implication is that the river is fordable for the best qualified. The question is whether it is fordable for the other two—in which case the best qualified will then help them across—or whether it is not fordable for them (no matter what help they receive). It seems that for the older men, making it across on their own is not a possibility.
Arguing for theism
1′. The best qualified—the wisest, the one most adept at philosophy—should first attempt to go through the case for theism alone. (As England points out (1921: 2. 463), the analogy does not imply that the Athenian must be the youngest of the three interlocutors, though he may be.) Since dialogue is the key to philosophical activity for Plato, this means the Athenian will engage in a dialogue with himself.
2′. The reason for this precaution: primarily the greatest possible success in defending theism, but also to spare the other men any embarrassment.
3′. The implication is that the Athenian can argue for theism. The question is whether the argument is 'fordable' for the other two—that is, whether they can follow the argument for theism, with the Athenian's help, or whether they simply cannot grasp the argument. But Plato tells us that the argument they are about to encounter is 'probably not fordable given your strength' (892e6–7), and it's unclear whether that means the other two cannot grasp the argument without the Athenian's help, or that they cannot grasp it at all. (Cf. Republic 6.506d1–e3, where, prior to discussing the Form of the Good, Socrates tells Glaucon and Adeimantus that he must leave them behind.)
(1) Everything is stationary, nothing is in motion. (The Eleatic outlook.)
(2) Everything is in motion, nothing is stationary. (The Heraclitean outlook.)
(3) Some things are in motion, and some things are stationary.
in the case of this rotation, the largest circle and the smallest go around at the same time, and such motion distributes itself to the small and the large proportionally (ana logon), being less or more according to proportion (kata logon). This is why it [i.e. circular motion] has become a source of all sorts of wonder: at the same time it imparts to large and small circles slowness and swiftness in harmony, an occurrence that one would expect to be impossible. (893c8–d5)
(1) Gliding: a motion by which the moving object continually changes to another place, while 'possessing a base of one point' (basin henos kektêmena tinos kentrou, 893d8–e1). (I take it Plato is using 'point' loosely to refer to whatever point of contact an object has with the surface over which it is gliding, whether a spinning top moving smoothly over a marble surface, or a stone block gliding on ice.)
(2) Rolling: a motion by which the moving object continually changes to another place and continually changes its point of contact.
Each time they [i.e. moving objects] encounter (prostugchanta) each other, they are split apart (diaschizetai) by the ones standing still (tois hestôsi), whereas with the others that come and are borne from the opposite direction, they combine (sugkrinetai) and become one thing intermediate between the two (mesa kai metaxu) [in nature].
(1) Separation (or splitting apart). In the next section Plato refers to this splitting as separation (diakrinomena, 893e6). In the case of separation, an object moving in many locations collides with an object that is standing still (presumably either completely motionless or perhaps moving in a circular motion), and one or both of the objects split apart (i.e. break into pieces). (It is unlikely that he is saying that the two objects split apart—i.e. don't combine but rather move away from each other—as separation seems to involve some one thing becoming many, not two or more things ricocheting off of each other and not combining. But much is unclear here.)
(2) Combination. In the case of combination, a moving object collides with another object moving from the opposite direction, and the two become one, its nature somewhere between the natures of the two original objects.
One of the most striking aspects of Plato's exposition of this idea is his confidence that combination and separation are to be discerned everywhere, from wool-working to the intermingling and segregation of social classes to the connections and distinctions between concepts. He never qualifies his claims, and it is quite clear that he does not mean them to be taken metaphorically: these phenomena are universal, and to describe both carding and the sorting out of concepts as 'separation' is to use the word literally and correctly.
Now when anything comes into being, what is it that happens? It is clear that when the principle (archê), receiving growth (labousa auxên), proceeds to the second change, and from this to the next and proceeds as far as the third, it provides perception to perceivers. (894a1–5)
The principle 'receives growth' (which is the first change) → the second change → the third change → perceptible object(s).
Is the archê something or nothing? This description of genesis is not meant to be a historical account, but a logical deduction from Plato's doctrine of space. It is a kind of geometrical allegory. Geometry postulates a thing 'without parts or magnitude' (Arist. Met. A 992a21 […]. The first transformation by which this grows […] is its elongation into a (still imaginary) line; the second […] is the extension flatwise of the imaginary line into an imaginary surface. With the third transformation […] we pass into the region of sensible objects, for now thickness is added to length and breadth; the transformed archê 'furnishes perceivers with perception' … (See also Skemp (1942; 105).)
On this interpretation, Plato is saying something like the following:
The principle (a point) 'receives growth' (the first change, the point becomes a line) → the second change (the line becomes a plane) → the third change (the plane becomes a solid) → perceptible object.
- Isosceles triangle (sides 1: 1: √2) → square → cube → earth
- Scalene triangle (sides 1: √3: 2) → equilateral triangle → octahedron → air
- Scalene triangle (sides 1: √3: 2) → equilateral triangle → tetrahedron → fire
- Scalene triangle (sides 1: √3: 2) → equilateral triangle → icosahedron → water
(1) The first change: the principle (a triangle) 'receives growth'; i.e. it is formed from three lines and/or utilized by a soul (the craftsman).
(2) The second change: triangles are put together to form a particular equilateral polygon (a triangle or square), which will become the face of one of the above mentioned solids.
(3) The third change: polygons are put together to make perfect solids.
(4) An accumulation of many perfect solids yields, depending on the type of solid, perceptible earth or air or fire or water.
Take the cube (the simplest example):
(1′) The first change: the principle (a right-angled isosceles triangle with sides 1: 1: √2) 'receives growth'; i.e. is put together by the craftsman.
(2′) The second change: two such triangles (of the same size) are put together to form a square. (It is likely that Plato has in mind two triangles here, as that would make the account of the formation of earth better parallel the formation of the other elements; but note that at Timaeus 55b3–7 the square is constructed out of four such triangles.)
(3′) The third change: six such squares are put together to form a cube.
(4′) Perceptible objects: when enough of these cubes have accumulated, there is earth that can be perceived by the senses.
(9) That motion capable of moving others but incapable of moving itself; it moves by another and is changed by another.
(10) That motion capable of moving itself and others. It is responsible for the change and motion of all beings; it is in harmony with all action (or doing) and all experience (or being done to). It employs the previous eight motions—combination and separation, growth and decay, etc.—in causing other things to move. Finally, as we have seen, it is connected to soul (but it is not yet clear in what way).
1. Self-moving motion
2. Non-self-moving motion
3. Circular motion
4. Motion in many locations
(a) Gliding
(b) Rolling
5. Combination
6. Separation
7. Growth
8. Decay
9. Generation
10. Destruction
If we hold that one thing changes another, and this other yet another, forever, will one of these changes ever be first? And how will that which is moved by another ever be first among the things that are altered? For that's impossible. But when something having moved itself alters another, and this other another, and in this way thousands upon thousands of things being moved come into being, what will be a principle of all of their motions except the change from what has moved itself? (894e4–895a3)
1. There must be a first mover.
2. If there is an infinite regress of motions, then there is no first mover.
3. Therefore, there cannot be an infinite regress or series of motions.
4. The first mover must be either a self-mover or a non-self-mover.
5. The first mover cannot be a non-self-mover.
6. Therefore, the first mover must be a self-mover.
If somehow everything were to come together and stand still, just as most of those men venture to say, which motion of the ones we spoke of would necessarily be the first to come to be among them [i.e. all things]? Surely the one that moves itself. For it ['the one that moves itself' or 'all things'] would never be changed (metapesêi) by another that is prior, since there is among them [i.e. all things] no prior change. (895a6–b2)
It is not reasonable to make generation come from [bodies] that are separated and moving. This is why Empedocles sets aside [the possibility of] generation in the time of Love, for he could not have established the heavens by building it out of separated [elements] and making them combine through Love; for the cosmos is composed of elements in separation, therefore it must come from what is one and combined. (De Caelo 3.2.301a14–19)
(1) Possessing the capacity for self-moving motion is what living is.
(2) Possessing (or being) a soul is what living is.
(3) Therefore, possessing (or being) a soul and possessing the capacity for self-moving motion are identical.
(4) Therefore, soul is the capacity for self-moving motion.
(1) the name (onoma) of the being;
(2) the definition (logos) of the being;
(3) the being (ousia).
(1) name: 'even';
(2) definition: 'a number divisible into two equal parts' (895e3; cf. Euclid, Elements 7 (def. 6));
(3) being: the quality or capacity that some numbers have of being divisible into two equal parts.
(1) name: 'soul'
(2) definition: 'motion capable of moving itself';
(3) being: soul; Soul Itself; the capacity for self motion (?).
(1) name (onoma);
(2) definition (logos);
(3) image (eidôlon);
(4) knowledge (epistêmê) (or other cognitive states by which some being is grasped);
(5) the being itself.
(1) name: 'circle';
(2) definition: 'the figure whose extremities are everywhere equally distant from its center' (cf. Parmenides 137e1–3 and Timaeus 33b2–7, and Euclid, Elements 1 (def. 15));
(3) image: drawing of a circle (which can be rubbed out) or round object turned on a lathe (which can be destroyed);
(4) knowledge (epistêmê) and reason (nous) and true opinion (alêthês doxa) concerning circles;
(5) the circle itself (autos ho kuklos).
1. Soul is older than body.
2. Therefore, 'the things of the soul [are] older than the things of the body' (896c6–7).
1. Soul is older than or prior to body.
2. Therefore, every part or aspect or manifestation of soul is older than or prior to every part or aspect or manifestation of body.
1. For anything that is in motion, soul resides in it and manages it.
2. The heavens are in motion.
3. Therefore, soul manages the heavens.
1. Soul is the cause of all motion.
2. Soul is the cause of all orderly motion.
3. To the extent that there is orderly motion in the heavens, soul can be said to manage the heavens.
4. Therefore, soul manages the heavens.
In the course of innumerable discussions to which this passage has given rise this aitia kakias [cause of evil] has been called a 'world-soul,' and has even been raised to the dignity of a full-blown Devil. Such titles are seriously misleading, and are at variance with the context and drift of the passage.
Nous, or Reason, is the prime factor in the ordering of the world—so Plato declares both in the Timaeus and in the Laws (966e)—and this is in the highest sense the divine. On the other hand, Nous can only function as a cause operating in the world when in alliance with a soul. Whether Plato's God, then, is thought of as impersonal Reason, or as a soul in which reason operates with a supremacy impossible to any created soul, is a question that we cannot answer with certainty. (1960; 483–4)
AS: Do you want us to answer these questions as follows?
K: How?
AS: We should say: … (897c1–3)
(1) in relation to the same things/according to what is the same (kata tauta);
(2) in the same way (hôsautôs);
(3) in the same place (en tôi autôi);
(4) around the same things (peri ta auta);
(5) toward the same things (pros ta auta);
(6) according to one formula (logon) and one order (taxin).
(1) in the same way (hôsautôs) (corresponds to #2 on the other list);
(2) in relation to the same things/according to the same (kata ta auta) (corresponds to #1 on the other list);
(3) in the same place (en tautôi) (corresponds to #3 on the other list);
(4) around the same things (peri tauta) (corresponds to #4 on the other list);
(5) toward the same things (pros tauta) (corresponds to #5 on the other list);
(6) in one place (en heni) (not part of the other list, as this is a defining feature of that motion);
(7) in an arrangement (en kosmôi) or in an order (en taxei) or in some formula (en tini logôi) (corresponds to #6 on the other list).
When soul reaches the best decision in accordance with the best reason (noun), the result, which is truly according to reason, is perfectly unalterable. Not even adamant could ever be mightier or more unalterable. Truly, three Fates preserve whatever has been decided through the best counsel by each of the gods, and guarantee that it is brought to pass. Humans should admit as evidence of the reason [or rationality, noun] of the stars and this entire movement of theirs, the fact that they always do the same things, because they are doing what was decided an astonishingly long time ago and do not change their decision back and forth, sometimes doing one thing and at others doing something else, wandering (planasthai) and changing their orbits. This opinion of ours is the exact opposite of what most people believe—that because [the stars] do the same things and in the same way they do not possess soul. The crowd has followed the fools in supposing that the human race is intelligent (emphron) and alive because it undergoes change, whereas the divine is unintelligent because it remains in the same orbits. But in fact anyone could have adopted views that are finer and better and dearer, and could have understood that whatever always acts in relation to the same things (kata tauta), in the same way (hôsautôs) and because of the same things (dia tauta), is because of this to be regarded as intelligent. Such a person could also understand that this is the nature of the stars, the finest of all things to behold, and further that moving through their march and dance, the finest and most magnificent dance there is, they bring to pass what all living things need. (982b8–e6, trans. from Cooper (1997), rev.)
Best of men, this belief (dogma) about the moon and the sun and the other stars—that they sometimes wander (planatai)—is not correct, but the complete opposite is the case. For each of them traverses the same path, in a circle—not many [paths], but always one—though each appears to move in many. (822a4–8)
1. Soul resides within (the chariot of) the sun, so that the sun is a living thing.
2. Soul is outside of the sun, and uses some kind of matter ('a body of fire or some kind of air', 898e10–899a1) to push the sun 'by force' (biai, 899a2).
3. Soul, 'being itself void of body' (psilê sômatos), guides the sun with 'some other extremely amazing powers' (dunameis allas tinas huperballousas thaumati, 899a2–4).
But, as they [the gods] received what was naturally theirs in the allotment of justice, they began to settle their lands. Once they had settled them, they began to raise us as their own chattel and livestock, as do shepherds their sheep. But they did not compel us by exerting bodily force on our bodies, as do shepherds who drive their flocks to pasture by blows, but rather, by what makes a creature turn course most easily; as they pursued their own plans, they directed us from the stern, as if they were applying to the soul the rudder of persuasion (peithoi). And in this manner they directed everything mortal as do helmsmen their ships. (109b5–c4; trans. in Cooper (1997))
Applying this entire train of reasoning to the god that was yet to be, the eternal god made it smooth and even all over, equal from the center, a whole and complete body itself, but also made up of complete bodies. In its center he set a soul, which he extended throughout the whole body and with which he then covered the body outside. And he set it to turn in a circle, a single solitary heaven … (34a8–b7)
i. If the gods supervised human affairs, evil people would never be happy.
ii. Evil people sometimes are happy.
iii. Therefore, the gods do not supervise human affairs.
Or perhaps you see humans nearing the end of old age, leaving behind grandchildren in high honors, and now you are disturbed observing in all these cases … that there are some who have engaged in many terrible acts of impiety, and through these very acts (di' auta tauta) have gone from humble beginnings to tyrannies and pre-eminence. (899e4–900a6)
i. If the gods supervised human affairs, evil could never lead to happiness.
ii. Evil does sometimes lead to happiness.
iii. Therefore, the gods do not supervise human affairs.
Concerning the most sovereign part of our soul, we should think in this way: that god has given this [part of the soul] to each of us as a spirit (daimona); indeed, we claim that this resides in the top of our bodies, and raises us up from the earth toward what has a kinship (suggeneian) with us in heaven, as if we were not an earthly plant (phuton) but a heavenly one. (90a2–7)
But perhaps it would not be difficult to prove this at least, that the gods supervise small matters no less than the especially big matters. For presumably he heard and was present at what was just said: that, being good with respect to every virtue, the supervision of all things is perfectly appropriate to them. (900c7–d3)
(a) mss: 'the gods supervise small matters no less than (ούχ ἧττον ἢ) the especially big matters'.
(b) Eusebius and Theodoterus: 'the gods supervise small matters not less, but more, than (ούχ ἧττον, μᾶλλον δέ, ἢ) the especially big matters'.
- Hunger and the lazy man are always together,
- But both gods and men resent (nemesôsi) the lazy one,
- Who lives like stingless drones (kêphênessi kothourois eikelos) …
- (u. 302–4).
1. Ignorance: The agent mistakenly thinks that it makes no difference to the whole (i.e. whatever is being supervised considered as a whole) if he neglects the small, as long as the great things are properly supervised.
2. Vice: The agent recognizes that it makes a difference if he neglects the small, but he does so anyway, through indolence (rhaithumiai) and luxury (truphêi) (901c1).
1. Only indolence could lead the gods to neglect the small (having ruled out ignorance).
2. Indolence appears in a soul characterized by laziness and (the desire for) luxury.
3. Laziness is a product of cowardice, and the desire for luxury is a product of being immoderate.
4. The gods, who are good and virtuous, cannot be cowardly or immoderate.
5. Therefore, the gods cannot be lazy or desire luxury.
6. Therefore, the gods cannot be indolent.
7. Therefore, the gods cannot neglect the small.
8. Therefore, the gods supervise the small.
So what is left, if they do neglect the very small things in the universe: either they do this knowing that it is absolutely necessary † to supervise none† of these things, or—what is left, except the opposite of knowledge? (902a1–4)
- gignôskontes hôs to parapan oudenos tôn toioutôn epimeleisthai dei
- knowing that it is absolutely necessary to supervise none of these things
So which is it, very best of men: Should we put you (se) down as saying that the gods are ignorant and through ignorance neglect what ought to be supervised, or that they know what they ought to do, as the basest of humans are said to do: they know it is better to act otherwise than how they are acting, but don't do so, because they succumb to pleasures or pains? (902a6–b2)
- γιγνώσκοντες ὡς τὸ παράπανοὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ
- knowing that it is absolutely necessary to supervise none of these things
- γιγνώσκοντες ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἀμελεῖσθαι δεῖ
- knowing that it is absolutely necessary to neglect none of these things
- γιγνώσκοντες ὡς τὸ παράπαν τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ
- knowing that it is absolutely necessary to supervise these things
- γιγνώσκοντες ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι οὐδὲν δεῖ
- knowing that it is absolutely not necessary to supervise none of these things
either they [i.e. the gods] do this knowing that it is absolutely necessary to supervise none of these things [but that is impossible, as it is necessary to supervise them, and so there can be no such knowledge], or—what is left, except the opposite of knowledge [i.e. they are ignorant about what they should supervise, and that, too, is impossible]?
the Demiurge supposes the whole which he constructs of parts that are both good and bad is better than a whole of only good parts.… In the Laws evil does not exist over and against and in spite of the Demiurge [as Plato says it does in the Timaeus], but is adapted just as it is directly into his design. (2006; 200–1)
Since soul is always put together with bodies—sometimes with one, sometimes with another—and undergoes all kinds of changes through itself or through another soul, no other function is left for the game-player except to transfer the character that is becoming better to a better place, and the one becoming worse to a worse place, according to what is appropriate to each of them, such that each is allotted its proper fate. (903d3–e1)
(a) Changes through itself. Shifts in character brought about by the individual soul itself—what one does oneself in one's lifetime to become virtuous or vicious (or more or less virtuous or vicious).
(b) Changes through another soul. Aspects of character which result from the influence of parents, educators, statesmen, etc.
The way in which the supervision of the universe by the gods would be easy—this is what I seem to be explaining. For if someone, failing always to look to the whole, were to mold all things by changing their shapes—for example, having ensouled [or 'cold'] (empsuchon [or empsuchron]) water come from fire, and not many things from one or one from many—then once they [i.e. all things] have taken part in a first or second or third generation, there would be an unlimited number of transformations in the arrangement of the cosmos. But in fact it is marvelously easy for the one who supervises the universe. (903e3–904a4)
1. The gods do not look to the whole while molding the universe, such that the universe is chaotic, and, for example, ensouled water can come from fire.
2. The gods look to the whole while molding the universe, such that the universe is orderly, and many come from one and one from many.
This cosmos, which is the same for all, was not created by any one of the gods or by mankind, but it was ever and is and shall be ever-living fire, kindled in measure and quenched in measure. (DK 22B30)
To souls, it is death to become water; to water, it is death to become earth. From earth comes water, and from water, soul. (DK 22B36)
For then it appeared that all four kinds of bodies [earth, air, fire, and water] could turn into one another by successive stages. But the appearance is wrong. While there are indeed four kinds of bodies that come to be from the triangles we have selected, three of them [i.e. air, fire, and water] come from triangles that have unequal sides, whereas the fourth alone [i.e. earth] is fashioned out of isosceles triangles. Thus not all of them have the capacity of breaking up and turning into one another, with a large number of small bodies turning into a small number of large ones and vice versa. There are three that can do this. For all three are made up of a single type of triangle, so that when once the larger bodies are broken up, the same triangles can go to make up a larger number of small bodies, assuming shapes appropriate to them. And likewise, when numerous small bodies are fragmented into their triangles, these triangles may well combine to make up some single massive body belonging to another kind. (54b6–d2, trans. in Cooper (1997))
(1) All actions involve soul (in contrast to the wrong view just described).
(2) There is much virtue in action, and also much vice.
(3) Soul with body, having come to be, is indestructible but not eternal. I follow England (1921: 2. 494) in taking this to mean that each of these—soul and body—is indestructible, like a god, and Plato tells us why: 'for there would never have been generation of living beings if either of these two had been destroyed' (904a10–b1). But a soul-body composite is not indestructible (and thus not eternal); nor is matter eternal, if it was created.
(4) Whatever in soul is good is naturally beneficial, while the evil is harmful. The connection between the good and the beneficial is built into the fabric of the universe.
'This is the judgment of the gods who hold Olympus', O child or young man, who believes he is neglected by the gods: the one who becomes more vicious is conveyed to the vicious souls, while the one who becomes better is conveyed to the better souls, in life and in every death, to experience and to do what is appropriate for like to do to like. (904e3–905a1)
For you will never be neglected by this judgment—not if you were so small as to sink into the depths of the earth, or so high as to fly to the heavens—but you will pay them the appropriate penalty, either while you remain here, or after you've been brought through to Hades or been carried over to a place even more savage than this. (905a4–b1)
But bravest of all men, how can you think it's not necessary to know this [i.e. that the impious will be punished in the afterlife]? If someone does not know it he would never see an impression, nor be able to offer an account, of life with respect to both happiness and an unhappy fortune. (905c1–4)
So if Kleinias here and our whole Council of Elders persuade you about this—that concerning the gods you don't know what you're saying—the god himself would assist you nobly. But if you should still need some further argument, listen to us address the third opponent, if you possess any reason whatsoever. (905c4–d2)
- The gods themselves can be moved.
- . . . . . . . . . . . .
- And with sacrifices and soothing prayers
- And libations and burnt offerings, humans turn [the gods] around With begging, whenever someone has transgressed and done wrong.
- (Iliad 9.497, 499–501; quoted in Republic 2.364d6–e2)
For since we have agreed among ourselves that the heavens are full of many good things, and also of the opposite, and that there is more of what is not good, this sort of battle, we claim, is immortal and requires amazing vigilance, and the gods and spirits are our allies, while we are the property of the gods and spirits. (906a2–b1)
1. Dogs who allow wolves to ravage the flock, in exchange for a share of the kill (906d3–5 is reminiscent of Homer, Iliad 16.352–5).
2. Captains who ' "turn from their course by the libation of wine and the burnt offering", and overturn ship and sailors' (906e1–2, in part quoting Homer, Iliad 9.500).
3. Charioteers who throw a race for money (906e4–6; Lewis (1870: 72) suggests that we should here think of any case in which the gods help someone win a horse race—as Athena helps Diomedes and wrecks the chariot of Eumelos at Iliad 23.382–400).
1. A general prison, for nearly all crimes calling for imprisonment. (The only exceptions will be criminals sent to the other two special prisons.) It is centrally located, in the marketplace (agora).
2. The Sound-mind Center (sôphronistêrion). The name of this prison is almost certainly a playful dig at the school of Socrates in Aristophanes' Clouds, often translated 'the Thinkery' (phrontistêrion, see l. 94). The Sound-Mind center is located near the meeting place of the Nocturnal Council, so that its members can properly admonish the prisoners sent to this special prison.
3. The prison for the worst offenders is 'in the middle of the countryside, in some empty place that is as savage as possible, having as its name some word for punishment [or vengeance, timôrias]' (908a5–8).
The ones who have come to be impious through lack-of-reason, without vicious anger or character, let the judge place, according to law, in the Sound-mind Center for not less than five years; and during this time let no other citizens meet with them except members of the Nocturnal Council, who are to associate with them for admonishment and for the preservation of the soul. When the time of their imprisonment has come to an end, if any one of them seems to be of sound mind, let him reside among those of sound mind; but if not, and he is again convicted on such a charge, let him be punished with death. (908e6–909a8)
'If' and 'if not' read as if they refer to the same point in time, i.e., when the possibility of release arises. But they can hardly be; for obviously, 'such a charge' can occur only in society, after release. Hence 'if' implies: 'but if he does not seem to be of sound mind, he is not released'; in effect his sentence, subject to the minimum period stipulated initially, was an 'indefinite' one, terminable not by a decision of a court but at the discretion of officials. 'If not' will mean, 'if the appearance of soundness of mind proves (after release) to have been deceptive'. The heretic, though released, is on probation. (1991; 310)
Despising humans, they lead the souls of many of the living while claiming to lead the souls of the dead and promising to persuade the gods, by bewitching them with sacrifices and prayers and incantations (epôidais), and so they attempt to destroy utterly individuals and whole households and cities, for the sake of money. (909b1–6)
Another [kind of poisoning], through certain kinds of magic (magganeiais) and incantations (epôidais) and so-called binding spells, persuades those who dare to do harm that they can do this, and [persuades] others that they are harmed most of all by those who can bewitch [them]. Now with respect to all such things, it is never easy to know their nature, nor, if one could know, is it easy to persuade others. It is not worthwhile to attempt to persuade the souls of humans who are suspicious of one another with respect to such things—if they should ever see molded waxen images at doorways or where three roads meet or at tombs of their ancestors—to be directed to make light of all such things, as they do not have a clear opinion about them. (933a2–b5) (On difficulties with this text see Saunders (1991; 320–3) and England (1921; 2. 554–5).)
[1] If one of these is convicted, let the court punish him with imprisonment, according to the law, in the prison in the middle of the country. No free man is ever to visit such men, but they will get food from slaves, as arranged by the Guardians of the Laws. [2] When he dies, he is to be cast out beyond the borders unburied; and if a free man should help bury him, let this person be brought to trial for impiety by anyone who wishes. [3] If he [i.e. the convict] should leave behind children fit for the city, let the Supervisors of Orphans care for them as well, as if they were orphans in no way inferior to the others, from the day their father is convicted at trial. (909b6–d2)
A law should be laid down for all of these people in common, which would make many of them offend less against the gods by deed and by word, and particularly become less unreasonable (anoêtous), by not allowing them to deal in the divine (theopolein) contrary to the law. Let the following law be laid down for all of them without qualification (haplôs). (909d3–7)
(1) Establishing shrines and gods correctly is not easy, but requires 'deep thought' (megalês … dianoias, 909e4–5); however, the people who customarily take it upon themselves to establish private shrines do not employ deep thought, but act from emotion and irrationally.
(2) The law against private shrines prevents (certain) impious people from committing impious acts in secret.
It is customary for all women especially, and for those who are sick in any way or in danger or distressed (however one might be distressed), or, conversely, when they gain some prosperity, to sanctify whatever is in front of them at the time and to swear to offer sacrifices and promise to found shrines to gods and spirits and children of gods. And because of fears from apparitions seen when awake and from dreams, and similarly recalling many such visions, they make remedies against each of them by filling every house and every village with altars and shrines, founding them in clear places or wherever someone happened to have such experiences. (909e5–910a6)
(1) The Guardians of the Laws 'are to order the private shrines be carried off to the public ones'; those who disobey are to 'be punished until the shrines are carried off' (910c5–7).
(2) The death penalty.
